Abstract
This article demonstrates that, notwithstanding Ireland's 1949 Commonwealth secession, it (re)established an informal external association with this grouping's principal concrete concerns, which remained quite extensive, that lasted throughout the 1950s. By law or practice, 1950s Ireland lifted alien restrictions on most Commonwealth citizens and its citizens received preferential treatment in most Commonwealth countries. It participated in the Commonwealth tariff ‘system' by both giving and receiving preferences based on ‘Commonwealth' status and by maintaining long-standing trade agreements with the UK, Canada and South Africa. As with all the Commonwealth bar Canada, it remained within the Sterling Area which greatly bolstered economic links. Ireland also participated in several lower-level Commonwealth fora and its ‘special position' was said to strikingly illustrate the Commonwealth's capacity to adjust. However, it took no part in high-level political consultation and, even in functional areas (with the singular exception of agricultural research), lacked privileges to exercise leadership or even clear rights. These limitations bolstered interest in rejoining especially in the late 1950s. However, allied to a background a recognition that the Commonwealth was becoming less central to concrete links including in the crucial UK context, this was rendered politically impossible by the unresolved issue of Partition.
Keywords
Ireland's secession from the Commonwealth on 18 April 1949 apparently brought to a close an often fraught and contested linkage which went back to the founding of the Irish State in 1922, almost thirty years previously. Since the late 1930s Ireland had explicitly maintained that it was merely in ‘external association' with the Commonwealth. In contrast, the other members rather cryptically asserted that they were ‘prepared to treat' Irish developments as ‘not affecting a fundamental alteration' in Ireland's position ‘as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations'.
1
However, Ireland's relationship with this grouping was clearly fundamentally altered during the Second World War as a result of its unique neutral position. In the war's aftermath, the Commonwealth itself was in a state of complex transformation as exemplified in the London Declaration in 1949 which agreed that, despite rejecting ‘a common allegiance to the Crown', India could retain full membership by ‘accept[ing] The King as symbol of the free association of its independent member nations and as such Head of the Commonwealth'.
2
The nature of Ireland's negotiated secession from the Commonwealth in 1948–9 was also complex. In sum, following an agreement fashioned with the UK and other Commonwealth Governments, the Irish Government announced that it ‘recognise[d] and confirm[ed] the existence of a specially close relationship' with the Commonwealth and did not intend to regard Commonwealth ‘citizens as “foreigners” or their countries as “foreign” countries' after its exit. It further clarified that: This exchange of rights and privileges, which it our firm desire and intention to maintain and strengthen, in our view constitutes a special relationship which negatives the view that other countries could raise valid objections on the ground that Ireland should be treated as a ‘foreign' country by Britain and the Commonwealth countries for the purpose of this exchange of rights and privileges.
3
In contrast to the 1930s, it did not prove possible for Commonwealth Governments collectively to issue a joint declaration in response. Nevertheless, following a short consultation, most did issue broadly reciprocal declarations and a wider range of Commonwealth countries took similar action later. 4
The brief chronology above raises the question of whether Ireland's post-1949 position vis-à-vis the Commonwealth continued to constitute an (albeit informal) version of ‘external association'. The small literature which has developed in this area has profoundly diverged in its characterization of Ireland's post-1949 position. Mansergh (1968) claims that ‘the Irish relationship with the Commonwealth proved brief and transient', Wynne (2020) in contrast states that Ireland was a ‘closet member of the Commonwealth' from 1949 to 1973, McCabe (1991) argues that Ireland from 1950 ‘although not “in” the Commonwealth was again part “of” it' and Lowry (2019) asserts that post-1949 Ireland ‘was able to benefit from all the advantages of Commonwealth membership, including freedom of movement, labour, trading and citizenship rights, whilst remaining outside the organisation and with no obligations to it’. 5 However, Mansergh's article and Lowry's book chapter both focus principally on the pre-1949 position and are only 14 and 24 pages, respectively, Wynne's piece is a mere four pages and, while more substantial, McCabe's book almost exclusively explores the process of exit rather than its impact. Not least given these very divergent perspectives, a deeper analysis of the post-1949 situation is clearly necessary. Moreover, given that both the Commonwealth and Ireland's external positioning were subject to significant change during the decades following Irish secession, a periodized approach is warranted. Therefore, this article will analyse the situation as it coalesced in the first full decade following the Irish secession, whereas subsequent work will take the story forward into the 1960s and 1970s.
It will be argued that, at least during the 1950s, Ireland did remain in a form of external association with the Commonwealth. Admittedly, and as well explored in the section immediately following, the Commonwealth of the 1950s is difficult to define. Nevertheless, its intended characteristics were laid out at the April 1949 meeting which issued the London Declaration. According to the first agreed Interpretative Minute, Commonwealth countries were to continue to regard each other as ‘not foreign' and, while given discretion as to the extent and precise method of its exercise, were to take the necessary steps ‘to maintain the right to accord preferential treatment, as had been customary, to the citizens and trade of other Commonwealth countries'.
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In principle, such preferential treatment was secured through granting individuals with ‘Commonwealth nationality'
7
or citizenship certain rights, ensuring reciprocal and/or status-based preferential tariffs for Commonwealth imports and (with the exception of Canada) being tied financially to the Sterling Area.
