Abstract
Cold War tensions between the superpowers marked the years 1956 to 1966, where the United States, Britain and France prioritised European defence against Soviet aggression. Despite being envisaged for civil aviation purposes, the Concorde aircraft was the Franco-British alternative to US proposals concerning the introduction of a supersonic bomber within the Inter-Allied Nuclear Force (IANF) to protect against Soviet attack during the Cold War technological race. This offers a unique case study for the examination of Franco-British bi-lateral partnership in the context of European defence. This article will concentrate on three main themes. The first investigates how Concorde was considered as a viable component for the IANF. Subsequently, the loci of US, British and French policy decisions will be explored with regards to constructing supersonic aircrafts. Lastly, the article considers how foreign policies influenced the shift from a military-use Concorde to a more commercial option. The historiography on Concorde focuses on its commercial impact, and how it affected the Franco-British partnership. Considering Concorde from the defence perspective allows us to analyse the divisions between the US and French grand design ideas – the IANF and Europe puissance – and how they provoked further friction in the Franco-British military relationship.
On 2 March 1969, the first flight of a prototype Franco-British supersonic transport (SST) – Concorde 001 – took place in Toulouse. The significance of this date cannot be under-estimated as the United States of America, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France had been trying to develop an SST for two decades. SST development was an important strategic aim in the Cold War technological race, particularly as aerial technological innovations were viewed as a necessary means of maintaining nuclear deterrence forces following non-proliferation agreements, namely the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. 1 The pursuit of supersonic flight followed Chuck Yeager flying a Bell X-1 faster than the speed of sound in 1947. This was a critical turning point in the evolution of military aviation since supersonic flight was considered unattainable due to the issues with airframe integrity and increased drag. 2 Developing a military supersonic aircraft became a key concern from 1956 to 1966, and featured prominently in debates around European defence within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Academics have generally viewed this period as one of instability since technological innovation was one of the only ways in which Britain and France could compete with the superpowers following the Suez Crisis. Competition, as a means of securing a new influential role following the processes of decolonisation, allowed European nations to keep pace with the superpowers, which held an empirical advantage in sheer manpower and nuclear hardware, making ‘the barrier to entering the superpower club’ substantially higher. 3 However, the launch of Sputnik in 1957 firmly placed nuclear weapons at the heart of defence discourse. For some western nations, positioning nuclear weapons within NATO was viewed as essential. Britain and France held different views on European defence integration under US influence, which negatively impacted SST development. Discussions around the integration of a dual-purpose supersonic aircraft within NATO took place against the backdrop of British and French reorganisation of their defence outlook to accommodate imperial decline. For Britain, this involved a commitment with the United States to joint ‘development of defense plans’ on 3 July 1958 as part of the Mutual Defence Agreement. 4
Contrary to prevailing academic viewpoints focusing on the Franco-British divisions over Cold War nuclear affairs, this article contends that high technology cooperation permitted European nations to develop amicable bi-lateral collaboration. Concorde became an example of high technology cooperation, when Britain and France agreed in November 1962 to construct an SST. While the 1962 Anglo-French Agreement was being formulated, conversations about the possible uses for an SST took place within NATO, as supersonic transports were considered a viable option for European nuclear defence. The Anglo-French Agreement provided a basic framework for the level of control each country's manufacturer had over vital aspects of the SST's construction. Crucially, the British Aviation Corporation (BAC) – with the government's blessing – agreed to 60 per cent of the work on the Bristol Olympus engine. 5 Access to British aeronautical equipment would prove to be a vital facet of Franco-British politico-military cooperation, as it allowed France to combat its decline with British turboprop technology acting as the propulsion system for the Mirage IV, the aerial hardware for France's nuclear force – the force de frappe. Nevertheless, while the Concorde SST was envisaged for the purposes of civilian aviation, it took on a role in Euro-Atlantic defence planning. This article explores Concorde's uniqueness within the Franco-British partnership, particularly as its role within a defence context jeopardised the bi-lateral relationship, which was not the desired outcome, according to the British Minister of Supply responsible for civil aviation Aubrey Jones. 6 The historical irony of Concorde's involvement in NATO defence deliberations was that it caused further bi-lateral tensions wherein both countries aimed to carve out a measure of influence in nuclear affairs while the superpowers bolstered their atomic weapons arsenals. US nuclear delivery systems and the Soviet Union's success in launching orbital satellites demonstrate their strategic superiority over European powers. The rapid technological advances of the early Cold War coincided with supersonic aviation advancements, which were being considered in competition with the allure of nuclear weapons developments. This article contends that both advances in supersonic transport and the creation of a nuclear deterrent were mutually reinforcing, especially in the French case despite some reservations within the French political hierarchy.
