The Dynamics of Japanese Military Justice and the Maintenance of Order in the Philippines,1942-5

Abstract

Maintaining order in occupied territories was considered vital to the wider success of the Japanese wartime effort during the Asia-Pacific War (1937–45). Efforts to establish peace in the Philippines after occupation of the islands in January 1942 were impeded by the emergence of widespread guerrilla resistance. The Japanese military employed a variety of pacification and subjugation measures to combat opposition and restore order. Perhaps the most integral of these measures was the imposition of a military justice system to reinforce military rule and facilitate military control over occupied territories. This article examines the system and its evolution in the Philippines between 1942 and 1945, offering the first in-depth overview of Japanese military justice in the islands during the Asia-Pacific War. It demonstrates the dynamic character of military justice, emphasizing a shift from intimidation to conciliation over the course of the occupation, before an eventual radicalization of judicial practices towards the end of the war. The article also reflects on the role of military justice in the widespread violence perpetrated by Japanese forces during the final months of occupation, identifying structural weaknesses and institutional norms as factors shaping a notable increase in the use of force.

Maintaining order in the vast territories that came under Japanese rule during the Asia-Pacific War (1937–45) was of immense importance to the Japanese military's wartime strategies and long-term plans for the region. This had been one of three major tenets of occupation policy, devised late November 1941 in anticipation of the invasion of Southeast Asia the following month. The other two tenets – acquisition of vital resources and self-sufficiency for Japanese forces – relied to no small degree on success in this endeavour. ¹ Establishing order proved difficult in the Philippines where Japanese forces encountered a more ambivalent and unreceptive populace than elsewhere in Southeast Asia. ² The islands had been a self-governing commonwealth since 1935, having secured a guarantee of independence under the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934, and so promises of liberation from the Japanese leadership were comparatively less enticing. News of military exploits in China had also undermined the veracity of pan-Asian claims of ‘co-prosperity’ and called into question the collaborative style of military administration the leadership proposed for the islands. ³ Armed guerrilla opposition reminiscent of that which had plagued the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) in China since 1937 emerged soon after the surrender of US-Philippine forces in May 1942. Ongoing resistance in the islands hindered efforts to consolidate military rule and impeded the realization of political and economic objectives. ⁴ It also became a security threat that diverted valuable human and material resources away from the main war effort. Continued hostility and civilian support for guerrilla activities, so vital for their survival, was also central to the radicalization of military strategy and large-scale violence directed at the civilian population in the islands towards the end of the war. ⁵ Hayashi Hirofumi has observed in wartime documents, for instance, a deep-rooted perception that the Filipino population as a whole had become hostile and would rise up en masse when US forces arrived in the area. This appears to have been a major contributing factor in the wholesale violence of the Manila Massacre in 1945. ⁶

Prior to the adoption of more indiscriminate use of force employed during the final months of occupation, the 14th Army had utilized a variety of methods in an attempt to secure the compliance of the local populace and restore order in the islands. Such measures included the use of propaganda, featuring pan-Asian inspired rhetoric, goodwill missions, Japanese-Philippine friendship events and other conciliatory pacification efforts, such as the eventual granting of independence in October 1943 and ongoing ‘surrender and return’ (kijun) campaigns aimed at persuading guerrillas to give up their cause. ⁷ To directly combat resistance, more coercive strategies were also adopted. This involved hostage-taking, establishing neighbourhood associations (hokō), which imposed collective punishments and, more importantly, launching subjugation (tōbatsu) operations meant to locate and thoroughly suppress or ‘eliminate’ (senmetsu) anti-Japanese elements, bandits and guerrillas. ⁸

One of the principal coercive mechanisms through which occupying forces sought to maintain order was the military justice system. The IJA had employed martial law (gunritsu) to impose restrictions on civilian liberties and to facilitate the punishment of resistance or non-compliance as deemed necessary in wartime occupied areas during all formally declared wars, as well as during the so-called ‘China Incident’, since its inception in 1871. ⁹ These prohibitions were enforced by kenpei (lit. law soldier) units who wielded considerable latitude and developed a reputation for brutality in doing so. Punishments were also meted out in military commissions (gunritsu kaigi) that followed streamlined wartime judicial procedures to expedite the handling of unrest in occupied territories. The military justice system became a key nexus of interaction between local populations and military authorities and therefore had a major influence on the realities of life for civilians during wartime occupation.

With the exception of the pioneering work of Kita Hiroaki, however, the history of Japanese military justice in occupied areas has received limited scholarly attention until relatively recently. In the last few years, Ono Hiroshi has engaged in efforts to reintegrate martial law into Japan's legal history, while several scholars, such as Ogino Fujio and Okada Taihei, have presented detailed analyses of the role of kenpei in the Philippines, with a particular emphasis on war crimes committed by members of these units. ¹⁰ This article adds to this scholarship by offering the first in-depth examination of the military justice system as a whole and analysing its role in the maintenance of order in the Philippines between 1942 and 1945. Beginning with an overview of the initial establishment and intended function of the military justice system in 1942, it traces its subsequent evolution and highlights changes in the army's criminal policy as occupation progressed. In doing so, it shows that, whilst the Japanese military justice system was initially imposed as a coercive mechanism of population control, its trajectory over the course of occupation largely reflects an appeasement-coercion dichotomy which Nakano Satoshi has observed was at play in army occupation policy in the Philippines. ¹¹ The article also analyses the eventual breakdown and streamlining of judicial practices towards the end of the war in late 1944 and early 1945, offering insights into the increased violence employed by the IJA at that stage in the war. In particular, it highlights the role of structural weaknesses and institutional norms in facilitating and ostensibly necessitating the use of force to maintain order and suppress resistance. Accordingly, the article draws attention to the role these factors played in shaping the challenges faced in the administration of military justice beyond the Philippines.