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As will be seen below, 1950s Ireland engaged with all three areas of preference which, in any case, were far from uniform within the Commonwealth itself. Beyond this, the London Declaration was grounded in a commitment to the ‘exchange [of] views’ (or, in other words, general consultation) and the Declaration itself recorded that Commonwealth members remained ‘freely co-operating in the pursuit of peace, liberty and progress'
9
(or, in other words, general co-operation). The initial understanding was that, aside from associate membership of the Commonwealth Agricultural Bureau (CAB), Ireland would face exclusion here. Potentially consistent with the idea of a merely
Not only has the Commonwealth always been ‘not easy to understand' 12 but the nature of the 1950s Commonwealth appears particularly inscrutable since, while ceasing to constitute the alliance or bloc which it constituted as late as the Second World War, it was also not merely the slender bridge between radically different countries that it had become by the end of the 1960s. For some, therefore, it was simply a ‘community which nobody can define' and it is undoubtedly true that the Commonwealth's ‘experimental [and] tentative nature' remained a central characteristic throughout. 13 Nevertheless, at least the intended shape of this association was clarified at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting which issued the London Declaration on 26 April 1949, just one week after Ireland finally seceded. The Declaration itself confirmed that, despite rejecting ‘a common allegiance to the Crown', a republican India could remain in ‘full membership' as it accepted ‘The King as symbol of the free association of its independent member nations and as such the Head of the Commonwealth'. All members including India affirmed that they remained ‘united as free and equal members of the Commonwealth of Nations, freely co-operating in the pursuit of peace, liberty and progress'. 14 Such co-operation and associated consultation, which encompassed both high-level political meetings and several multilateral agencies and fora, remained extremely wide-ranging. The meeting's Interpretative Minute on ‘preferential treatment' also agreed that all Commonwealth countries should ‘continue to regard themselves as not foreign in relation to one another' and, while given discretion as to the extent and precise method of its exercise, should take necessary steps to ‘to maintain the right to accord preferential treatment, as had been customary, to the citizens and trade of other Commonwealth countries'. 15 While formally recorded, this Minute was not itself made public. Nevertheless, its contours were broadly articulated. In particular, the outlines of a general scheme for the preferential treatment of Commonwealth citizens had already been published in 1948, following a pan-Commonwealth conference on this subject held the previous year. 16 Meanwhile, even Nehru, the leader of the member country which placed the greatest emphasis on the limits of Commonwealth unity, stressed that the London decision ‘gave India certain temporary advantages of co-operation in industry and trade'. Nevertheless, not only was the caveat of ‘temporary' rather ominous but Nehru also emphasized that no ‘commitments of any kind limiting our sovereignty or our internal or external policy have been made'. 17 The tension between, on the one hand, expectations of both preferential citizen and economic treatment and wide consultation and co-operation and, on the other, the autonomy of each state were acute even at the start of the 1950s and would become even more so by 1960.
The idea of ‘external association' with the Commonwealth presents similar complexities. It traces to Éamon de Valera's suggestion during Ireland's cession from the UK in 1921–2 that Ireland could ‘be associated' with the Commonwealth States ‘for purposes of common concern', would grant their citizens reciprocal citizenship rights, repel any foreign power using its soil or waters for any purpose hostile to these States, would recognize The King as head of that Association (without acknowledging allegiance to the Crown) and finally would be granted (at least) equal ‘rights, status and privileges' when acting as an associate. ‘Common concern' was defined as including ‘Defence, Peace and War, Political Treaties, and all matters now treated as of common concern amongst the States'. 18 This proposal was not accepted but when de Valera came to power in the 1930s he nevertheless sought to apply this model through establishing an entirely separate Irish national citizenship, eliminating the Crown from the Irish Constitution and its internal affairs and finally enacting an External Relations (Executive Authority) Act 1936 which recognized an Irish association with the Commonwealth States and authorized the Irish Executive to use The King when appointing diplomatic representatives and making treaties while this association continued. This approach was not accepted by other Commonwealth members which instead responded by stating that they were ‘prepared to treat’ these developments as ‘not affecting a fundamental alteration' in Ireland's position ‘as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations'. 19 Meanwhile, de Valera laid particular emphasis on separation and selectivity in Ireland's Commonwealth interactions and avoided high-level Commonwealth political meetings (then still styled Imperial Conferences) throughout the 1930s. 20 This new reality was accentuated by Ireland's unique neutrality in the Second World War which resulted in its de facto suspension from Commonwealth councils during that existential conflict. 21 These experiences led Mansergh in 1948 to opine that ‘[i]n the field of political realities’ external association may appear as ‘a very negative concept'. 22 However, he went on to argue that this need not be the case and it is clear that (not least as a result of Mansergh's own intervention) this model played not only a cautionary but also a constructive role in the development postwar of a Commonwealth capacious enough to embrace Republics alongside States owing allegiance to the Crown. 23
Alongside its (ultimately contingent) connection with political negativity, a further problem with the external association is that, as originally formulated, it traces to a period when the Commonwealth was a relatively tight-knit (albeit informal) alliance founded on Crown allegiance. In contrast, from 1949 onwards the grouping's cohesion was more limited, but it remained committed to various forms of preferential treatment and to consultation and free cooperation ‘in the pursuit of peace, liberty and progress'. 24 It is therefore necessary to relate the external association concept to this looser grouping. Clearly, the adjective attached to association indicates that it cannot necessitate any participation in purely internal aspects such as acceptance of the British Monarch as the symbolic Head, even if post-1949 these aspects only necessarily had an external as opposed to internal or constitutional significance to the members themselves. Similarly, it obviously cannot entail a requirement to cooperate in matters no longer clearly part of the reconstituted Commonwealth, such as the common coordination of defence or political treaties. Nevertheless, even a reformulated definition must require that a country be generally associated in those aspects of ‘common concern' to which the 1950s Commonwealth did (even if rather disjointedly) remain committed. The presence or absence of this kind of association will be tested below, alongside consideration of what Ireland's rights, status and privileges were in these areas and to what extent, if at all, this led to it to consider rejoining the Commonwealth itself.
A fundamental axiom of the prewar (British) Commonwealth was that, as a corollary to common Crown allegiance, all citizens within the Commonwealth possessed a common national status of British subject and could neither be considered, nor be treated as, an alien. At least theoretically, a common code defined who possessed this status and Commonwealth Governments in 1930 had agreed that ‘changes should only be introduced (in accordance with current practice) after consultation and agreement amongst the several Members of the Commonwealth'.
25
Following a postwar Conference of Experts in February 1947, Governments abandoned the common code but crafted a new system to preserve a common and non-alien status alongside fully-fledged national citizenship. Repeating the Conference Report (which was not itself made public) verbatim, the UK Government outlined the new system in February 1948 when introducing its new British Nationality Bill: The essential features of such a system are that each of the countries shall by its legislation determine who are its citizens, shall declare those citizens to be British subjects, and shall recognise as British subjects the citizens of the other countries. For the last purpose there is a need of a ‘common clause', of which the substantial effect shall be same in each country, to ensure that all persons recognised as British subjects in any part of the Commonwealth shall be so recognised throughout the Commonwealth.