This article is divided into three sections. The first seeks to uncover how Concorde was considered as a military hardware alternative for the US-Canadian F-104G Starfighter within the NATO Inter-Allied Nuclear Force (IANF). US President John F. Kennedy conceived a multilateral defence association comprised of NATO member states to attain ‘optimum strength’ to counterbalance the growing threat of the Soviet Union. 7 While Kennedy held firm to maintaining a veto over an IANF, the British sought to use Concorde as a means of challenging US hegemony particularly to relieve demands ‘to meet the same continuing pressure for a significant contribution to the MLF [Multilateral Force]’, which Britain subscribed to as a condition of securing the Polaris delivery system at the 1962 Nassau Conference. 8 The contrasting US, British and French policies will also be considered with regards to each nation's defence objectives in constructing the SST. For instance, both European countries were actively pursuing the SST project not only as a civil aviation project but as a facet of their defence policies. The need for an SST to have a multidimensional purpose – having military and civil aviation implications – was in both countries’ national interests as an indication of power following a period of decline. Lastly, this article examines how diverging defence aspirations within the higher echelons of the French political hierarchy undermined Concorde's role in European defence. Regardless, the bi-lateral cooperation between French and British aeronautical companies remained strong, resulting in Concorde thriving as an example of technological cooperation. Philip H. Gordon has established that the French did not require Concorde to play a military role given the construction of the Mirage IV fleet to carry atomic weapons. 9
The study of Concorde has recently experienced resurgence with renewed interest around civilian supersonic travel, with a Boeing SST in development. The military angle of the Franco-British SST has received scant scholarly attention, with the likes of John Baylis, Martin W. Bowman, Takeshi Sakade and David Versailles focusing on the products of Concorde development, such as the Mirage IV and the Anglo-French Variable Geometry (AFVG) project. 10 This article sheds light on the military aspirations for Concorde. Through a bi-lingual analysis of newly-disclosed NATO Military Standing Group files, British and French defence and foreign affairs files, British Cabinet files, personal papers of politicians, and US government files, the central priority of this article will be to explore how Concorde's role in the Franco-British relationship changed from a dual-purpose design to a solely civil aviation concept. This article analyses two questions: how did Concorde become a prospect for Franco-British military cooperation? And secondly, how did the focus of the SST project shift from the military concept? This will provide a novel lens for studying Franco-British military relations. The inclusion of Concorde and Mirage IV schematics and letters from notable figures involved in military decision-making, such as US General Curtis LeMay provide further novelty as it moves the focus away from purely high politics to a broader context of those involved in European technological cooperation in the military sphere. The historical interpretation of Concorde has concentrated on the commercial aspect, and how it affected the Franco-British relationship prior to the unsuccessful EEC application in January 1963. 11 Exploring the Concorde case study from a defence perspective allows us to discern the divisions between the IANF and the Gaullist alternative to NATO – the Europe puissance – and how both contrasting visions effectively forestalled the introduction of a dual-purpose aircraft. 12
When Royal Aircraft Establishment aeronautical engineer Morien Morgan formed the Supersonic Transport Advisory Committee (STAC) to consider designs for an SST, Britain and France found themselves in a precarious position after the loss of the Suez Canal. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal arose as a result of Pan-Arabism, which advocated the unification of Egypt and Syria thus maximising Arab influence in the Middle East. By extension, Arab control of the waterway hampered Britain's access to vital economic commodities since 60 to 70 per cent of its supplies travelled through the canal per year. 13 The British and French governments saw Nasser's anti-colonial agenda as a threat to their ‘continuing influence in the Middle East’, including a Franco-British EURAFRICA comprising their Africa dependencies in one defence organisation. 14 The Suez Crisis had a dramatic effect on European defence policies. It shifted the view of defence policymaking away from traditional colonialism, forcing Britain and France to reposition themselves towards obtaining credible nuclear forces. 