The occupation of the Philippines officially began with the capture of Manila on 2 January 1942, though fighting with US-Philippine forces continued across the islands until the official surrender at Corregidor on 6 May. ¹² On entry into the city, Japanese forces encountered outbreaks of unrest, especially looting, which were resolutely and summarily quashed. ¹³ Against this backdrop, General Honma Masaharu, Commander of the 14th Army, peppered overtures and assurances of cooperation in creating a ‘Philippines for the Filipinos’ with warnings that further resistance and hostile acts would ‘lead the whole native land to ashes’. ¹⁴ Various other threats were issued during these first days to quickly establish army authority and set the tone for a zero-tolerance policy vis-à-vis opposition to military objectives in the islands. Informal corporal punishments – for example, face-slapping or pillorying offenders in the midday sun – were utilized as a swift corrective to disobedience, like failure to heed sentry directives, and, as mentioned in the introduction, the threat of hostage-taking and collective punishment was used to institute a form of self-policing within communities. ¹⁵ The imposition of martial law was central to the success of this coercive side of the military's approach to maintaining order.

Martial law was a form of emergency legislation enacted by respective army commanders in accordance with the ‘right of supreme command’ (tōsuiken) enshrined in Article 11 of the Meiji Constitution. ¹⁶ Commensurate with contemporary examples of martial law in occupied territories, this legislation did not replace existing local laws or suspend the functioning of Philippine courts. ¹⁷ It did enable the extension of military authority over the Philippines as a means of maintaining order in occupied areas, ensuring the safety of Japanese forces and facilitating the realization of military goals. This was to be achieved by making all civilians, excluding those in military employ (gunzoku), liable to military punishment for certain proscribed acts which either harmed the military or impeded its administration of occupied territory. Through a proclamation dated 3 January 1942, martial law was formally declared in the Philippines and civilians were advised that disturbances of the peace – ‘spreading fabulous, wild rumours’, for example – would be treated as hostile operations for which offenders would be punished severely; ‘the gravest offenses being punishable by death’. ¹⁸ A separate announcement on the same day enumerated some of those ‘gravest offenses’. This included, but was not limited to: rebellion, espionage, damage to or destruction of essential infrastructure, such as roads, railways and telegraph lines, theft of military supplies and efforts to avoid requisitioning by military forces. ¹⁹ Violating military orders imposing limitations on daily life (e.g. curfews, food rationing, price fixing or restrictions on mobility and use of electricity or water) could also be prosecuted under this rubric and proclamations informing the public of new prohibitions regularly stressed the threat of severe punishment for non-compliance. ²⁰

While warnings circulated in newspapers and periodicals focused on the threat of death for violation of martial law, prescribed punishments also included confinement with labour, exile, fines and, as a supplement to these penalties, confiscation of stolen goods or counterfeit items. ²¹ Judges had discretion to impose, commute or waive sentences recommended by prosecutors of the 14th Army Legal Department and, in making such decisions, were encouraged to consider the circumstances of the offence, the demands of the wartime situation and the perceived value to the military of pursuing either leniency or severity in each case. This was an established practice, as can be seen in the example of a speech to legal officers and judges delivered in 1940 by Lieutenant General Kasahara Yukio, North China Area Army Chief of Staff. This speech emphasized that offences in wartime could not be judged based on peacetime principles because demands were different in the field and urged judges to consider military needs when pronouncing sentences. ²²

Such sentiments were echoed in textbooks and manuals produced for kenpei, particularly newly recruited junior and non-commissioned officers who were trained in specially created field training institutes. Responsible for all military law enforcement in occupied areas, kenpei were advised that martial law was a control mechanism meant to exhort local residents to cooperate with and accept the realities of military strategy, realities which policy makers had understood would inevitably become a burden on daily life, but which civilians would have to bear during wartime. ²³ Kenpei training materials did draw attention to belligerent obligations under international law, yet also observed that civilian welfare and rights should be upheld only in so far as this did not impede military activities. ²⁴ As enforcers of martial law, kenpei, like judges, were encouraged to consider the ‘tremendous influence’ that punishment would have on public order and, in regard the exercise of judicial authority, guidance advocated for a balance between severity and leniency. Severity, after all, might be useful as a means to intimidate the populace into compliance, but could also incite further hostility and anti-Japanese sentiment if arbitrary and excessive. ²⁵

With military interest and necessity of paramount importance, the swift, decisive handling of cases was prioritized during investigations. As explained by Warrant Officer Satake Hisashi, kenpei were invested with considerable latitude – an ‘all-encompassing authority’ (ban’nō no kenryoku) – in carrying out their duties. ²⁶ Such was also described in the field handbook for junior and non-commissioned officers which explained that as enforcers of martial law, kenpei wielded ‘power over life and death’ (seisatsu yodatsu no ken). ²⁷ This power included the authority to monitor personal correspondence and communications, to conduct impromptu stop and searches of person or property, to make summary arrests and to detain for lengthy periods without formal charges. ²⁸ Though guidance warned officers to ensure that their conduct remained above reproach, the overriding sentiment displayed in kenpei wartime materials was that perceived military necessity took precedence over civilian rights and strict adherence to lawful procedure should not obstruct the realization of military objectives. ²⁹ Furthermore, as Okada Taihei has observed, the military legal framework offered little formal recourse for monitoring and curbing abuses of such power, leaving a great deal to depend on the personalities and effectiveness of senior leadership. ³⁰ Most infamously, torture was used routinely by investigators during interrogations and was subsequently justified by kenpei veterans postwar under the guise of necessity. ³¹

