Abstract
All studies of the last military dictatorship in Argentina have underlined that in December 1983 a constitutional government that assumed office when democracy was restored faced a chaotic macroeconomic situation in a heavily indebted country. Most relevant writings, however, have not examined in detail how and why this regime was unable to solve this problem. This article therefore examines a short period during which minister of economy Roberto T. Alemann, an influential orthodox representative of Argentina's establishment, tried to consolidate Argentina's foreign debt and rebuild relations with international financiers. It is based mainly on recently declassified primary sources from British and Argentine archives. A first section focuses on the reasons of his rise to office and some relevant traits of his early economic program. Thereafter the impact of an unexpected war with Britain, and how and why the minister's emergency foreign debt policies hastily substituted for his initial program are examined. Finally the epilogue assesses the record of an aborted interlude which was the springboard for the outbreak of one of the most notorious foreign debt crises of the early 1980s, and a millstone for the incoming constitutional government in 1983.
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