15 Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin's threat to use nuclear weapons on Britain, France and Israel belittled European influence in the Middle East and compounded the economic strain of the Suez Crisis, illustrating the relative military decline of European powers against the superpowers. Britain and France adopted separate defence strategies with regards to developing a nuclear deterrence force. The French sought to construct a nuclear force for a European Defence Community. French Ambassador to Bonn Maurice Couve de Murville persuaded German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer that European defence integration was essential to avoid ‘a direct and exclusive entente between the United States and Russia’. 16 Meanwhile, the British government experienced a leadership transition from Anthony Eden to Harold Macmillan, bringing about a shift in defence priorities. It was imperative for Britain to balance relations with the United States and Europe if defence policy reorientations were to be successful. Macmillan sought to re-establish the ‘special relationship’ with the United States to mask imperial decline, while espousing that ‘if we go into Europe, our horizons would broaden’ during a speech at Women's Conservative Annual Conference in May 1957. 17 While initially Concorde did not play an active role in European defence planning, understanding the post-Suez divisions between Britain and France is important as they led to the breakdown in bi-lateral relations in January 1963. French Prime Minister Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury authorised the development of a nuclear deterrent when the Chinon nuclear power station was opened on 1 February 1957. Chinon power station represented the new direction of French defence policy. The production of enriched uranium was necessary for France to play a strategically important role within the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and provide a Europe-centric axis to Continental defence, rather than what had previously been a US-dominated defence agenda. In contrast, Macmillan feared the Suez Crisis caused friction between the US and European governments. Thus, Britain's defence policy was a case of ‘keeping up with the Joneses’ to combat decline relative to the United States and Soviet Union.
Britain and France sought to cultivate an influential role after the embarrassment of the Suez campaign. Control of supersonic aviation provided the means for both countries to achieve this aim. For Britain, this would be a difficult task since US imports supported its commercial aviation industry following the grounding of the Comet jetliner fleet after two crashes in January and April 1954. Keen to assert control over supersonic aviation, the Ministry of Supply worked with STAC to develop an SST. Eventually SST construction was considered a viable option for the British aeronautical industry. Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply, W.J. Taylor, stated in the House of Commons on 3 June 1957 that an SST as ‘an economic proposition’ deserved further investment rather than the supersonic bomber proposed by A.V. Roe. 18
Eager to capitalise on a flourishing civil aviation sector, the French government strived to conquer the supersonic market through the construction of a Super-Caravelle utilising specifications of Caravelle airframes. 19 It quickly became clear that the French aerospace industry could not afford the production of an SST. The French Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs Antoine Pinay withheld vital funding for the project because it would not have met the balance of payments, thus destabilising the French economy. 20 A decision he later regretted in an interview with Le Monde on 5 May 1971 – although crucially this change of heart took place after the successful test flights of Concorde 002 in 1969. 21 Wilfrid Baumgartner replaced Pinay as a result of his interference in the SST project. By 1959, the French began to consider bi-lateral cooperation on the SST project since they started question the feasibility of developing a Super-Caravelle after failed attempts at constructing a turboprop capable of supporting supersonic flight. 22 This decision succeeded a similar one by STAC in 1956, following George Gardner's report highlighting Britain's inability to design an airframe sufficient to withstand the pressure of supersonic flight. 23 In many ways, both countries’ limitations created an opportunity for collaboration. The French government reached out to their British counterparts with an offer of collaboration. When President Charles de Gaulle visited Britain in 1960, he declared that the future of Franco-British cooperation was ‘bright’ and encouraged Britain to continue to practise respect towards her cross-channel ally. 24 The Anglo-French Agreement of 1962 was the outcome of the invitation over SST cooperation.