Once investigations were complete, kenpei also shaped the judicial process. In addition to exercising considerable control over the content of their reports, and therefore, the flow of information to senior leadership and legal departments, they had some interpretive discretion to determine how to proceed with a case. Based on reports prepared by investigators, including opinions on the severity of the case, its impact on public order and, on occasion, a recommended course of action, kenpei commanders could opt to release offenders if they judged the evidence to be insufficient for prosecution, if they were not certain of the accused's guilt, if the crime was relatively minor or when otherwise advantageous to the military (e.g. for propaganda or intelligence purposes). ³² If they judged the case to have had little bearing or consequence for the military, it could also be forwarded to local courts for trial, albeit with military oversight. This was encouraged as a particularly useful means of alleviating the burden on understaffed legal departments. ³³ Finally, investigators could, and when handling serious cases should, refer the case for trial in a military commission. ³⁴

Military commissions were courts established by Japanese occupying forces in wartime exclusively to try violations of martial law. The authority to convene such courts also lay in the ‘right of supreme command’ and respective army commanders enacted separate trial regulations that laid out their jurisdiction, composition and procedural elements. Under these regulations, each army's military commission was competent to try all violations by non-military personnel, regardless of nationality in their area of operational jurisdiction, although Imperial subjects had been exempted until 1940. ³⁵ Military commissions were staffed with three judges (two commissioned officers and one legal officer) and another legal officer acting as prosecutor. Clerks, guards, and (if available) interpreters were also to be in attendance to support the work of the court. Trial procedure was based upon the expedited process used in the special courts martial (tokusetsu gunpō kaigi), which heard cases against Japanese military personnel in the field during wartime. Many of the judicial safeguards that were enshrined in the Army Courts Martial Law (Rikugun gunpō kaigi-hō), enacted in 1921, did not apply in such courts. This meant that during wartime, defendants (soldiers and civilians alike) had no legal right to defence or to appeal judgements in the field. ³⁶

Postwar accounts of civilians prosecuted by the military justice system in the Philippines offer insight into how the expedited procedure outlined in regulations functioned in practice. According to these accounts, upon conclusion of the kenpei investigation, prisoners were asked to sign documents exclusively in Japanese prior to being transferred to Old Bilibid Prison in Manila to await trial. Whilst there, some recalled being questioned further about the statements they had made in kenpei custody. Colonel Nishiharu Hideo, Head of the 14th Army Legal Department, later explained that if the legal officer assigned to review the case file handed over by the kenpei investigator deemed it necessary, they would carry out further investigation, though this was not required in all cases. Once satisfied, that legal officer would submit a report with an assessment and recommendation on whether to prosecute or dismiss and await orders from the 14th Army Commander prior to convening a trial. ³⁷ This process apparently took some time with civilians recalling having been held at Old Bilibid for weeks, even months, prior to trial. On a specified trial day, defendants were, often with no prior notice, taken in trucks to the Arellano Building in Intramuros where they would be led into a large room to be seated on rows of chairs facing a panel of Japanese officers. Defendants were called forward in groups together with their co-defendants according to their case. Charges were then read in Japanese prior to being translated into English by an interpreter. Following this, each defendant would be asked to confirm or deny the charges and had an opportunity to speak briefly in mitigation of the sentence. They might also be questioned by the court. Afterwards, the officers retired to deliberate on the verdict and sentence. Once sentences were pronounced, they were enforced promptly (either the next day or shortly thereafter). ³⁸

To serve as a deterrent, notifications of the punishments pronounced in military commissions were publicized, often featuring on the front page of the Japanese-controlled newspaper, The Tribune, with the names and sometimes even photographs of the offenders. In February 1942, for example, it was reported that four persons had received death sentences (three for inflicting injury on a Japanese soldier and one for setting fire to houses), while 27 others had received ‘severe punishment’ for unlawfully entering and stealing goods from bodegas which had been sealed by the military. ³⁹ In a similar vein, the public was notified in May 1942 that 20 of the 50 Chinese leaders arrested when the military occupied Manila had been sentenced to death for anti-Japanese activities, while those remaining had received 20 years confinement. ⁴⁰ And an additional announcement that month noted that 13 Filipinos had received death sentences, having been found guilty of cutting electrical wires near Culi-Culi Station (now Pasay Road Station). ⁴¹ This was an interesting case because, according to a report on the incident submitted to Honma by Lieutenant Colonel Ōta Seiichi, Commander of the 14th Army Kenpeitai, these persons had actually been executed without trial as the facts of the case had been clear and the kenpei believed there was a need for ‘swift, demonstrative punishment’ (jinsoku katsu shiiteki shobun) given the prolific nature of this type of crime. Ōta had also advised Honma that an announcement would feature in newspapers to set an example to others, though the article did not report the extrajudicial character of the punishment. ⁴²

Two other notices in June 1942 recorded death sentences for a further 52 persons and heavy terms of confinement for 14 others involved in various crimes, including printing and distributing anti-Japanese propaganda, and reiterated that violators of martial law would be punished ‘without the slightest mercy’. ⁴³ This particular warning included a lengthy explanation of the circumstances and dangers of counterfeiting after a group of 23 Filipinos were arrested and executed for printing and circulating forged military scrip. A report by Ōta on this matter reveals that, because of the emergence of counterfeit notes in recent weeks, kenpei had requested permission to execute the offenders on the spot due to the necessity of preventing future crimes, though it is unclear whether this was granted. ⁴⁴ A month later, the execution of 18 more persons for various acts, such as looting, spreading anti-Japanese propaganda and listening to enemy broadcasts, was publicized. The announcement explained that such crimes caused ‘extreme harm’ to the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and cautioned that the military would continue to ‘sweep away’ these acts by imposing severe punishment. ⁴⁵

