Manipulating Friends: Mossad's Covert Operations and Disinformation in Europe

Abstract

Alongside targeted killing operations, intelligence agencies often organize disinformation campaigns to cast doubts about who is behind the murders. While there is a large body of literature that researches intelligence agencies’ efforts to influence the views of an enemy (such as propaganda or disinformation campaigns), this article looks at it differently: how does a disinformation campaign look like to influence the views of friendly counties or allies? The article focuses on specific reports sent by Mossad to European intelligence agencies during the early 1970s when Mossad was running a targeted assassination campaign in Europe. The reports that Mossad shared with its European partners provided alternative ways of interpreting Mossad assassinations. The article identifies two purposes of these cables beyond exchanging information: they allowed Mossad to feed disinformation to European agencies to deflect responsibility for the killings away from Israel. Later, they allowed European governments to plausibly deny knowledge of Israeli responsibility for Palestinian deaths and to continue to share intelligence with Mossad about Palestinian terrorist groups. This article advances current understandings of how states try to manipulate other states’ behaviour, and how friendly relations can be abused to foster one's own interests.

An intelligence agency's efforts to deceive its enemies can take many forms. Typically, such operations are known as disinformation or propaganda campaigns, which often support an ongoing covert operation. Research on disinformation campaigns by various intelligence agencies is vast. ¹ Most studies look at an agency's effort to deceive its enemies. ² But what about an agency's efforts to deceive its friends? This is a topic that is much less researched and is this article's focus.

The article centres on a Mossad covert assassination campaign in the 1970s, called Operation Wrath of God, and its corresponding disinformation efforts. The article examines specific Israeli intelligence reports that were sent to European intelligence agencies. Normally, these cables would not stick out and could be read as routine and genuine alerts. However, when one puts these cables into the broader context of Operation Wrath of God, as this article does, a different reading of these cables appears.

The suspicion that Mossad was using intelligence-sharing to manipulate a partner agency's views was shared by the CIA leadership in the 1970s and 1980s. Allegedly, the CIA chief of the Israeli desk, James Jesus Angleton, and his counterterrorism team believed that Israeli intelligence was mainly used to serve Israeli political goals. It was assumed that the information received by Mossad was not trustworthy and that it was sent with the purpose of altering the way the USA would see the Palestinians. ³

The research for this article builds on these intelligence assessments and advances current understandings of how states try to manipulate other states’ behaviour, and how friendly relations can be abused to foster one's own interests. This article further expands the concept of disinformation. It shows that disinformation is not limited to propaganda campaigns or operations that target public opinion. As the article suggests, disinformation includes efforts of an intelligence agency to change the opinion of friendly agencies via intelligence-sharing.

In this vein, the article argues that cables sent by Mossad were initially meant to deviate suspicions away from Mossad as perpetrator of Operation Wrath of God assassinations. Mossad tried to enhance the plausibility of these messages by burying the misleading information in a wealth of accurate intelligence. These cables changed in purpose, however, once it had become publicly known that Mossad was behind the assassinations (such as when Mossad was blamed for the murder cases by mainstream newspapers like Le Monde). ⁴

An intelligence agency could refer to these alternative ways of explaining the murder cases when bringing up the assassinations in correspondence between European and Israeli agencies. European agencies could refer to an assassination without having to ever mention any suspicions that Mossad was behind the murders. It allowed to uphold otherwise well-functioning and highly esteemed intelligence cooperation.

This intelligence cooperation took place in a multilateral intelligence-sharing platform that was established to collectively counter Palestinian terrorism in Europe. This intelligence-sharing liaison, which will be described in more detail further below, operated under the codeword Kilowatt and was created in 1971. By 1973 it had become an important and trusted intelligence-sharing tool to counter the mounting threat of Palestinian terrorism. ⁵

The cables that were sent and received among the Kilowatt group constitute the archival source base of this article. I received unredacted and complete access to all records of this secret multilateral communication channel from the Swiss National Archives in Bern. ⁶ In 1971, members of the Kilowatt group had agreed to not send cables bilaterally but to include all Kilowatt members in each message. Hence, by accessing the cables that were received and sent by one member, in this case Swiss intelligence, I was able to gain access to all cables sent among the Kilowatt group. This allowed me to reconstruct exactly which agency shared what type of intelligence, to whom, and at what time. The time frame for this article ranges from 1972 to 1973, which is when Operation Wrath of God was primarily running.

