Abstract
This article addresses the epistemological issue of the theorist's subjectivity. I suggest that theories of human nature reflect the theorist's personality as he or she externalizes it or projects it onto humanity at large. This article extends this familiar proposition by proposing that there are two forms of externalization: static externalization, in which the theorist projects outward his or her own structures, and dynamic externalization, in which the theorist projects outward his or her needs. In the first, the theory of human nature is a selfportrait of the theorist as he or she is; in the second, the theory is a self-portrait emphasizing what the theorist needs.
After a review of the philosophical positions on the issue of the fundamental subjectivity of knowledge, I consider Freud and Adler as instances of the contrasting styles of externalization. Their personal histories, peer relation-ships, and their clinical arrangements are reviewed for evidence that their theories are externalizations of themselves.
I conclude, on the basis of these arguments, that the case is quite strong that theory inevitably contains large elements of self-portrait. This is taken as a cause not for despair, but for caution. The value of theories of human nature is not denied, but they are seen as members of an array of descriptions, in each of which there is lodged a valid description of some portions of humanity.
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