After the outbreak of organized armed resistance from August 1942, and with subjugation operations ongoing, notifications in October and November that year reported death sentences for a combined total of 35 persons involved in offences such as banditry or arson that were tied to the guerrilla groups appearing across the islands, while 49 others received severe punishment. ⁴⁶ In view of these deteriorating conditions, Lieutenant Colonel Kodama Kazuo, Head of the Police Affairs Section, gave a speech on the future of public order strategy at a meeting for commanders at 14th Army Kenpeitai Headquarters in December 1942. According to Kodama, as of the 11th of that month, 174 persons had been executed, 202 sentenced to long periods of confinement and numerous others had been judged on the spot as an extension of battle. However, the effectiveness of this intimidation strategy was in question because violations of martial law were not only not decreasing but were actually increasing in some areas. This, he noted, had been an ‘unexpected response’ (igai ni hanō) in light of the main objective and advantages of imposing heavy punishments, as explained in the field handbook. ⁴⁷ He therefore suggested that a different approach might be necessary and, under the leadership of Colonel Nagahama Akira, who had replaced Ōta on 30 September 1942, there was a decided shift in policy regarding the punishment of violators of martial law.

Coming directly from Tokyo, where he had been Head of the Third Section in Kenpeitai Command Headquarters, Nagahama had arrived with the 14th Army, now under the command of Lieutenant General Tanaka Shizuichi, preparing to launch subjugation operations in the Visayas, the central region of the archipelago and site of most unrest at this time. Instructions to kenpei who would be accompanying subjugation units reveal what postwar memoirs suggest was a somewhat unique approach by Nagahama in regard to pacifying the Filipino populace. ⁴⁸ According to these instructions, he had believed that a policy focused on punishment alone would not resolve the anti-Japanese sentiment of the Filipino populace, the cooperation of whom, he argued, was vital to the maintenance of order during a total war effort. In his view, without ‘unconditional cooperation’, the resources of the Philippines could never be secured. ⁴⁹ As such, he proposed a new approach, referred to as ‘shichi-kin, shichi-ju’ meaning roughly ‘arrest seven times, release seven times’. Explaining the rationale behind this idea, Nagahama noted that public beheadings and reckless ‘genjū shobun’, a euphemism for summary execution, had only fuelled the animosity and anti-Japanese sentiment of the populace, and his suggestion that avoiding referrals under martial law would reduce the number of deaths implies that he saw military commissions as part of the problem. Thus, he advocated for the release, after enlightenment as to the ‘true intention’ of Japan, of all except those who were truly irredeemable. In so doing, he posited, those who passed through kenpei hands might be converted to pro-Japanese civilians. ⁵⁰

Reflecting this shift of policy, the number of reports on punishments in military commissions declined and the military began publicizing instances of detainees who had been released more often from late 1942. In one example from The Tribune dated 24 December, four Philippine officials who had been arrested in connection with espionage activities had been cleared of all charges, having apparently shown ‘willingness to cooperate’ with the Japanese military. The article, printed on the front page, included a photograph of Nagahama and Jorge B. Vargas, Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission, addressing the suspects and their families in a small ceremony held to mark the occasion. According to the article, 30 other detainees had been released in previous days under similar circumstances. ⁵¹ The following month, Nagahama issued a public declaration on this new approach to policing in which he explained that, because most violators of martial law had ‘blindly believed’ American propaganda or had otherwise misjudged the situation when they committed offences, the policy of kenpei going forward would be to focus more on ‘educating’ misguided elements than punishing them. ⁵²

As a demonstration of this, on 6 February 1943, the release of 100 Filipino suspects arrested for ‘hostile acts’ was announced as ‘concrete proof’ of the military's ‘magnanimity, generosity, and fraternal affection toward the Filipino people’. They were reportedly released during a ceremony into the custody of relatives and their respective district chiefs, who were to act as guarantors of good behaviour. ⁵³ Shortly thereafter, in celebration of National Foundation Day (Kigensetsu) on 11 February, it was announced that the military had enacted an ‘Order of Amnesty and Alleviation’ and would be granting amnesty to select persons who had violated martial law. To demonstrate the ‘magnanimous clemency’ of Japanese forces, pending death sentences would be commuted to 15 years confinement, life sentences to 10 years and all other terms would be reduced by two-thirds. Furthermore, the elderly and infirm would be released immediately. ⁵⁴ This was not a blanket act of amnesty, however. Lists of those who would benefit were prepared by 14th Army Kenpeitai Headquarters in advance based on evaluation of the severity of the case and apparent repentance of the offenders. In total, 50 persons (38 Filipinos and 12 Chinese) were released, 169 persons (125 Filipinos and 44 Chinese) had sentences commuted to a third of that initially pronounced and 11 (all Filipino) persons awaiting trial had their punishment waived. ⁵⁵