How does deception through intelligence-sharing work? One element that an agency can exploit, in this case Mossad, is that information received by a foreign agency is nearly impossible to verify. In order to do so, one would need to know where exactly the information came from. However, information provided by a foreign connection was often based (or was claimed to be based) on sensitive sources, such as spies or human informants. If an agency were to reveal its sources, it bore the risk of compromising the people who provided the intelligence. As a consequence, when an agency received foreign intelligence, it had very little tangible criteria to judge whether the information was correct and whether it could be used as a basis to advise decision-makers.

For an agency to nevertheless judge the veracity of a piece of intelligence, the sending agency's reputation and previous track record are central. Hence, if an agency had continuously provided intelligence that turned out to be accurate, others were more likely to trust its intelligence in the future. On the flip side, however, once a trusting relation had been established, the receiving agency bore a risk of falling prey to manipulation.

In the case of Mossad, intelligence shared by Israeli agencies within the Kilowatt liaison generally appeared as reliable. While American intelligence agencies may have been critical of Israeli intentions, generally Mossad aimed to come across as very well informed about Palestinian terrorism (especially since Israeli interests were the main targets of Palestinian armed groups). Furthermore, Mossad's cables always included a comment suggesting where the information had come from. Phrases like the following were frequently included: ‘source: has access to terrorist circles’. Mossad cables also mentioned the date of the intelligence received and included an assessment of the likely accuracy of the information.

Having established a track record of sharing accurate intelligence, Mossad could occasionally include some cables that were aimed to mislead its audience. Namely, Israeli intelligence alerted Kilowatt members that Palestinians were using killing methods that were either typical methods of Mossad operations, or that would cast suspicions away from Mossad in the event of an assassination.

Correspondence shows three examples of information sent to sow doubt about Mossad as the perpetrator of an Operation Wrath of God killing operation. First, Mossad claimed that Palestinians were using car bombs as a terrorist strategy. The first cables with these warnings were sent in April 1973, possibly when Mossad was planning for the next assassinations in Rome and Paris, where each of the victims died in a car bomb. From what is known from the secondary literature and contemporary journalistic accounts, Palestinian groups had at the time not used car bombs as a terrorist tactic.

Second, Mossad issued several warnings about the risk of Palestinian suicide attacks. If Europeans believed that Palestinians were organizing suicide attacks, they were more likely to interpret a deadly explosion as a suicide attack gone awry, as opposed to a Mossad operation. Comparing this intelligence report again with what is known today, suicide missions were not used as a tactic by Palestinian groups.

Third, Mossad claimed that Palestinians were carrying silencers and were organizing targeted assassinations. If Europeans believed that Palestinians were killing each other, such as in inner-Palestinian feuds, and this even in the same way as Mossad killed Palestinians, any assassinated Palestinian could have also been shot by a fellow traveller and not necessarily by Mossad.

Each of these cases is discussed in a section of the article, after a background section that provides more context about the intelligence-sharing framework Kilowatt and Mossad's Operation Wrath of God.

In terms of the historical backdrop of the events described in this article, in October 1972, the Israeli government mandated its foreign intelligence agency, Mossad, to initiate an assassination campaign that was meant to target Palestinian terrorists operating in Europe. The purpose of this covert action was to avenge past terrorist victims (especially those killed at the Munich Olympics Massacre), to disrupt current terrorist plans, and to deter anyone from perpetrating future terrorist actions. This assassination campaign is known today as Operation Wrath of God (Hebrew: מבצע זעם האל Mivtza Za'am Ha'el) and is one of Mossad's most spectacular targeted killing operations. The operation consisted of ten missions to kill Palestinians who were directly or loosely associated with Palestinian terrorism.

Eight of these assassinations took place in Europe, between October 1972 and July 1973. The methods by which the Palestinian targets were killed included: placing explosives in their homes or cars, as well as shooting them point-blank as they were walking in a street. As will be shown below, Mossad claimed that Palestinians were using these same killing methods to prepare for terrorist attacks or to settle internal disputes.