After months of negotiations, British Minister of Aviation Julian Amery and French Ambassador to the United Kingdom Geoffroy de Courcel signed the Anglo-French Agreement on 29 November 1962. While the agreement secured bi-lateral cooperation, this international treaty highlighted pre-existing tensions in British and French defence planning. Macmillan and de Gaulle previously authorised an inter-ministerial committee to study the strategic value of the Blue Streak missile as a component of an entente nucléaire. 25 However, the project was stalled in its developmental phase as the Blue Streak missile design was UK/US intellectual property shared under the MacMahon Act, which restricted French access to US nuclear technology under Articles I and II. 26 Britain remained optimistic about Concorde's practical use as a civilian aircraft, while entertaining ideas of its use within the IANF. Meanwhile, the French viewed cooperation as a means of realising Gaullist policy of creating an independent force de frappe. The French Defence Ministry permitted the signing of the Anglo-French Agreement on the provision it would strengthen bi-lateral military cooperation. The French Minister for the Armed Forces Louis Le Puloch stated that he would only authorise the signing of the Anglo-French Agreement if the British aided in the construction of a force de frappe, by providing details of their missile propulsion design. 27 The force de frappe was a strike force with sea, air and land-based nuclear weapons delivery systems, which de Gaulle envisaged as the foundation of the Europe puissance. The Anglo-French Agreement allowed the French government to advance their nuclear ambitions. BAC and engine manufacturer Bristol-Siddeley welcomed this exchange of ideas, although the consensus of the British Cabinet was one of ingratitude towards the sharing of nuclear technology. Despite Macmillan's desire to avoid sharing nuclear weapons technology, Amery signed the Anglo-French Agreement following a consultation with the Chief of Staff for the US Air Force General Curtis LeMay, who thought it ‘short-sighted’ not to assist France with its deterrent project. 28 LeMay voiced support for the force de frappe so the United States could reduce its military contribution to NATO, stating ‘say we will take action, then do nothing while a long build-up is completed’. 29
The connection between civil aviation and nuclear cooperation occurred against the backdrop of a push towards creating an organisational framework for European defence integration. Jacqueline McGlade argued that the United States developed a ‘synchronised network’ for NATO integration, much to the chagrin of the British and French governments. 30 NATO decision-makers were acutely aware of the Soviet Union's threat. The riposte to Soviet technological supremacy was the formation of a strategic nuclear force within the Alliance command structure – the IANF. The Canadian supersonic arrow fighter Avro CF-105 was the United States’ preferred hardware option for the IANF. As early as March 1959, Canadian Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker expressed ‘deep and continuing concern’ around the US decision to use the CF-105 beyond joint defence initiatives. 31 This drew criticism from various quarters in political and international contexts. In a meeting with NATO Heads of Government, Macmillan openly referred to public concern ‘about US and UK planes carrying atomic bombs’. 32 Macmillan's worries stemmed from public outcry by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in Britain to dismantle the Atlantic Alliance and establish a ‘third way’ of representing domestic security without relying on nuclear weapons. 33 Macmillan's concerns were justified since there was an emerging coalition of left-wing movements against the British government's nuclear policies. CND enjoyed support from the left-wing non-political and parliamentary elites, with a growing number of Labour MPs calling for Britain to engage in a policy for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 34
Despite calls for nuclear disarmament, Concorde was considered as an alternative hardware solution for the IANF following the cancellation of the CF-105. 35 The Kennedy administration mooted the US-Canadian F-104G Starfighter as an alternative to the CF-105. On 12 June 1961, the North Atlantic Council released a statement, promising that Starfighter would ‘accomplish fighter-bomber, all-weather intercept and reconnaissance missions… this way two major objectives of the Alliance will be attained, namely, standardisation and cooperation, and countries can make the best common use of their resources for defence’. 36 However, no date was given for the introduction of the Starfighter and neither British nor French permanent representatives signed the official statement permitting its introduction within NATO. Jonathan Glancey questioned the installation of Starfighter in the IANF since there were several fatalities during test flights, with the lack of an official introduction date owing to the burgeoning US high technology programme. 37 In the 1960s, the United States was committed to ‘advancing technology’ across national, aeronautical and orbital programmes, which split resources and defined the diverse complexities of the Cold War technological race. 38 The Gaullist government maintained a fractious relationship with the United States over NATO activities, and the proposal of the Starfighter as a key component of the IANF characterised this friction. De Gaulle viewed the incorporation of US hardware for the IANF as further hostility towards European defence interest, particularly as de Gaulle's idea for a US-British-French directoire à trois as a NATO leadership model was rejected in 1958 by Eisenhower and Macmillan.