Two months later, in honour of Emperor Hirohito's birthday on 29 April 1943, a second order was promulgated, leading to the release of a further 79 offenders and the reduction of sentences for 76 others. This time all those who had been sentenced to less than three years confinement, who were over 60 years of age and selected persons who ‘showed contrition’ were to be released. The same terms for reduction of sentences applied and those that had already had sentences commuted in February would see their terms halved. In the announcement for this act, it was stressed that the army's policy was to show mercy, even to criminals, and to protect those who were cooperating with the military. However, because it would be unjust to treat violators of martial law who had a ‘natural criminal inclination’ differently from those tried under Philippine law, it was cautioned that cases would be examined carefully prior to the act taking effect. It was reiterated, however, that a redeeming feature of crimes perpetrated under martial law was that many were perpetrated by those ignorant of Japan's intentions or misled by enemy propaganda. As such, offences tried in military commissions could be more readily forgiven. ⁵⁶ Amnesty was granted a third time in 1943 as a gift for the newly, if nominally, independent Philippine Republic on 14 October. On this occasion, 79 persons were released and 52 had sentences commuted, with regulations indicating that the terms of commutation or waiving of punishment were identical to those adopted in April 1943. ⁵⁷ As in earlier examples, notices to the public emphasized the military's policy of consideration, understanding and benevolence, highlighting the more concerted attempt to portray the military justice system in a positive, conciliatory light at this stage of occupation. ⁵⁸

Part of these efforts also involved addressing the problem of ‘delinquent overseas residents’ (furyō hōjin) from Japan who were seen to be undermining military efforts in the islands by exacerbating tensions with the local populace and damaging the reputation of Japan as a ‘leader’ of Asia. ⁵⁹ The ‘shameful’ behaviour of Japanese residents in occupied territories had been a pervasive problem since the outbreak of fighting in China where an influx of migrants, particularly the so-called ‘China rōnin’, to the continent had overwhelmed the existing consular police force and were exacerbating difficult relations with the Chinese population. ⁶⁰ This had led, in 1940, to the introduction of new martial law regulations that permitted military punishment (except death) of Imperial subjects (teikoku shinmin) for acts which disturbed the peace or disrupted the economy (e.g. intimidating local inhabitants or profiting through currency trading), which were inadequately covered by existing national legislation. ⁶¹

In the Philippines, Imperial subjects had been liable to punishment under martial law from the outset and, as of July 1942, upon completion of their sentences, could be sent back to Japan. The military administration could also deport overseas residents if they regularly committed ‘infamous offences’ (haren chizai), if they were of a ‘violent temperament’ (hinsei sobō) or if they otherwise impeded military rule by debasing the prestige of the Japanese as a ‘leading people’ (shidō minzoku). ⁶² Deportations were publicized in The Tribune, as demonstrated in an article on 20 December 1942 which reported that seven Japanese nationals had been expelled for ‘undisciplined behaviour’ and promoted the military's policy of ‘non-discrimination’ in regard those who disrupted public order. ⁶³ The following month, a further six ‘delinquent Japanese’ were sent back to Japan after carrying out acts of intimidation for personal gain that were ‘disgraceful to the prestige of the Japanese nation’. ⁶⁴ However, much of the behaviour that was viewed to be exacerbating tensions with the local populace was not considered to be so serious as to warrant formal measures of redress. Therefore, on 3 May 1943, the Watari Group Ordinance for the Summary Punishment of Acts of Illegality by Overseas Residents (Watari shūdan hōjin hii sokketsu shobun-rei) was enacted. ⁶⁵

The idea behind permitting summary punishments for civilians in occupied territory was rooted in a procedural law from 1885 – the Ordinance for the Summary Punishment of Misdemeanours (Ikeizai sokketsu-rei) – which permitted police chiefs in Japan to pronounce sentences on the spot for misdemeanours. ⁶⁶ Kenpei had also been empowered to pass summary judgements for minor crimes by civilians under regulations established by the Korean Garrison Army during the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) and, since 1940, commissioned officers with command authority had been authorized to impose sentences of up to 90 days confinement and administrative fines of no more than ¥100 upon Chinese civilians for minor violations of martial law. ⁶⁷ This measure had been introduced in occupied China as a means of addressing deficiencies in the existing system that were thought to be causing widespread ‘anxiety’ among the general populace and, as such, were negatively impacting public order. One such deficiency and a major point of criticism had been the length of time that detainees were held in custody while awaiting trial and so a key aim of this measure had been to appease the populace by speeding up the processing of cases involving minor violations of martial law. ⁶⁸ Such judicial authority was extended to kenpei in the Philippines on 1 October 1942 under the 14th Army Martial Law Summary Punishment Ordinance (Dai 14-gun gunritsu sokketsu shobun-rei), though this did not apply to Imperial subjects. ⁶⁹ Reflecting the change to criminal strategy towards the end of 1942, between January and August 1943, the number of cases handled summarily, as shown in Figure 1, surpassed that referred to the military commission. ⁷⁰

Figure 1.

Measures taken in cases involving violations of martial law (October 1942–3).

Where this ordinance had concentrated on minor violations of martial law, however, the ordinance for Imperial subjects targeted acts which were thought to be causing dissatisfaction among the local populace or were deemed shameful from the perspective of efforts to position Japan as leader of Asia. This included, but was not limited to: unprovoked face-slapping or other insulting acts; noisy or drunken wandering in public places; defecating on streets; public nudity; defiling religious or culturally significant sites; posing fraudulently as military or government personnel to coerce, intimidate or profit by dishonest means; causing disruption in congregations of people at churches, theatres and other public places; compelling restaurants or similar establishments to provide services outside of business hours; and any other acts, such as dangerous driving or ignoring orders from Philippine officials, which seriously injured the prestige of Imperial subjects or otherwise disturbed public order. The act of face slapping (binta) was singled out for particular attention because, whilst considered a normal and trivial custom in Japan for correcting behaviour, kenpei leadership learned that Filipinos considered it to be immensely insulting and it had, therefore, become a major source of contention. ⁷¹