The framework where Mossad was sending these cables was under a cooperation scheme called Kilowatt, which was operated by the Club de Berne. This multilateral liaison is an association of the heads of domestic intelligence services primarily of Western European countries. Sources from Swiss archives suggest that the Club de Berne was established in 1969. ⁷ The Club's eight founding members were the intelligence agencies of the following countries, in alphabetical order: Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and West Germany. ⁸

The goal of the Club de Berne was to facilitate effective exchanges of information and knowledge about counterterrorism and counterespionage. The heads of the member services met twice a year for a threat evaluation, to set priorities in their operational work, and to determine where cooperation could be improved. Occasionally, specialized officers of the member countries also participated in workshops or training courses on relevant themes. The members of the Club de Berne deemed this personal contact among the leadership and the operational staff as extremely valuable and helpful to foster international counterterrorism cooperation. ⁹

Even though the Club included a relatively large group of intelligence agencies, its existence was kept entirely secret. In the case of Switzerland, where the Club was founded, only a handful of high government officials knew about the Club de Berne. In the early 1970s, these were the Minister of Interior, the head of Swiss intelligence, the attorney general, and the operational staff directly involved in the information exchanges. Other countries kept a similarly intense veil of secrecy.

In October 1971, Israel suggested to open a separate encrypted communications channel to warn each other and share intelligence about Palestinian terrorist activities in Europe. This channel sent cables under the codeword Kilowatt. In addition to the Club de Berne members, ten further countries were included in the Kilowatt encrypted telex system. From 1971 onward, Israel and the USA were included and gradually over the course of the decade Denmark, Canada, Australia, Ireland, Sweden, Norway, Austria, and Spain joined too. ¹⁰ This warning system was installed to prepare and protect against Palestinian terrorism.

From there developed a fruitful cooperation mechanism. Kilowatt was used on a daily basis by the agencies to track Palestinian organizations and share intelligence about terrorist operational methods, planned attacks, weapon acquisitions, and terrorist innovation techniques. All agencies replied timely to requests, especially when it was believed that a terrorist suspect was in their country. The information on suspects (mostly in Europe) included for instance what hotel a Palestinian terrorist suspect stayed, what phone numbers they called, flight routes if applicable, address, passport, or anything of relevance that could be found. Furthermore, agencies distributed general threat assessments or lessons learned after a successful attack.

This Kilowatt channel was the first multilateral counterterrorism warning channel. ¹¹ Cooperation continued over decades and has developed into a cross-country near-institutionalized intelligence apparatus. ¹² Today, the Club de Berne is the most important informal counterterrorism intelligence channel in Europe and among its partners. ¹³

Overall, Kilowatt cooperation was perceived as a strong and very useful counterterrorism medium, one that intelligence agencies believed to be efficient and effective. A considerable amount of sensitive information, which previously was only given to a handful of people within an administration, was now readily given to counterparts in other countries.

Concerning the claims that Palestinians were using car bombs, in early April 1973 Israel sent a warning to all Kilowatt channels about a new operational method of the Palestinians. The cable claimed that Palestinian armed groups were now using car bombs to attack Israeli embassy staff members. ¹⁴ The information was said to be ‘reliable’ based on a source ‘with access’. Mossad believed that the goal of Black September was to harm Israeli embassy personnel. However, because embassy security in Europe was too tight, the group needed to find new ways of attacking diplomats. Placing bombs under cars of embassy personnel, Mossad suggested, was a way for Black September to circumvent the high level of protection of embassy buildings. In previous months, several Black September attacks involved embassies or diplomatic staff, such as in Bangkok in December 1972 or in Khartoum in March 1973. It was thus reasonable to expect that diplomatic personnel remained an important terrorist target.

Mossad described this new operational method as follows: First, terrorists were trying to identify which cars belonged to embassy staff. They would then photograph the cars parked near embassies and keep them under surveillance to determine their owners’ home address. Next, terrorists would attach explosives to the cars that could be identified as belonging to embassy staff. Mossad thought that the explosion could either take place close to a staff member's home or near the embassy. The advantage of this method was, as mentioned, a way of bypassing embassy security. Another advantage was the fact that the explosion could be triggered by remote control, which would make it more difficult to capture or identify the perpetrator. ¹⁵

Israeli intelligence claimed that these terrorist plans were very advanced and that their implementation had already begun. Namely, on 27 March 1973, a Palestinian whose name was shared had allegedly arrived in Rome charged with this operation. This suspect was known to Mossad, and he had been mentioned in reports at the beginning of the year (1973) in relation to plans for a terrorist attack in Switzerland. He was said to have worked with the Libyan embassy and Mossad suspected that Libya supported these kinds of attacks in Europe. ¹⁶

This cable was sent in April 1973, and it is interesting to note that a few months after this cable was sent, Mossad killed two Operation Wrath of God victims, Abdel Hadi Nakaa and Abdel Hamid Shibli, through a car bomb in Rome in mid-June 1973. It might not have been a coincidence that Rome was mentioned in this cable. In the cable, Mossad further specified that preparations for such an attack were also underway in Paris. There, the cable claimed, two Arabs were spotted jotting down the licence plates of cars parked outside of the Israeli military purchasing mission. Interestingly, the other time Mossad killed its target via a car bomb was in Paris, when it assassinated Mohamed Boudia in late June 1973. Mossad specified though that such terrorism reconnaissance practices around Israeli targets had also been seen in other countries.

