The Research Domain Criteria project, although innovative, remains thoroughly grounded in a naturalist conception of psychopathology. Exploring the meaning of psychopathology with reference to social categories such as race and gender makes it apparent that, by taking this naturalist approach, Research Domain Criteria runs the risk of treating contingent social norms as immutable facts of nature. The political impact of this approach is inherently conservative as it perpetuates the status quo, even if the status quo entails discrimination. These political effects are not an inevitable outcome of the application of neuroscience to the study of psychopathology. Exploring the implications of neuroplasticity demonstrates that maintaining rigid dichotomies between the biological and the social is untenable. Accordingly, taking a neuroscience approach to psychopathology actually reveals the significance of social science, phenomenological, and narrative-based approaches to research and ultimately points toward the ethical significance of service user participation in the science of nosology.
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