In handling acts of illegality (hii) by Japanese residents, kenpei officers could impose sentences of up to 30 days confinement or administrative fines up to ₱50. A detailed explanation of the main provisions for the new ordinance explained, however, that punishment should only be inflicted if the nation's prestige had in some way been diminished by the offence in question. According to the explanation, this meant that if the act had not been witnessed by the local populace, except for admonishment, punishment was unnecessary. Indeed, in keeping with Nagahama's approach, the ordinance was not envisioned to be fundamentally punitive in character. A stated aim was to promote self-reflection and self-discipline among Imperial subjects to encourage them to improve the way they conducted themselves in front of the local population. To that end, kenpei officers were also to give lectures that aimed to ‘enlighten’ offenders and to secure a written oath of good behaviour prior to their release. ⁷² Warnings and instructions on conduct for Japanese residents were also published periodically in Japanese language newspapers, like the Manira shinbun. ⁷³

Statistics included in monthly military policing reports for May to October 1943, as represented in Figure 2, reveal that kenpei punished 21 acts of illegality under this ordinance, primarily involving face-slapping, noisy or drunken wandering, posing fraudulently as military or government personnel and ‘other’ acts, such as reckless firing of guns or trespassing in private residences. This was alongside handling 14 ‘crimes’ (hanzai), including looting, piracy and the fraudulent trafficking of proscribed goods, and 45 cases of ‘misconduct’ (hikō) predominantly featuring drink-fuelled quarrels, belligerence towards Philippine police officers and refusal to pay for services. ⁷⁴

Figure 2.

Crimes, illegalities and acts of misconduct perpetrated by Japanese residents in the Philippines (May–October 1943).

The aforementioned crimes were referred for trial, whilst the acts of illegality received summary sentences, with the majority (65 per cent) of those pronounced between May and September 1943 reaching the maximum of 30 days confinement. Cases of misconduct were dealt with by more informal means, including an admonishment from the arresting officer, being taken into protective custody or being made to write apologies, make an oath of repentance or provide compensation (e.g. if they had refused to pay for services at a restaurant). ⁷⁵

In spite of the more conciliatory efforts employed by kenpei, unrest in the Philippines increased over the course of 1943. The monthly public order reports prepared by 14th Army Kenpeitai Headquarters recorded, for example, 2918 public order disturbances (chian kakuran) in 1943, an increase of 1613 instances from the previous year. ⁷⁶ With guerrilla activity escalating, and especially after an assassination attempt on Jose P. Laurel (future president of the Philippine Republic), Nagahama received criticism from superiors in Tokyo and staff officers within the 14th Army who saw his approach as too weak. His subordinates in the Philippines had also come to view the ‘arrest seven times, release seven times’ policy as impossible to sustain as the wartime situation became ‘more urgent’. ⁷⁷ He reaffirmed commitment to this policy in July 1943, yet also instructed that kenpei adopt a policy of taking a ‘resolute stance of severe judgement’ (genjū shodan no danko taru taido) to ‘unruly elements’ who obstructed the creation of the ‘New Philippines’. ⁷⁸ As demonstrated in Figure 1, the number of arrests increased later that year after the army launched subjugation operations in preparation for the granting of independence in October.

After the Philippines had become independent (albeit nominally), there were few changes to the administration of military justice with the exception that kenpei would no longer exercise direct authority over Philippine police officers. ⁷⁹ According to instructions delivered to kenpei officers on 4 November 1943, guidelines for maintaining order after independence would mostly remain the same. However, it was acknowledged that this might cause officials and civilians to misinterpret the army's ‘true intentions’ in the islands. To avoid resentment over trivial matters, it was imperative that kenpei conduct themselves with ‘careful consideration and care’ working in cooperation with the newly established Philippine Government. ⁸⁰ To that end, kenpei were to comply with the 60-day general amnesty ordered by President Laurel later that month. Orders regarding military policy during the amnesty period advised that subjugation operations would be suspended in areas where the security situation was considered normal or at least such that it would be possible for the Philippine Constabulary to maintain order without assistance. The surrender of guerrillas was not to be impeded, and those that did hand themselves in in accordance with the stipulations of the amnesty were to be transferred to Philippine authorities with only a quick interrogation by kenpei permitted beforehand. Yet amnesty did not mean a complete halt to law enforcement activities. The military was permitted to continue subjugation operations to suppress so-called ‘bandits’ in that event that unrest or guerrilla activity broke out in the aforementioned areas and could act unimpeded in regions that were firmly under guerrilla control. Furthermore, those who were captured during such operations or those who had been arrested for committing hostile acts were still to be handled under the provisions of martial law. ⁸¹

Public order reports reveal that subjugation operations did continue during the period of amnesty and document a steady decline in security across the Philippines. In December 1943, kenpei reported that preparations were underway for ‘thorough suppression’ of the islands as soon as the amnesty period had lapsed. ⁸² The number of public order disturbances continued to increase, with a further 1538 incidents reported by May 1944. ⁸³ Whilst military criminal policy continued to outwardly emphasize ‘enlightenment’ over punishment at this time, the use of more coercive methods by kenpei (e.g. threats of violence, collective punishments, and torture during interrogations), though never completely disappearing under Nagahama's tenure, became more prolific as conditions in the islands deteriorated and the functioning of the military justice system gradually broke down under the strain of handling a growing number of cases towards the end of the war. ⁸⁴