26
Reflecting a recognition that the terminology of British subjecthood placed India, Pakistan, Ceylon and perhaps others in a difficult position, 27 the final UK British Nationality Act stated that persons benefiting from this common status ‘may be known either as a British subject or as a Commonwealth citizen'. 28 Finally, the London Declaration's Interpretative Minute on preferential treatment clearly recorded an expectation that the essence of this arrangement would form part of the fabric of the 1950s Commonwealth.
Ireland was itself represented at the 1947 experts conference but, consequent to the external orientation which it had adopted since the mid-1930s, rejected the common clause outright. Instead, it secured ‘general approval' that its citizens ‘though not British subjects, should not have the status of aliens'.
29
This understanding played an important role the following year when, at the time of its Commonwealth secession, Ireland negotiated directly with the UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand (with the other Commonwealth States being only indirectly involved through subsequent consultation). This resulted in the following commitment being made by the Taoiseach John Costello on behalf of the Irish Government during the passage of the Republic of Ireland Bill: [W]e propose, as and when the Commonwealth countries grant our citizens recognition and rights, to make Orders provisionally under Section 23 (2) [of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1935] giving their citizens comparable rights…. [A]fter the passage of this Bill we will continue, provided they so desire, the exchange of citizenship rights and privileges. Ireland does not now, and when the Executive Authority (External Relations) Act of 1936 is repealed, does not intend to regard their citizens as ‘foreigners' or their countries as ‘foreign' countries.
30
If these commitments had been fully implemented then Ireland would clearly have remained strongly and manifestly associated, even if only externally, with intra-Commonwealth citizenship arrangements. However, realities were rather different. 31 In particular, despite interest from Ceylon, India and Pakistan in establishing reciprocal arrangements, Ireland only offered citizenship rights orders to ‘old' Commonwealth countries with substantial Irish migrant populations including, most crucially, the UK which was by far the most significant destination for Irish migrants. 32 In any case, since all these orders stated that they were ‘subject to [other] law’, 33 they were largely symbolic. Nevertheless, alongside its Aliens Act 1935 which defined all persons other than Irish citizens as formally aliens, Ireland retained the Aliens (Exemption) Order 80/1935 which released ‘citizens, subjects or nationals' of all the ‘old' Commonwealth States 34 and also ‘India’ from ordinary aliens control including as regards entry, residence and employment. Internal discussions make clear that the Irish Government did not accept that the latter reference covered present-day India, let alone Pakistan or Ceylon 35 and that it adopted a narrowly self-interested perspective which entailed none of the commitment to the Commonwealth as such which was important to elite support for an open-door Commonwealth immigration policy in the UK. 36 These discussions also record a strong awareness of British press concerns about ‘large-scale emigration of coloured people' to the UK and reveal an acute desire to avoid such emigration in Ireland's case. 37 Nevertheless, it was recognized that a policy excluding these Commonwealth countries would ‘run the risk of [Ireland] being charged with colour discrimination' and could also lead to new restrictions on the activities of its missionaries. Ireland therefore decided to grant ‘administratively exempted aliens status to Indians, Pakistanis and Ceylonese unless and until circumstances obliged us to change our attitude'. 38 However, similarly advantageous treatment was not extended to Malaya or Ghana when they became independent members of the Commonwealth in 1957 or Nigeria when it did likewise in 1960. 39 Indeed, immigration privileges would only be clearly extended to all Commonwealth nationals in 1962 when, as part of fundamental reorientation by both the UK and Ireland, these would be severely attenuated and full aliens exemption confined to each other's own ‘nationals’. 40 Turning to the other side of the equation, all the ‘old' Commonwealth States and all but three of the ‘new' Commonwealth States did include Irish citizens alongside the most-favoured Commonwealth citizens (aside from their own nationals) in their law although, as explored below, the practical consequences varied considerably. However, Ceylon, Pakistan and Ghana failed to make any special legal provision for Irish citizens. 41
The hopes of ensuring a coordinated and effective common multinational citizenship were far from fully achieved in the 1950s Commonwealth. Even prior to the Commonwealth's official crystallization following the First World War, the self-governing Dominions had a recognized right to exercise immigration control which, notwithstanding protests, 42 aimed in practice at preventing any significant permanent non-White migration. Pre-partition India responded by developing a ‘retaliatory nationality policy' 43 and even by the late 1930s wider divisions were apparent arising, in particular, from a desire by Ceylon (and Burma which left the Commonwealth in 1948) to curtail migration from India. 44 The discriminatory approach of the ‘old' Commonwealth largely continued after the Second World War and even intensified in the case of South Africa with its developing system of apartheid such that, as recorded by Walker (1962), ‘South Africa prohibited immigration from India and Pakistan both of which took similar action in regard to immigration from South Africa'. 45 The ‘new' Commonwealth countries also adopted ‘highly restrictive citizenship laws' which were ‘designed to prevent large-scale immigration as well'. 46 Nevertheless, at least during the 1950s (and indeed up until the mid-1960s), it remained possible to see the overall construction as positive and meaningful. Thus, notwithstanding the many limitations, Parry (1957) found that ‘no citizen of any country of the Commonwealth is an alien in any other' 47 and that ‘[w]hat may tend to preserve the reality of the distinction now drawn between British subject and alien is that its basis is in principle common to the whole Commonwealth'. 48 Meanwhile, while recognizing that coordination based on a ‘common status' of British subject or Commonwealth citizen had been far from fully achieved, Wheare (1960) argued that ‘[i]n place of common citizenship there has been developed the idea of reciprocal citizenship' where ‘citizens of Commonwealth Members are accorded some degree of rights of reciprocal citizenship'. 49 Intentionally or otherwise, this idea of reciprocity as opposed to universality accommodated both close relations as well as tensions or even ruptures within the group. 50
Wheare emphasized that the ‘Irish device of the reciprocal citizenship' 51 had been the basis for reciprocal provisions adopted in Commonwealth countries, stressed that Irish citizens were generally treated on a similarly favourable basis in the Commonwealth and that Ireland likewise accorded certain reciprocal citizenship rights to citizens of Commonwealth members. Some of this analysis clearly overlooked certain specific limitations within Irish law and also in the Irish position within some Commonwealth states, especially those which had recently become independent. Nevertheless, not least given the shortcomings of Commonwealth arrangements generally, it must be concluded that Ireland did remain in external association with the Commonwealth in this area throughout the 1950s.