A month before, in March 1973, French authorities arrested a Mercedes car loaded with weapons. It was later revealed that the weapons were planned for the Black September attacks in France. Mossad referred to this arrest and saw it as further evidence for such a new operational method. Namely, Israel believed that more such vehicles with men, combat means, and especially explosives had already been in Western Europe (but had not yet been discovered) and more were believed to arrive further. Mossad also believed that Black September would adapt its operational methods after the arrest of the Mercedes and was likely going to change their transport routes. A possible route was said to be Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and East Germany, potentially using the crossing points between East- and West Berlin. ¹⁷

Assessing this cable in the broader context at the time, there is no mention in secondary literature that Palestinian violent groups were using car bombs as terrorist tactics. Given the lack of verisimilitude, it is likely that these warnings were meant to mislead European intelligence to divert suspicions away from Mossad after it used a car bomb to kill a target but also to foster a sense of comparison between Palestinian and Irish terrorism. At the time, Israelis were trying to convince European security agencies that the Palestinian armed struggle was as much of a threat as Northern Ireland's violent groups. By intimating that Palestinians were using a method typically used by PIRA at the time, Mossad was creating exactly such a comparison.

It is interesting to note that this warning was embedded in relevant and plausible-sounding intelligence about Palestinian operational methods, like embassies being a target or a reference to a recent case of weapons smuggling via a car. In terms of the art of deception, it is generally considered most effective and convincing when pieces of disinformation are weaved in together with accurate statements.

Regarding the claims that Palestinians were preparing suicide attacks, in mid-May 1973 Mossad informed about a new technical innovation in weaponry that was said to be in Palestinian terrorists’ hands. ¹⁸ The Israeli agency heard from a source ‘with access to terrorist circles’, but whose reliability had not yet been established, that the Palestinians received a cigar-shaped explosive charge. The consignment was said to have arrived from China to the Fatah in Syria. The delivery contained a cigar-shaped explosive charge, about 15 cm long, 2 cm thick, and was khaki coloured like a cigar.

The charge was described to contain small buckshot-size fragments and could be actuated when thrown on its head. The explosion was believed to cause serious damage over an area of about 20sqm and from close quarters the explosion was believed to be lethal. A terrorist could conceal the bomb when holding it like a regular cigar. The intended use of it was said to be as a last-resort explosion in case of a failing mission. Namely, should terrorists encounter difficulties in the execution of their task, such as the hijacking of a plane, they could throw it down to explode and transform it into a suicide mission. ¹⁹

In a similar vein, two days later Israel warned that Palestinian terrorists held another new easily camouflaged suicide-mission device. ²⁰ In this item, the explosives were concealed in a large Chianti flagon and could be used in suicide attacks against aircraft or other targets. The device was described to be a large wine-flagon that was covered in a woven straw bottom like Chianti bottles often were.

The mechanism of this explosive wine bottle was given in much detail, as follows: The bottom of the flagon was said to have been cut away and another, smaller bottle inserted so that the neck was to fit into the neck of the larger flagon. The smaller bottle was filled with wine so that if the device was tested for its contents by pouring, nothing suspicious could be noted. The empty space around the smaller bottle was said to be packed with about 10 kg of high explosives activated by a detonation device with a very short delay. The flagon was said to have a small wax seal concealing a cord and the mechanism was activated by pulling this cord. Mossad ‘believed this report to be highly reliable’ and referred to watt 6098 of 19 March 1973, which was about a new terrorist tactic of using duty free items in hand luggage as cover to smuggle weapons onto a plane. ²¹

Mossad emphasized that it had become increasingly difficult for terrorists to smuggle weapons and sabotage material across countries, onto planes, ships or into crowded public spaces. Given the enhanced security measures and these increased difficulties to perpetrate terrorist actions, Mossad thought it was to be expected that terrorists would attempt to create more complicated concealment devices like this one. Items which could pass as personal belongings were believed to be ideal for this.