After the landing of US troops at Leyte in October 1944, anti-guerrilla military operations, especially in southern Luzon, intensified. The military justice system played an important role in efforts to suppress and pre-empt resistance through the arrest and punishment of guerrillas. Kenpei were instructed to round-up suspects across the islands and apparently had been promised military merits (bukōkishō) for doing so by Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General Nishimura Toshio. According to Colonel Utsunomiya Naokata, Head of the 14th Army General Affairs Department, this had led to a competition among junior officers and exacerbated the growing disregard for Nagahama's more conciliatory ideals. ⁸⁵ The Japanese ambassador to the Philippines, Murata Shōzō, recorded receiving numerous complaints from Philippine officials about the excessive and arbitrary behaviour of kenpei as a result of this renewed drive in his wartime diary. Aside from the pervasive issue of torture in custody, kenpei had been involved in the harassment and arrest of several key figures in the Philippine government. This had earned the ire of President Jose Laurel, especially since it had been agreed that he would be consulted prior to any such action taken against government officials. That this continued despite apology and assurances from Nagahama led Murata to wonder whether he had lost control of his subordinates at this point. ⁸⁶

Due to these activities, by November 1944, cells in Fort Santiago were reportedly overflowing. One consequence of this was the suffocation of between 400 and 550 detainees who had been held in dungeon cells with poor ventilation. ⁸⁷ Another was that processing the remaining prisoners (estimated to be somewhere between 1000 and 2000 persons) presented a serious logistical problem for the 14th Area Army Legal Department, which was staffed with just three legal officers, including Nishiharu, and one probationary legal officer. ⁸⁸ Over four separate trial days in November 1944, the department had tried 61 cases involving 653 civilians, in addition to 12 cases involving 16 Japanese soldiers and civilians. ⁸⁹ On the busiest day, 5 November, 27 cases involving 330 Filipino, Chinese and American persons were heard in the military commission and, perhaps a reflection of the burden placed upon the legal department, instead of a legal officer, Captain Fujita Takefumi of the North Manila Kenpei Squad took on the role of prosecutor in all trials that day. ⁹⁰

Arrests continued as 14th Area Army Headquarters (the 14th Army had been reorganized as the 14th Area Army in July 1944) were preparing to retreat to Baguio. Nishiharu testified to having brought the problem to General Yamashita Tomoyuki and Lieutenant General Mutō Akira, his chief of staff, since the legal department would be moving with headquarters and there was no time to try all detainees following the usual process. ⁹¹ According to Nishiharu, he secured approval for his suggestion that the remaining suspects at Fort Santiago be tried in an expedited manner with just one legal officer acting as judge, though Yamashita and Mutō both denied discussing the matter at all. As a result, Nishiharu alleged that around 600 persons received death sentences and were subsequently executed. ⁹²

The memoirs of kenpei officers, Ishida Chūshirō, Head of the Special Internal Affairs Corps, and Yanagisawa Seiichi, a member of the North Manila Kenpei Squad, depict the executions carried out in mid-December 1944 as extrajudicial. ⁹³ The latter, who participated in the execution of 100 prisoners at the Manila North Cemetery, explained that all legal procedures had been omitted and a decision made that, with US forces advancing, prisoners would simply be killed. ⁹⁴ While testimony from Filipinos suggests that kenpei were conducting summary executions in Manila at that time, surviving court verdicts lend support to Nishiharu's testimony that a condensed form of trial was held in some cases. ⁹⁵ They indicate, for instance, that at least 65 cases featuring 562 persons had been judged by First Lieutenant Shigemi Yoshikatsu of the 14th Area Army Legal Department, with assistance from probationary legal officer, Yonenaga Shigehikō acting as prosecutor over a period of three days between 16 and 22 December 1944. The verdict in each case was identical, except for the accused's personal details, the date of the offence and the name of the guerrilla unit to which they had allegedly belonged. These details were written in a different colour ink from the main text suggesting that a boilerplate verdict had been prepared in advance. This included a brief paragraph reasoning that the accused had all been pro-American and anti-Japanese and had immediately agreed to join a guerrilla organization when solicited. Thereafter, they had been engaged in plots, waiting for the opportunity to rise up against the Japanese Army when US forces returned. The verdict concluded by stating that these facts had been verified by the testimony of each defendant in court and statements made to the army judicial police officer (one of the kenpei investigators). ⁹⁶

This court material indicates that 553 persons (98.4 per cent) were sentenced to death upon being tried in this expedited format, while only nine had their punishments waived. None received a sentence of confinement, which contrasts with the record for November 1944. The recommended sentences documented for that month included 165 (25 per cent) death sentences and 437 (67 per cent) sentences of confinement, with terms ranging from 15 to 2 years. An additional 51 persons never made it to court in November, with 46 of them dying in custody prior to their court date and subsequently having their case dismissed, and five others judged too ill to stand trial. ⁹⁷ Other verdicts from December 1944, having been tried by three judges as normal, show that an additional 22 persons received death sentences, 25 received a term of confinement and nine persons had died prior to trial that month. As Table 1 shows, then, during the final two months of 1944, as the army prepared to retreat from Manila, the military justice system processed at least 1271 persons, 740 of whom received death sentences, the majority of which (75 per cent) were pronounced by just one judge. ⁹⁸

Table 1.

Disposition of Violators of Martial Law (November–December 1944).