Alongside particular arrangements in relation to people, the Interpretative Minute of the April 1949 Prime Ministers’ Meeting made clear that the preferential treatment of trade was also intended to form an integral part of the 1950s Commonwealth. The primary mechanism for this, namely, privileged tariff treatment had a long and complex history dating back to the late 1890s when the self-governing (and protectionist) proto-Dominions unilaterally granted ‘imperial' preferential tariffs to goods originating from other ‘British' territories. Notwithstanding its traditional free trade commitments, the UK similarly established limited preferential tariffs during the First World War and then through the 1919 Finance Act. 52 However, it was only as a result of the Ottawa Economic Conference, convened in 1932 in the aftermath of the Great Depression, that serious consideration of much more potent and comprehensive tariff preferences emerged. The result was a series of reciprocal arrangements which, with certain adjustments, were subsequently maintained. Although the product of individual bilateral negotiations, the central agreements between the UK and various other full Commonwealth members all shared a common pattern. In sum, the UK ‘agreed to grant specific margins of preference over foreign imports – mainly agricultural commodities which were of particular interest to Commonwealth countries … and generally agreed to guarantee duty-free entry to Commonwealth goods' whereas the other members agreed ‘to give a wide range of preference, and undertook certain limitations on their ability to impose protection against United Kingdom goods'. 53 This so-called ‘Commonwealth preference system' 54 proved unpopular, especially with the United States but nevertheless continued into the post-Second World War period. 55 However, various factors constrained its functioning over time. In particular, although Article 1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 uniquely saved the arrangements which coalesced at Ottawa, 56 it also provided that these could not be expanded. Moreover, it was increasingly recognized that the Commonwealth shouldn’t (and probably couldn't) constitute a largely self-sufficient economic bloc. Indeed, while eschewing the idea of a customs union, the UK sought to negotiate an Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) free trade area in 1956–8 and was the leading founder of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1958. 57 The value of Commonwealth preferences was also subject to a slow decline; for example, the average preference enjoyed by UK trade within the Commonwealth was calculated to have declined from 7 per cent in 1948 to 5 per cent in 1958 after peaking at 11 per cent in 1937. 58 Nevertheless, Governments assembled at the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference held in 1958 still affirmed that ‘Commonwealth participation in the preferential system has proved to be of mutual benefit and we have no intention of discarding or weakening it'. 59
Ireland was strongly associated with Commonwealth preferential tariff arrangements. Indeed, given the economic sanctions and frozen relations which existed between the UK and Ireland in the 1932–8 period after the latter withheld land annuities payable to the UK,
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its associations were stronger than during much of the time when it was still formally fused to the Commonwealth. Thus, at the time of its secession in 1949, Ireland had reciprocal agreements with Canada
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and South Africa
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which went back to the 1932 Ottawa Economic Conference and an Ottawa-style agreement with the UK which dated to 1938 and which had been confirmed and modified in 1948 and was again updated in 1960.
63
Ireland also extended many preferences to jurisdictions with ‘Commonwealth' status, similarly enjoyed status-based preferences within many Commonwealth territories (including the UK) and as late as February 1959 clearly recognized in its internal documents that its special trading arrangements including in the crucial UK market were embedded within the ‘Commonwealth preference system'.
64
Although considered less critical than the preferences vis-à-vis people, the safeguarding of these arrangements including from third country challenge was a central rationale for Ireland's attempt to establish a reciprocal non-‘foreign' basis for its relationship with Commonwealth countries during its exit. Likewise, its most-favoured nation treaty with the United States concluded in 1950 expressly saved goods preferences accorded by Ireland ‘to members of the British Commonwealth of Nations and their dependent territories’.
65
Throughout the 1950s Ireland continued with these special Commonwealth tariff arrangements and ‘[i]n many cases the rate accorded [all] Commonwealth countries [in Ireland was] the same as that given to the United Kingdom and Canada'.
66
Similarly, to cite one Commonwealth example, ‘the Republic of Ireland receive[d] the same tariff treatment in Australia as the United Kingdom', such that ‘[i]n effect the Irish Republic [was] receiving all the benefits of the United Kingdom and Australia Trade Agreement (the Ottawa Agreement)'.
67
The combined effect of these arrangements was seen as being important to the depressed 1950s Irish economy as this evocative 1957 quote from a report of the Australian Charge d'Affairs in Dublin highlights: On a long-range basis, one is inevitably forced into a comparison between Ireland and Newfoundland. Their two economic histories have run largely in parallel since Ireland became a separate entity. Both have enjoyed the benefits of Imperial [sic] Preference, but both have presented much the same picture, until the time when Newfoundland joined Canada.
68
Commonwealth links were also not irrelevant to Ireland's plans for economic expansion. Indeed, during a visit to West Germany in 1955, the Irish Tánaiste (Deputy Prime Minister) William Norton reportedly stressed that ‘[i]n return for German capital and technical skill' Ireland was ‘able to offer a privileged access to the British and Dominion markets, to which many Irish-manufactured goods have the right of admission duty-free'. 69 The importance of this position was enhanced by the fact that, as a result of a desire to maintain its general protectionism, 1950s Ireland did not join either GATT or EFTA.