As a follow-up to the cable about the Chianti bomb, a few days later, Israel sent further – very precise – details about the bottle's dimensions and measures, detonation mechanism, explosive charge, and exact camouflage technique of the Chianti bomb. ²² Mossad specified that, when knowing what to look for, an X-ray could identify the bomb in two ways. First, a screening would show the difference between the explosives and the wine. Second, the outline of the activation mechanism would become visible via X-rays. To facilitate detection, Israeli security promised to soon send a picture of such a bottle bomb.

As a concluding assessment, Mossad added that this lethal device indicated that Palestinian terrorists were planning suicide attacks to execute mass killings, most likely at airports, seaports, aeroplanes, and aboard ships. Mossad also believed that plans for these mass killings had reached an advanced stage of implementation. The Israeli agency therefore suggested that checks for Chianti bombs should be installed at all air- and seaports. Given that the use of this device was believed to be intended for mass killing, Israeli intelligence emphasized that these checks should be made before the entrance to the departure halls. Holding up to their promise, two weeks later in late May 1973, Mossad sent a picture of the bottle bomb and a closeup of its safety pin. ²³

In all three cables on this subject, Kilowatt cables 6112, 6114 and 6116, the title of the cable mentioned suicide mission as a new tactic and the core of the cable informed how the Palestinians went about to develop new explosive devices for such suicide missions. These new devices were described in much detail. It was further emphasized that it was likely that Palestinian terrorist groups were indeed to move their tactics towards suicide operations.

During that time, however, Palestinians were not perpetrating suicide missions. ²⁴ The first suicide attacks by a Muslim group started in Lebanon in the early 1980s. There was a first attack in 1981 and a subsequent Hezbollah suicide attack against the US Marine Corps Barracks in 1983. ²⁵ This attack in 1983 established suicide bombing as a terrorist tool, whereas it previously had mainly been used as an insurgent tactic against government and military targets. ²⁶

Given the absence of plans for suicide missions among Palestinian groups in the early 1970s and when placed in the broader context of Operation Wrath of God, these cables appear as Israeli disinformation. Those claims about Palestinian tactics prepared the ground for the idea that when an explosion happened it was a Palestinian suicide attack that went awry or a bomb that exploded prematurely. This could deviate suspicions away from Mossad as the perpetrator of an assassination. Like in previous disinformation cables, as mentioned in the previous section, these claims were embedded in pieces of plausible intelligence, such as the Palestinians’ strategy to find new ways of circumventing airport security.

Shortly after Swiss intelligence had received these cables from Mossad, the Swiss agency received a very similar warning from the Swiss national airline, Swissair. ²⁷ This warning suggested that Palestinian terrorists were trying to hide explosives in alcoholic bottles, particularly from the Chianti manufacturer due to their bigger bottle sizes. Swissair's message did not specify who had issued the warning. Generally, a warning is more credible when it is received through different sources. In the Swissair message the devices’ purpose for a suicide mission was taken out. Was this message also sent from Israel, but using a different channel? If so, the goal might have been to increase the credibility of part of the claims (terrorists using wine bottles) to make the content of the entire cable (using them for suicide missions) more believable.

With regard to the claims that Palestinians were using silencers to assassinate individuals, in early July 1973 Israeli intelligence sent out a warning about an imminent terrorist attack. ²⁸ Mossad received intelligence from a source whose reliability had yet not been tested, but who allegedly had access to terrorist circles. According to this report, a group of five Fatah terrorists were on their way from Damascus to West Germany. They had already flown to East Berlin and arrived there on 18 June 1973. Their intention was said to cross into West Germany on false Jordanian passports in order to carry out an attack against Israeli interests in Western Europe.

Six weeks before, on 18 June 1973, German intelligence had warned that Palestinian terrorists had been trying to reach West Germany via East-Berlin. ²⁹ Their goal, according to the cable sent by the BfV, was to organize an attack in Munich in September 1973, which would have been a year after the Munich Olympic Massacre. The Israeli cable referred to the BfV cable and speculated that this terrorist squad in charge of the Munich anniversary attack was the one Mossad had recently been warned about.

Mossad further mentioned that each of the terrorists allegedly had a 9-mm American pistol fitted with a silencer, which they dissembled and concealed in false bottoms in their suitcases. ³⁰ Because the squad had been given silencers, Mossad thought that their intentions were to kill specific persons and not installations. The possibility was however not ruled out that they were going to attack bigger targets, like an embassy, in order to penetrate it, gain control, and obtain the release of prisoners. There was also the possibility, as Mossad added, that the squad was going to split up into smaller units.