	Death	Confinement	Punishment waived	Died (prior to trial)	Ill
November 1944	165	437	0	46	5
December 1944	575	25	9	9	0
Total	740	462	9	55	5

Elsewhere in the islands, due to the difficulty of transporting suspects, some prisoners had been executed with no semblance of judicial proceedings. In Davao, for instance, kenpei had executed guerrillas in custody in September 1944, having incorrectly assumed that US forces would land in Mindanao rather than Leyte. From kenpei veterans’ perspective, to have released them at a time of withdrawal would have been akin to ‘releasing a tiger into the wild’ (tora o no ni hanatsu). ⁹⁹ According to the Unofficial History of the Japanese Kenpei (Nihon kenpei gaishi), such measures had also previously been sanctioned by Nagahama in situations during which it was not possible to hold trials, such as during battle or retreat. ¹⁰⁰ Indeed, in the aforementioned instructions to subordinates dated 15 November 1942, Nagahama had warned that summary execution was prohibited in principle, but recognized that there were some circumstances in which it might be unavoidable, such as in consideration of transportation concerns. Additionally, while condemning reckless use of ‘genjū shobun’ after battle, Nagahama added that there was no problem with the killing of ‘anti-Japanese elements’ on the battlefield or during subjugation operations. ¹⁰¹

These sentiments largely echoed those in the field handbook for junior and non-commissioned officers. The authors of this text had acknowledged that ‘genjū shobun’ might be necessary and effective as a means of making the populace aware of the ‘cause and effect’ (inga) of their actions and that, whilst prohibited once an investigation was complete, there were circumstances – when a suspect resisted arrest, attempted to flee or adamantly refused to submit to questioning – in which death might be an unavoidable consequence of ‘expedient, necessary measures’ (rinki hitsuyō no sochi) taken. Generally, however, the handbook had warned that excessive or arbitrary use of ‘genjū shobun’ could backfire, becoming a ‘cancer’ on public order of the kenpei's own making and instructed that as the situation progressed from battle to occupation and order was gradually restored, kenpei should endeavour to send violations of martial law to military commissions. ¹⁰²

With occupation having shifted back to battle in many areas, kenpei units, now under the command of Major General Matsuoka Kenshichi, were notified in March 1945 that violators of martial law were to be either released on the spot or receive ‘genjū shobun’ unless, from the standpoint of political policy, there was a reason to refer them for trial. ¹⁰³ Instructions, however, had cautioned against excessive use in view of the potentially negative impact on defence plans; officers were warned that ‘genjū shobun’ should only be employed when unavoidable, such as during military subjugation operations, and kenpei were to seek permission from the commander prior to proceeding with execution. ¹⁰⁴ Essentially, in the final stages of war, processing violations of martial law through the military commission had become untenable and as a matter of practicality kenpei were formally sanctioned to employ summary measures, if necessary, in accordance with direction from senior leadership.

The Japanese military justice system was a mechanism of control that, whilst not completing disregarding civilian welfare, nevertheless prioritized the needs, interests and, at times, convenience of the military. Rooted in military necessity, it was an inherently mutable system, adapted as required to meet shifting wartime demands and the particularities of diverse local contexts. In the Philippines, the system initially functioned as part of a policy of intimidation which aimed to coerce acceptance of military rule and to deter resistance, disobedience and crime by threatening and then swiftly demonstrating the harsh punishment that would befall those who violated martial law. By the end of 1942, however, the effectiveness of this approach had been called into question given the levels of armed resistance then prevailing in the islands. This precipitated a re-evaluation of criminal strategy, particularly within the 14th Army Kenpeitai whose new commander, Nagahama, had broader and more conciliatory ideas about how to restore order. In 1943, there was a determined attempt to portray the military justice system in a more positive light by periodically releasing offenders, allowing for light summary sentences to be passed by kenpei and punishing Japanese residents for conduct which exacerbated tensions with the populace, though it should also be noted that heavy-handed investigative practices by kenpei and trials in military commissions did continue behind-the-scenes. The dynamics of military justice as the system evolved during occupation, then, reflected military policy and practice in the Philippines, especially the appeasement-coercion dialectic at its core.

The more conciliatory tone and emphasis of 1943, however, gave way again to intimidation and, eventually, the use of force with the military justice system playing a role in the wider radicalization of military strategy in the Philippines towards the end of the war. Kenpei were active in rounding up and executing guerrillas, while military commissions pronounced harsh punishments, including death sentences, upon hundreds following a judicial procedure that largely failed to uphold the legal safeguards that have since been enshrined as inviolable human rights under international law. In many respects, the less discerning administration of justice and more widespread use of extrajudicial punishment in the islands at this time was a result of deteriorating conditions and perceived wartime urgency, compounded by the longer-term failure to address guerrilla resistance. However, existing structural weaknesses within the military justice system, exacerbated by serious logistical challenges at this juncture, occasioned a wider simplification of trial procedure if not the omission of judicial proceedings altogether. Indeed, though the context of organized guerrilla resistance in the Philippines intensified inherent struggles in handling large-scale unrest with limited resources and manpower in late 1944, occupying armies across Southeast Asia faced similar practical complications. This resulted in formal amendments to the military legal framework in May 1945 which allowed for more streamlined procedures, including summary proceedings and trials held in absentia. ¹⁰⁵

Systemic issues undoubtedly contributed to the extrajudicial violence of early 1945 in the Philippines, but this violence was also rooted in established parameters of permissible conduct within the kenpei as a law enforcement institution. Field commanders, such as Nagahama, could exercise personal influence, yet their decisions were framed by wartime handbooks, training manuals, and other regulatory guidance that accepted, and in some cases recommended, violent measures as an appropriate or even necessary response. Thus, whilst the dynamics of military justice in the Philippines were shaped to no small degree by distinct local conditions, the structural constraints and institutional norms that influenced the radicalization of military law enforcement and judicial procedures towards the end of the war were not unique to the islands and point to broader challenges inherent in the administration of military justice under Japanese occupation in Southeast Asia.