The Franco-British divisions over nuclear policymaking affected the Concorde SST's possible integration into the IANF. By January 1963, the French Permanent Representative to NATO Pierre de Leusse criticised Starfighter's inclusion in the IANF as its provenance allowed the United States to exercise control over NATO, as the terms of the Nassau Agreement dictated. 39 Instead, de Leusse mirrored de Gaulle's sentiments that the IANF was ‘unworkable’ and ‘there could be no nuclear force’ as the NATO direction of travel contrasted with the grandeur policy. 40 The Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Lyman L. Lemnitzer sought to overcome French objections so ‘that countries [were] represented on an equitable basis’. 41 Lemnitzer's re-evaluation of the IANF was designed to accommodate French and British military objectives: principally, the increase of each nation's ‘political clout in the wider world’. 42 By September 1963, the NATO military committee began scrutinising the idea of a European-centric IANF, which the French might have appreciated. Concorde was indicated as a means of creating a more equitable hardware solution in the IANF at the 14th General Assembly of the Scientific Standing Group of NATO Military Authorities (AGARD) in Portugal on 16 September 1964, when Adrien Blanchet, a representative of Sud-Aviation and BAC recommended it to Colonel Joseph A. Woida, the Acting Deputy Director of AGARD. 43 Concorde's possible involvement arose due to concerns from NATO Permanent Representatives that ‘nuclear battlefield weapons should not be included’ in the proposed IANF. 44 The IANF required aircraft capable of a dual purpose. Concorde's purpose, therefore, was to alight Franco-British concerns and, more importantly, to act as a challenge to US hegemony, which would achieve a significant victory in maintaining NATO multilateralism.
Within the context of Franco-British relations, the Concorde SST played an important role across several avenues of politico-military affairs. The Anglo-French Agreement reflected French desires to possess nuclear weapons knowledge in order to achieve its foreign policy ambitions. The military caveat which impacted the signing of the Anglo-French Agreement hinged on the international agenda, particularly the development of nuclear deterrents was conditional on the opposing nations’ ability to strike back. 45 In addition, debates around the IANF and its composition between the NATO allies further hampered the Franco-British bi-lateral relationship. The Blanchet proposal to furnish Concorde as a dual purpose aircraft brought the grand design ideas for European defence into direct conflict. De Gaulle's Europe puissance was in direct opposition to the principles of Kennedy's IANF. The Europe puissance would act as an intermediary between the superpowers while terminating France's ‘sub-hegemonic’ status. 46 The Concorde SST provides a useful case study for examining the divisions between NATO allies. The Blanchet proposal did not initially gain much traction with certain NATO member states. Norwegian Permanent Representative to NATO Georg Kristiansen vetoed the proposed inclusion into the IANF, citing that the SACEUR's consideration of Concorde did not ‘improve the plans’ for a hardware-based nuclear force. 47 This comment struck deep at the heart of the problem for the IANF. The United States perceived the IANF as a means of furthering their control over NATO's defence strategy, which frustrated the French grand design idea towards creating a European defence identity. The Macmillan government required the IANF to balance its foreign policy ambitions, specifically in advancing a multi-lateral approach to achieve European economic and political integration while securing US support for its deterrent programme. 48 The different bi-lateral policy aims further exacerbated tensions. Indeed, de Gaulle adopted exclusionary tactics against Britain as the Europe puissance needed to avoid a ‘rivalry of power and domination’, which the inclusion of a pro-Atlanticist country could potentially cause. 49
The North Atlantic Council deliberations over an IANF placed European nuclearisation at the centre of political debate concerning Franco-British cooperation. Previous academic discussions regarding Concorde suggest that the SST represented a policy of British Europeanism rather than its more traditional Atlanticist outlook. 50 However, this interpretation does not extend into the European military field. The British and French governments were divided over Concorde's perceived military use. Amery favoured introducing Concorde as a military alternative. He argued that the SST would give Britain and France a greater voice in NATO nuclear decision-making, while conceding that ‘the extension of [US] nuclear power’ was ‘something quite inevitable’. 51 The French government did not share Amery's perception of Concorde. The Contrôleur general des armées M. Salez, who was responsible for the facilitation of French military hardware, considered France's impressive aeronautics industry as the country's ‘trump card… for the construction of Europe’, which would compensate for its imperial collapse following Algerian Independence on 5 July 1962. 52 De Gaulle shared Salez's view but was at odds with experts from his national aeronautics industry. The Usines de Toulouse branch of Sud-Aviation compiled a report on adapting Concorde for an IANF following the Nassau Agreement of December 1962. It stated that Concorde's effectiveness would be confirmed if ‘efficient synchronisation’ between the allies could be achieved through the integration of the SST within the IANF. 53 This openly contradicted Gaulle's preferred military entity – the Europe puissance – which was designed to ensure that multi-lateral cooperation involving a dominant power and several dependent nations was avoided.