The cable included the names of the five Jordanian passports that the terrorists were likely to use for the border crossing. For each name, the cable included a physical description of the terrorists based on what Mossad called their ‘terrorist identity cards’. Cables often referred to this, which was a register of terrorist suspects with their names and pictures held and continuously updated by all Club de Berne and Kilowatt members (sometimes also called ‘terrorist album’). Mossad believed that the members of this squad had previously already used these passports to move from East to West, from where they transferred vehicles to Jordan. That meant that Germany might already have held records of these passports in their migration database. ³¹

It is interesting to note that the assumption that the terrorist squad held pistols with silencers was mentioned in the reference or title of the cable, thus highlighting this weapon appliance as a particularly important element. Here again, the question arises whether this might have been part of an Israeli disinformation attempt. Namely, by mentioning silencers, Mossad was again suggesting that Palestinians were using a killing method that had typically been used by Mossad for their assassinations. Again, this could deviate suspicions away from Mossad after a close-range shooting, given that Palestinians were said to also use this killing method.

In a similar vein as in the above-mentioned cases, the information was linked with plausible-sounding or cross-checked intelligence, like the reference to the German cable. First, the BfV warned about a terrorist squad coming to Europe and then Mossad added that they brought silencers with them.

By the same token, this might also have been a case of ‘mirror imaging’, namely that Israeli security was afraid that the Palestinians would use the same kind of killing method that Mossad used on them. Targeted killing as a means to retaliate against Operation Wrath of God had indeed happened. Black September killed Baruch Cohen, Vittorio Olivares, and then shortly after this cable was sent also the Joe Alon in Washington DC. Hence, the silencer cable can be seen in the context of Israeli disinformation but could also be a reflection of Operation Wrath of God methods and Palestinian terrorists adopting them themselves.

As an indication that warnings about suspects were taken seriously and that these ‘terrorist albums’ were indeed used among the agencies, a week later a man was arrested at London Heathrow. The reason for his arrest was that he looked similar to a suspect mentioned in Israel's cable alerting about the five men coming with silencer pistols, except that ‘he was not balding’. ³² British Airlines alerted MI5 about the arrival of this suspect since the airline held a list with names on a watchlist and MI5 compared the physical description to Mossad's cable. On the next day, MI5 announced a false alarm after the agency had been able to interview the suspect and his story and reason for visiting the UK were considered genuine. ³³

If these cables were indeed part of a disinformation campaign, one can ask the question here: did deception work? In most cases, the intelligence reports that were shared with the Kilowatt group after an assassination did indeed offer alternative explanations for why the person died. Mossad's killing methods that involved car bombs are particularly relevant in this context, and Kilowatt correspondence after such assassinations is worth taking a closer look at.

The first time Mossad assassinated a Palestinian terrorist via a car bomb was in Rome, in June 1973. It was no doubt a spectacular operation, where Mossad killed two Palestinians, Abdel Hadi Nakaa and Abdel Hamid Shibli, on their way to place a bomb at an office of the Israeli national airline, El-Al. A few days before, Mossad had received intelligence that two operatives had left for Rome to perpetrate a terrorist attack at the El-Al office. ³⁴ Mossad's team immediately reacted to this intelligence and travelled to Rome. All accounts of Operation Wrath of God agree that Israel had successfully thwarted an imminent attack by killing the two men. ³⁵

This story could also be confirmed with Kilowatt sources, based on reports sent by Italian intelligence after the car explosion. ³⁶ In their messages via Kilowatt, the Italian agency explained that in the car the police found items to construct a bomb, like watchmaking devices for the timer, chemicals, and over 800 g of plastic explosives hidden in eight packs of Dunhill cigarette boxes. In another cable, it sent pictures of what was found in the car's boot, such as an ignition system and the still intact explosives that were packed in Dunhill cigarette packs. ³⁷ These were of course the explosives that were meant to blow up the El-Al office, not the explosives that were placed by Mossad and that killed them.

Given that, as the cable states, the explosives in their car were intact, Italian police must have deduced that the two had been killed by a separate bomb. This leaves the police with two assumptions: either the terrorists had two bombs, namely one that yet had to be built and a second one that was already built and exploded accidentally. Or somebody, like Mossad, added a second bomb. Journalist Bergman claims that Italian police believed in the former and that it concluded that the explosion was caused by inaccurate handling of the terrorists’ own bomb. ³⁸ This interpretation is in line with what the disinformation cables suggested and relates to the (made-up) claims that Palestinian terrorists were using car bombs as a tactic.