Nevertheless, care must be taken not to exaggerate the cohesiveness, centrality or solidity of these arrangements. Firstly, Ireland's association with the Commonwealth preference system ultimately remained only an external one. Thus, not only did India and Pakistan decide ‘not [to] give preferential treatment to Irish goods' 70 but Ireland took no part in gatherings such as the 1958 Conference even though it was ‘anxious to attend'. 71 (This institutional aspect will be further considered in the next main section). Second, and most crucially, the UK was the only Commonwealth country with which Ireland maintained a vital economic relationship. Moreover, although this market at least in terms of exports remained overwhelmingly dominant, even this showed some evidence of decline. Thus, whereas the UK (including Northern Ireland/The Six Counties) was the destination of 86.7 per cent of Irish exports in 1950, this had reduced to 73.8 per cent by 1959. Thirdly, Ireland as much as any other country was aware of the declining salience of Commonwealth preferences. Indeed, albeit in response to fears about the impact on Ireland should the UK modify or even eliminate status-based/Commonwealth preferences, the Irish Taoiseach Sean Lemass stated in July 1959 that ‘[i]t would seem that the Commonwealth preference policy is weakening now everywhere' and sought to argue that Ireland's ‘economic relations with Great Britain do not rest upon Commonwealth preference; they rest on the bilateral Trade Agreement of 1938'. 72 This purported reorientation was a harbinger of the attempt from 1961 by both the UK and Ireland to join the European Economic Community (EEC) which, reflecting the practical dominance of links with Britain, was expressly made contingent in Ireland's case on a successful UK application. 73 Although only achieved in January 1973, these developments would ultimately fundamentally transform Commonwealth trading arrangements. Nevertheless, it remains manifest that, both vis-à-vis its bilateral agreements with the UK (as well as Canada and South Africa) and as regards the status-based advantages it gave and also received, Ireland in the 1950s was clearly externally associated with the so-called Commonwealth preference system and that this was of significance to it throughout the decade.
Economic linkages within the Commonwealth were constituted not merely by tariff preferences but also by the financial relationships which coalesced within the setting of the Sterling Area. In terms of its core practical impact, the Sterling Area was merely a temporary expedient which never had a direct membership exactly coterminous with that of the Commonwealth itself. However, in practice, this arrangement was coordinated through Commonwealth institutions and ensured a degree of Commonwealth economic cohesion over several decades which (while reducing) was more substantial even than the tariff arrangements. As will be seen, although generally only externally associated with the relevant Commonwealth institutions, Ireland was fully integrated into the Sterling Area and indeed had a particularly strong practical and legal relationship with Pound Sterling. The deep origins of the Sterling Area trace to the importance of London as a ‘world banker' and the tendency of British territories to establish a policy ‘for commercial convenience, of maintaining a fixed parity between the local currency and Pound Sterling'. 74 However, it was only when Sterling was forced off the Gold Standard in 1931 that a discrete Area began to emerge, with those countries which remained linked with Sterling being almost entirely confined to the Commonwealth and only one Commonwealth country (namely, Canada, which thereafter linked to the dollar) deciding to break its link to Sterling at this time. During the Second World War, the Sterling countries implemented external exchange controls, many accumulated substantial sterling balances on credit, and a common dollar pool was organized for transactions requiring the use of this currency. Notwithstanding an abortive attempt to restore Sterling convertibility in 1947, this system which ‘permit[ted] the maximum freedom of transfer within the area and an absolute control of external transitions' 75 became an integral part of the postwar environment. Similarly to all other European currencies which imposed ‘tight exchange control' 76 in the postwar period, the Sterling Area liberalized throughout the 1950s. In particular, in 1954–5 the freedom to conduct external transfers for payment purposes was extended to all non-dollar countries and by the end of the 1959 current account convertibility was achieved (including for dollar countries). Nevertheless, ‘[t]ight controls remained on capital transitions, including international borrowing and investment' 77 with capital controls even increasing throughout the 1950s (and 1960s). Although ultimate decision-making as regards Sterling itself rested with the UK (and likewise other Sterling countries maintained final decision-making over their own currencies), there was a great deal of multilateral Sterling Area coordination within what were essentially Commonwealth institutions. In July 1949 a Commonwealth Finance Ministers' Meeting jointly formulated the Area's rules and procedures including as regards the dollar pool and throughout the 1950s these Meetings considered the details of ‘Sterling Area policy’, with Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meetings discussing the same policy ‘in broad principle'. 78 Meanwhile, the routine work of ‘examining the operations of the Sterling Area and recommending policy' 79 was ensured through two bodies which included representatives of all Commonwealth countries (including Canada), namely, the Sterling Area Statistical Committee and the wider Commonwealth Liaison Committee. In 1955 the first committee was merged into the latter. 80
Right from when Ireland became an independent State, the Irish Pound/Punt had an especially strong relationship with Pound Sterling based on one-to-one parity and, at least from 1927, a statutory underpinning. 81 Not only did post-1949 Ireland stay within the Sterling Area (thus joining a handful of Area members outside the Commonwealth 82 ) but, according to Seán McBride writing while Minister for External Affairs in late 1949, it remained ‘the only member of the sterling area that does maintain statutory parity with the pound'. 83 Despite McBride's unsuccessful attempt to revisit this statutory link when Sterling was forced into a 30.5 per cent devaluation against the US dollar in September 1949, all of these connections continued unimpaired throughout the 1950s (and beyond). 84 Moreover, in recognition of its strength, Ireland was uniquely allowed to remain a non-Commonwealth member of the Sterling Area Statistical Committee. 85 Nevertheless, it was immediately excluded from high-level bodies concerned with Sterling Area policy, including all meetings of both Commonwealth Finance and Prime Ministers, which paradoxically made it more reliant on its UK bilateral relationship. 86 Moreover, Ireland's overtures to remain associated with the Commonwealth Liaison Committee were rejected 87 and so when the Statistical Committee merged into this from 1955 onwards Ireland ceased to be a member of any multilateral Sterling Area institution. Therefore, at least from this point, Ireland was only externally associated with the Sterling Area's management. Nevertheless, it remained tightly within the Sterling Area itself and this connection greatly strengthened Ireland's external association with the Commonwealth in the economic sphere.
While emphasizing 1950s Ireland's continuing citizenship, trade and financial ties to the Commonwealth, the analysis above has also noted Ireland's exclusion from a variety of fora concerned with the development and/or discussion of Commonwealth policy in these and indeed other areas. This exclusion was stuck to even in the face of Irish pleas for inclusion as occurred vis-à-vis the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference at Montreal in 1958. Thus, although the Irish were ‘anxious to attend' and ‘endeavoured to secure an invitation to it through the good offices of the Canadians'
88
such exceptionalism was strongly resisted especially by the UK, with the advice relayed to its High Commissioner in Ottawa being that it would ‘be entirely inappropriate and contrary to the nature of the Commonwealth relationship to ask countries outside the Commonwealth, whether or not they were former members to attend what is purely a Commonwealth occasion'.