The next instance when Mossad killed a Palestinian target via a car bomb was a few weeks later in Paris. On 27 June 1973, Mossad planted a pressure-sensitive bomb underneath the driving seat of Mohammed Boudia's car. The bomb was purposefully designed to look like a home-made bomb. Mossad used a pressure activated ‘land mine’, which was packed with heavy nuts and sharp scrap iron. This was meant to make it look like Boudia fell victim of an accidental explosion of a bomb that Black September had built itself for an attack, but which had exploded prematurely while Boudia was carrying it. ³⁹ French police indeed came to this conclusion (at least in the Kilowatt reports that they shared after the explosion).

Mossad further knew that he always checked for explosive devices around the outside of his car before he would entre. Hence, by planting the bomb inside and hidden underneath the driving seat, Boudia was unlikely to spot it. ⁴⁰ He did not spot it, and the bomb detonated at 11 am on 28 June 1973, while he still had one foot on the pavement. The blast ripped him to pieces and when the French police arrived 10 min later, they found his flesh and body parts scattered around the surrounding cars.

On 29 June 1973, a day after Boudia died in Paris’ fancy St Germain district, the French DST sent a long report through the Kilowatt channel. ⁴¹ Boudia was referred to as an Algerian national and an active pro-Palestinian militant. The report described first how, where, and when the car exploded. Like the Italian agency in the Nakaa and Shibli Rome killing, the French DST gave details about the car, a Renault R16, its matriculation number, and where precisely it was parked. It happened at 32 rue des Fosses-Saint Bernard in the 5eme arrondissement in Paris, which was a vibrant quarter in the heart of Paris. At 10:57 am, the bomb exploded and killed him on the spot. ⁴²

He was known to French intelligence as a central player in several clandestine and terrorist groups. First, as the cable highlighted, according to most recent intelligence he was believed to be the key person of the Palestinian armed group Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in Paris. Second, he was known to have been an important coordinator of the R.U.R, a secret Algerian movement against the Boumediene government.

The explosives were placed right behind the driving seat and based on first examination, the French police assumed that it was an accidental explosion; as the cable said in French: ‘une detonation fortuite’. ⁴³ The French word ‘fortuite’ can be translated as ‘by chance’ or ‘unexpected’. The DST thus suggested that Boudia's death was caused by a bomb that was not meant to explode but exploded prematurely, unexpectedly, and accidentally. Given Boudia's terrorist activities, French intelligence suggested that the bomb was likely planned for a terrorist attack but already exploded in his car.

As mentioned above, Mossad had on purpose designed the bomb in a simple way to make it look like terrorists had built it themselves with nuts and bolt in it. Based on this cable, at least in the initial police report, this deception, together with the disinformation cables, seemed to have worked.

France shared another ‘very new piece of intelligence’ with its partners, one that had just come in shortly before Boudia's death and that was based on a ‘vulnerable source’. An R.U.R. disciplinary commission had allegedly just removed Boudia from his position and stripped him off all responsibilities in the R.U.R. This disciplinary measure was taken because he slept with the daughter of a militant of this group. ⁴⁴

As a consequence, the cable continued, Boudia was preparing his departure from France to move to Syria and was about to organize sales or giveaways of all his possessions in France. Ironically, as the cable had not failed to point out, he was also trying to get rid of the same car in which he found his death, and which was still registered under his former wife, Guerrar Hadia. The cable speculated that this disciplinary measure and the dispute with R.U.R. could have something to do with his death. France promised to keep all partners updated about the police and judicial proceedings of the Boudia case.

Similar to all Kilowatt cables after an Operation Wrath of God killing, the DST had not mentioned suspicions about Mossad's involvement in the killing in any way. At the time, however, Israeli covert assassinations in Europe had become more widely known. For instance, in the French newspaper Le Monde of the day after Boudia's assassination, Mossad was clearly blamed for Boudia's murder. ⁴⁵ The French cable, on the contrary, even drew suspicions away from Mossad: it suggested that the bomb exploded by accident or in case it was murder, the DST suggested that R.U.R. might have been behind it, given their irritation with Boudia's behaviour.