89
Ireland similarly did not participate in high-level political consultations including the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting, an absence which not only reflected the practical situation pre-cession during the 1930s but was potentially entirely consonant with an ongoing but [T]he policy of treating the Irish Republic and Irish Republican citizens as non-foreign applies only in a limited sphere, and there is nothing to suggest that representatives of the Republic abroad should enjoy any special position vis-à-vis their colleagues representing the United Kingdom, much less those representing the other members of the Commonwealth. They are in fact in the same position as representatives of any friendly foreign State. … [O]n leaving the Commonwealth, the Irish Republic was excluded from the established system of Commonwealth consultation.
91
This Circular was principally prompted by an indication in October 1951 from the UK Ambassador to France that he was ‘all in favour' of acceding to the wish of Con Cremin, the Irish Ambassador to France from 1950 to 1954, to attend the regular (in principle, monthly) dinners of Commonwealth Heads of Missions in Paris which had recently been established.
92
The Foreign Office promptly stated that in its ‘view' it would be ‘quite wrong for Cremin to take part in dinners which are of an avowedly Commonwealth character for business discussions' and provided the following rationale: Consultation and exchange of information with our fellow members of the Commonwealth is quite different from our exchange of views with other friendly governments, including the Irish Republic. We pass information to the Commonwealth, including the new members, unless we have good reason for not doing so simply in order to be of service to them, and regardless of whether they have a direct interest in the matter or we wish to elicit their views.
The reply also noted that it was ‘quite possible that Cremin himself might get a rap over the knuckles from his Government for taking part in an avowedly Commonwealth gathering'.
93
In fact, the Irish themselves had established a similar ‘general rule' in July 1950, although with the caveats that it ‘need not be interpreted as applying to smaller engagements of a semi-private character' and that exceptions might be made with special authorization.
94
However, it would appear that these various strictures were simply ignored (or, at least, circumvented on the basis that the meetings were merely a ‘social occasion'
95
). Thus, a letter sent to the Irish Department of External Affairs (DEA) by Cremin's successor, William Fay, in May 1957 stated that Cremin had told the DEA on 7 December 1954 that ‘it was his practice to accept' invitations to these dinners. Fay also revealed that the Irish Embassy had even hosted such a dinner in January 1957 and sought authorization for such engagements to continue. He stressed that at these gatherings ‘there is a distinct willingness to talk about general political problems and current affairs, particularly French policy and politics, and the exchange of views is often useful and valuable'. Moreover, in stark contrast to the UK Circular, he argued that: [T]he invitation to the Irish Ambassador to attend these Commonwealth dinners can be looked upon as the logical outcome of the Agreement shared by all the Commonwealth partners in 1949 which, whilst recognizing our departure from the Commonwealth, emphasised their desire that we should not be regarded as foreigners in any of the Commonwealth countries.
96
The DEA's reply sent later that month confirmed the Minister's view that he ‘does not see any reason to change the existing practice'. 97 Although these Parisian diplomatic arrangements were particularly close, they were not entirely anomalous. For example, in July 1956 an official in Ireland's UN Mission in New York informed the DEA that the British UN Mission had stated ‘that the Commonwealth nations meet together once or twice a month to inform each other of developments though not necessarily to commit themselves to any joint course of action' and indicated that ‘[t]hey would be very happy to keep us advised of the discussions in those meetings'. 98 A reply from DEA the following month confirmed that ‘it would certainly be desirable to be kept informed of proceedings at these meetings if this were possible on a basis which did not commit us to any definite association with the group’. 99 Finally, it should be noted that the UK Commonwealth Relations Office rather than its Foreign Office remained responsible for relations with Ireland 100 and a similar division of responsibility was retained in some other Commonwealth states. 101
Even during Ireland's secession in 1949, hopes were expressed that special arrangements might reach well beyond ‘non-foreign' treatment in the areas of citizenship and trade. Thus, in addition to the Sterling Area Statistical Committee position noted above, Ireland informed the UK's Commonwealth Relations Office that they were ‘quite prepared to continue to cooperate' with the Commonwealth Liaison Committee ‘if satisfactory basis could be found' and furthermore that its Department of Agriculture were ‘anxious to continue its association with the work of the Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux' having found ‘the technical and scientific work of the Bureau very useful’. 102 At least privately, McBride as Minister for External Affairs also indicated that he ‘would strongly favour representation' at meetings of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA). 103 As seen above, no association with the Commonwealth Liaison Committee proved possible and Irish participation in the Sterling Area Statistical Committee was also lost when that body was merged into the Liaison Committee in 1955. In contrast, in 1949–50, Ireland did become a Commonwealth Agricultural Bureau (CAB) Associate, a status which involved a reduction in its financial contribution from 5 to 3 (out of 170) units and the loss of its representation on the Executive Council (although not the right to attend Intergovernmental Review Conferences). 104 Likewise by 1952 Ireland (through the Irish Parliamentary Association) had been recognized as an ‘associated group' of the CPA with the right to take part in at least some of its Conference although not to raise ‘controversial intra-Commonwealth subjects'. 105 Moreover, during the 1950s Ireland was an ‘observer' 106 at a number of official Commonwealth technical fora, including conferences of Commonwealth Survey Officers in both 1955 and 1959, 107 Commonwealth Statisticians in 1951, 1955 and 1960 108 and conferences on standards 109 and meteorology 110 in 1959. Ireland's non-member engagement with Commonwealth bodies was particularly broad and its associate status within the CAB was entirely sui generis. Nevertheless, it was not associated with most of the Commonwealth's principal functional institutions including the Commonwealth Economic Committee, Commonwealth Liaison Committee and Commonwealth Telecommunications Board. Moreover, excepting the CAB, Ireland's involvement remained essentially consultative rather than extending to Commonwealth or Commonwealth-related cooperative endeavours. For example, it sought no part in the Colombo Plan, a multilateral aid framework targeted at Asia which ‘began as a result of a meeting of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers in Colombo in 1950' and where, throughout the 1950s, ‘the element of Commonwealth influence and joint endeavour … remained a strong one'. 