Evaluating both targeted assassinations and the subsequent intelligence reports, it is not possible to conclude with certainty that the alternative explanations were given because of the disinformation cables. It might have been that the French and Italian agencies would in any case have exculpated Mossad, given that Mossad was included in the Kilowatt correspondence. However, it is conceivable that the disinformation cables made it even clearer to the concerned agencies that Mossad was under no circumstances to be blamed officially for the murder cases. The cables can thus be viewed as a covert signal to European intelligence to always suggest alternative ways of interpreting the targeted killings.

Lastly, one has to keep in mind that Mossad was sending these cables between April and June 1973. At the time of sending the cables, Israeli intelligence could not have known that only a month later, in July 1973, its operation would come to an abrupt halt when it was publicly exposed in the so-called Lillehammer Affair. In Lillehammer, a small Norwegian town, Mossad organized the execution of who it thought was a top terrorist. However, the Israeli intelligence agency in fact murdered a completely innocent man, a Moroccan waiter and father-to-be. In an amateurishly executed escape and cover-up attempt, some Mossad officers were caught by the Norwegian police.

The subsequent trial exposed Operation Wrath of God and clearly linked Mossad to the assassination operations in France, Italy, Greece and Cyprus of the previous months. After Lillehammer, even the best deception and the ideal alternative explanation could not hide Mossad's involvement in the assassinations. Likewise, for European governments, it became increasingly difficult to pretend that they had not known about Mossad's covert actions on their territory.

In general, covert actions, especially targeted killings, very often have a ‘communicative element’, namely an audience to whom a message is being addressed. In the case of Operation Wrath of God, the goal was to inflict fear among Palestinian terrorists in Europe and to deter them from planning further attacks. For this deterrence effect to work, Palestinians living in Europe needed to know that it was Mossad who killed their fellow travellers. By the same token, Mossad was operating and murdering people on European territory but wanted to keep good relations with Europeans, especially on the level of intelligence-sharing. For this, Mossad had an interest that Europeans would not know that Mossad was behind the assassinations. The disinformation cables can thus to be placed in the context of keeping good relations with European intelligence and of sowing doubts about Mossad as the one who killed these Palestinians.

A few months after the operation had started, however, it became increasingly known publicly that Mossad was indeed behind these killing operations. Newspapers like Le Monde for instance, openly accused Mossad of these killings. Yet, among Kilowatt exchanges, European intelligence carefully avoided to ever bring up Mossad's potential involvement in these murder cases. This is an indication that the informal channels among the Club de Berne were not the right forum to call upon Mossad. Cooperation within Kilowatt – a multilateral framework – had a certain performative element. The rules of the game simply did not allow to alienate a partner agency that way. Furthermore, with an increased need for information about Palestinian terrorism in Europe, Mossad's intelligence was simply too important for any European agency to risk alienating Mossad and possibly losing access to its reports.

In this context, the disinformation cables were not so much a form of deception, but the cables offered an alternative way of interpreting the murder cases. By suggesting for instance, as France did in a Kilowatt cable, that a Palestinian was killed by accident while preparing a car bomb attack, European intelligence could feign ignorance about Mossad's involvement but still use Kilowatt to ask European partner agencies for help with the investigation and obtain more information on the case. The cables essentially allowed for a way out: one could bring up the question among Kilowatt of who might be behind the murder case, by referring to Mossad's own explanations. More outward facing, it gave European intelligence and government the means to uphold plausible deniability that they had not known about Israel's covert operation on their territory.

Lastly, one has to raise the question of whether these cables might really have served this purpose. It is nevertheless possible that Mossad sent these cables out of true and honest worry that Palestinian terrorists were in possession of these new lethal devices and that they were indeed changing their terrorist methods. What speaks against this, however, is that neither secondary literature nor contemporary accounts mention devices like these. Furthermore, as far as is known about Palestinian armed groups in the 1970s, violent groups had at that time not been planning suicide attacks – this is something that became part of Palestinian terrorist tactics much later, in the 1980s only.

Hence, when only the cables are considered in isolation, they might appear as genuine warnings. But when it is considered that Mossad was at the time running its covert assassination campaign, these cables appear rather as alternative explanations for how the Palestinians had been killed. This either served the purpose of deceiving European intelligence or helped them later to claim more credibly that they had not known about Mossad's deadly doings on their territory.

In this vein, the most likely explanation is that initially Mossad's cables were meant to sow doubt about its responsibility behind the murder cases. Later in the operation, it served instead as a facilitator for European intelligence to officially deny knowledge of Israeli actions and secretly continue cooperation about Palestinian terrorism. In short, it made it easier for Europeans to avoid the (by that time very clear) indications that Mossad was behind the assassinations.