111 Likewise, despite noting calls within the UK Parliament for Irish citizens to be included as potential award beneficiaries, 112 Ireland did not engage with the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan which was set up in 1958–9 and was quickly administering over a thousand academic awards for study in Anglophone universities. 113 In light of Ireland's straightened economic circumstances in the 1950s, its absence from the Colombo Plan donor list is readily comprehensible. In contrast, given both the presence of several leading Anglophone universities within Ireland (which did retain some connection with the Association of Universities of the British Commonwealth) 114 and the large number of Irish students studying within the Commonwealth (principally in the UK), the failure to seek some engagement with the educational Plan is more surprising but reflects Ireland's highly pragmatic approach to its, albeit significant, Commonwealth connections. Ireland was also not the only non-member country to establish special connections with Commonwealth and Commonwealth-related consultation and cooperation during the 1950s. To the contrary, the United States through its Congress was also an associate of the CPA (and had in fact helped initiate such an arrangement during the war in 1943), 115 joined the Colombo Plan (as did a number of other non-Commonwealth donors and recipient countries) 116 and sent representatives to conferences of Commonwealth Survey Officers in both 1955 and 1959 (where, in each case, a few further non-Commonwealth countries were also represented). 117 Finally, Irish experience with the CPA highlights that, when formal interactions extended beyond technical areas, tensions could easily emerge. In sum, paralleling similar actions conducted within the newly established Council of Europe, 118 Ireland's principal concern here was to further ‘the campaign against [the] Partition' between Northern Ireland (a continuing part of the UK) and Ireland itself. 119 However, when Irish delegates to the 1952 Conference sought to raise this topic concerns were immediately voiced that this violated the prohibition on associates raising ‘controversial intra-Commonwealth subjects' 120 and the Irish contributions to the proceedings were only printed in a brief summary. In 1953 the CPA Council endorsed this previous ruling and Ireland excluded itself from such gatherings for the rest of the decade. 121 However, and notwithstanding all these caveats, 1950s Ireland did establish a particularly broad and sometimes even deep connection with a number of Commonwealth bodies and also enjoyed an informal associate status within certain diplomatic circles as the Parisian Commonwealth dinners example above vividly highlights. All these connections strengthened Ireland's informal external association with the Commonwealth throughout the 1950s.
The preceding discussion has amply demonstrated that Ireland remained concretely associated with the Commonwealth, especially in the areas of citizenship, tariff and monetary relations, took part in a number of Commonwealth discussions mainly concerned with technical subjects and, in the area of agricultural research and information exchange, even engaged in active cooperation. Throughout the 1950s, the UK's Commonwealth Relations Office argued that Ireland's ‘special position' provided ‘a striking illustration of the capacity of the Commonwealth to adjust itself to changing circumstances' but also emphasized that Ireland ‘no long receives the constant flow of information on foreign policy and economic affairs which goes to Commonwealth countries, nor is she invited to attend conferences of Commonwealth ministers'. 122 Ireland therefore did not enjoy equal ‘rights, status and privileges' 123 in the shaping of the Commonwealth policy environment even on topics with which it remained strongly engaged. Finally, in contrast to the formal position during Ireland's secession in 1948–9, the London Declaration of April 1949 had clarified that Commonwealth membership no longer necessarily required any internal recognition of the Crown. These various factors raise the question of whether 1940s Ireland ever sought to rejoin the Commonwealth on this new basis and, if not, why not.
During the secession negotiations in 1948, Irish Ministers within the Fine Gael-led Government had agreed to consider ‘after an interval' seeking Commonwealth re-entry ‘on some basis (e.g., common citizenship) not involving any connection with the Crown'. 124 Moreover, in September 1949, the Leader of Fianna Fáil Éamon de Valera who was then in Opposition made clear to British Labour MP Lynn Ungoed-Thomas that he ‘clearly regretted’ Ireland's secession announcement and explicitly stated that the ‘Indian Commonwealth solution would have exactly met his position'. 125 However, neither the Fine Gael-led Government which held power until June 1951, the Fianna Fáil Government which ruled from then until June 1954 or the Fine Gael-led Administration which then governed Ireland until March 1957 made any attempt to reopen this. Instead, most Irish politicians stuck to a ‘rigidly “non possum” attitude'. 126 Nevertheless, from early 1957, a wider public debate emerged which appeared to show substantial support for a reapplication. This debate traced to a suggestion of Cardinal d'Alton, the Catholic Archbishop of Armagh (and Primate of All Ireland), in February 1957 that a reunited Ireland should rejoin the Commonwealth ‘on the same basis as India'. 127 In May 1957, a motion carried 16–18 at the Trinity College Dublin Historical Society held that Ireland as presently constituted should rejoin. 128 While such support within a Protestant institution was perhaps predictable, a more notable result emerged in November 1959 when the Dublin Institute of Catholic Sociology Debating Society voted similarly (albeit only 87–83) in a debate presided over by Fine Gael politician Liam Cosgrove TD (Teachta Dála) who expressed his ‘surprise'. 129 The previous year, the retiring Professor of History at University College Galway Mary O'Sullivan also argued for a reapplication, stating that nationalism was obsolete and that the only way to solve Partition was to accept it. 130 In some contrast, a ‘Brains Trust' on this topic organized by the Dublin Branch of the Nigerian Union of Great Britain and Ireland in February 1960 came to the conclusion that ‘in present circumstances' this was not desirable. Nevertheless, one of its members – the Leader of the National Progressive Democrats Noel Browne TD – stressed that ‘economically' Ireland was ‘still a member of the Commonwealth', although (in a sign of things to come) another member – Professor Dudley Edwards of University College Dublin – argued that Ireland should connect itself with a European organization which included Britain. 131 Finally, in June 1960 Fine Gael politician Patrick Bryne TD used the Dáil Committee on Finance's External Affairs debate to ‘deplore the fact that we are no longer members of the Commonwealth’, stating further that ‘[w]e could do tremendous good for humanity if we were still participating in that effort' and labelling it a ‘tragedy' that Ireland was ‘absent from the recent Commonwealth conference'. 132
Although several Irish politicians actively participated in this renewed debate, Irish politics was only very moderately influenced by its tenor. For example, Fine Gael did not modify its policy position even when James Dillon, the only TD who had advocated that Ireland join the rest of the Commonwealth as an ally in World War Two, became the new leader of the party in October 1959.
133
Turning to Fianna Fáil and de Valera who had returned to Government in March 1957, in September 1957 de Valera indicated to Labour Peer (and long-time friend of Ireland) Lord Pakenham that ‘he would not have any objection to [Ireland] being associated with the Commonwealth on the basis of the Indian formula as a step concomitant with the unification of the country' but did ‘not intend to take an initiative' on this and, furthermore, that there was ‘no question whatever’ of such an association absent unification.
134
Although unequivocally committed to the need for Northern Ireland consent,
135
the UK Government was not fundamentally opposed to Irish unification as was confirmed when the Irish took up a conversation on this subject with the UK's Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, Lord Home, in October 1957. Home recognized that such a united Ireland ‘might possibly consider returning to the Commonwealth' but nevertheless saw it as ‘improbable' that it would ‘be prepared to consider accepting allegiance to the Queen’ which, given that the Northern Ireland people wished to maintain such allegiance, he saw as ‘a big problem'. He therefore asked if the Irish Government had thought ‘for instance, of some system of federation under which the allegiance' of Northern Ireland inhabitants ‘could be preserved’. The Irish Government's response not only indicated that this was impossible but also refused to even confirm whether or not ‘re-entry to the Commonwealth [itself] could be envisaged'.
136
Nevertheless, during a visit to London in March 1958 de Valera publicly confirmed the position he had put to Lord Pakenham
137
and privately indicated to Lord Home that the UK should propose such an initiative as a ‘solution' to Partition.
138
However, the UK Government clearly saw this suggestion as impracticable and in September 1960 its Dublin Embassy noted that, following Seán Lemass replacing de Valera as Taoiseach (in June 1959), the Irish Government had not returned to it.
139
This attempt to tie formal reengagement with the Commonwealth to an initiative to end Partition mirrored the Irish Government's earlier stance regarding potential NATO membership
140
and was similarly doomed to failure. The UK Embassy kept a close eye on the broader public debate on Commonwealth membership within Ireland, even sending their Information Office to observe the Dublin Institute's debate in November 1959. Writing to the UK Commonwealth Relations Office with notes on that meeting, a senior Embassy official confirmed that ‘[i]n private conversation people of the professional and similar classes are very liable to say to me that it is high time this country rejoined the Commonwealth and that she should never have left it'. However, he also opined that the UK might ‘not wish to accept' Ireland back into the Commonwealth given that it had ‘voluntarily departed'.
141
In any case, after analysing wider interventions including by Patrick Byrne, Professor O'Sullivan and the Brains Trust mentioned above, another senior British Embassy official concluded in June 1960 that: The question of the Republic rejoining the Commonwealth is … in no sense a live or a contentious issue…. The question has therefore become, rather like partition, primarily a theoretical one, outside the realm of practical politics, and consequently a safe subject for polite disagreements.
142
Such an analysis was accurate. Notwithstanding Ireland's continuing strong association with the Commonwealth during this period and a diffuse yet widespread feeling that the formalization of this through membership could improve the country's position, the unresolved issue of Partition and the long history of conflict which surrounded it posed a huge impediment to any serious political initiative. An unwillingness to overcome this impediment was reinforced by a recognition that the Commonwealth itself was becoming less central to concrete links including in the crucial UK context.
External association with the Commonwealth was an idea which arose in Ireland, firstly as a theory at the time of Irish independence in the early 1920s and then as a practice which Ireland sought to put into effect from the mid-1930s. However, this concept was not generally accepted and when Ireland seceded in 1948–9 it was seen by the Commonwealth's other constituents as doing so as a member. How to characterize Ireland's relationship with the Commonwealth after 1949 remains contested, with very different perspectives being proffered within an (albeit small) literature. Particular complexities arise not only as a result of the somewhat opaque negotiations Ireland conducted at this time (directly only with Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK but arguably indirectly with the wider Commonwealth) but because the Commonwealth itself was transforming as exemplified by the London Declaration granting full membership to an Indian Republic. Nevertheless, that London meeting, including both its Declaration and Interpretative Minute on preferential treatment, establishes a basis for conceptualizing the Commonwealth as it continued to change during the 1950s. In turn, this also provides a means to assess whether Ireland remained, albeit only externally, associated with the Commonwealth in its continuing areas of common concern and, if so, on what basis.
This article has clearly established that 1950s Ireland did (re)establish an
Although sadly neglected in recent scholarship, an analysis of Ireland's informal association with the Commonwealth post-1949 exposes much about both Ireland and the Commonwealth. Thus, although the wider literature has recognized that ‘[t]he defining strategic issue for Irish foreign policy makers in the immediate post-war years remained Ireland's asymmetrical relationship with Britain', 144 this article reveals that much of this remained embedded within a Commonwealth context and that this linked, in turn, to ongoing Irish interest in wider forms of Commonwealth collaboration throughout the 1950s. Ireland's sui generis Commonwealth relationship can also provide further evidence of the ‘experimental [and] tentative nature’ 145 of the Commonwealth itself. Nevertheless, and paradoxically, a close mapping of Ireland's engagement with the Commonwealth in its principal areas of concern – namely, citizenship, tariffs, finance, consultation and cooperation – additionally reveals the often rather concrete and tangible nature of Commonwealth association in the 1950s. During the subsequent period, the Commonwealth's nature would be fundamentally altered and many of its historic links severely eroded or even extinguished. Nevertheless, it is clear that at least until Ireland and the UK joined the European Economic Committee in 1973 and the five-year transitional period had come to an end in 1977, Ireland's Commonwealth relationships still had some salience. 146 Subsequent work will therefore take this this story into the 1960s and 1970s as both the Commonwealth and Ireland continued to transform.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank those who gave feedback on this research at a University of Auckland seminar, the anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments and the University of Cambridge's Yorke Fund for its support.