While Britain and France remained totally committed to the SST project which had aligned their commercial interests; diverging foreign policy aims delayed Concorde construction. Britain's focus on augmenting its own nuclear arsenal following the Nassau Agreement publicly demonstrated that Britain would not aid in force de frappe construction, and thus was not fit to join the European Economic Community (EEC). 54 The friction over the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ coincided with a flashpoint in the Franco-British SST partnership. On 14 December 1962, the Bristol-Siddeley Olympus 593 engine failed on the test bed. 55 Both BAC and Sud-Aviation agreed Olympus 593 engines were the most practicable option for creating the thrust capable of flying Concorde passed Mach 1. However, the British government did not inform Director General of Air France Pierre-Donatien Cot of this setback, as BAC believed further development would culminate in the production of a successful engine for Concorde and the British strategic aircraft TSR.2. The Chief Scientific Adviser to the British Ministry of Defence Sir Solly Zuckerman introduced a system of ‘break clauses’ for unsuccessful hardware to cancel project development ‘if expensive mistakes were to be stopped’. 56 The lack of transparency over engines caused disharmony between Britain and France. The French Minister of the Army Pierre Messmer desired further Franco-British cooperation over military aviation projects to countenance the influence of Atlanticism in Europe. His counterpart Peter Thorneycroft invested energy into the successful completion of TSR.2 to keep pace with the United States. Thorneycroft held that Britain should not compete with the United States over high technology projects. Frustratingly, their view on Concorde and TSR.2 development contrasted with the general consensus of British polity, which opted for cancelling of British independent projects in favour of shared Franco-British aviation projects. Institutional support for Concorde and other Franco-British projects, including the Spey-Mirage, Mirage IV, AFVG and SEPECAT Jaguar, stemmed from the Plowden Report of December 1964. Lord Edwin Plowden's findings stressed technological cooperation between Britain and France was the appropriate foundation for successful European aeronautical projects. 57 Messmer and Gaston Palewski, the French Minister for Research, committed wholeheartedly to the institutionalising of Franco-British aeronautical cooperation. Both politicians carefully budgeted Sud-Aviation's spending on Concorde with Henri Ziegler, using a 1,708 m FF windfall that came from France's aviation exports. 58 French investment in Concorde production far exceeded that of the British. During the 1964 General Election campaign, Amery conceded that Britain's share of the Concorde costs was around £280 m, which was 12 per cent of the French government's investment. 59
On 15 October 1964, the Labour Party won the British General Election. Harold Wilson's premiership introduced a rogue element onto the international stage with Concorde's role in the civil aviation and defence spheres severely jeopardised. Wilson's Labour government explored the possibility of cancelling Concorde, viewing it as a ‘prestige project’ with little economic value. 60 The French government did not welcome this move; especially as Macmillan's decision to transfer funds to the Ministry of Aviation permitted the British to finally finance their side of the Concorde project. As a consequence, aviation expenditure during Amery's tenure reached £350 m. 61 BAC and Sud-Aviation approved of the injection of such finances. Nevertheless, the Minister of Economic Affairs George Brown published a White Paper assessing Concorde's feasibility in January 1965. Brown's appraisal of the project was damning. The Brown Paper described Concorde as ‘a prestige project of low economic and social priority’. 62 Abandoning the SST project characterised Labour's new economic plan, which was implemented from September 1965 until 1970, calling for ‘a sharp brake… on Government spending abroad which has been rising much too quickly’. 63 The French government's response was striking. Gaullist ministers threatened legal action against the British government as unilateral withdrawal from the Anglo-French Agreement was in violation of an international treaty. Such an act would result in compensation payments of £140 m. The chairman of the Bristol Aeroplane Company Sir W. Reginald Verdon-Smith criticised government proposals citing the negative impact it would have on the job market. Verdon-Smith recognised the significance Concorde had in securing Britain's role in the aviation sector, stating that ‘I do not believe that this country ought to renounce, allegedly on grounds of economic weakness… its traditional high place in the councils of the world’. 64 Following pressure from French government and British industrial sources, Wilson reaffirmed Britain's commitment to Concorde. This secured Franco-British military cooperation in the industrial field despite Labour's proposed cancellation threatening pre-established trade links between Hawker Siddeley Dynamics and Engins Matra Société Anonyme, for further production of supersonic engines for the Mirage IV.
The diverging foreign policy objectives in addition to the stronger French financial commitment to Concorde typify the tumultuous nature of the Franco-British relationship in the early 1960s. Despite the agreement on Concorde development, the Gaullist Minister of Information Alain Peyrefitte pondered ‘if the British proved to be such unreliable partners, is it wise to consider other forms of cooperation with them?’ 65 Messmer supported this view as he pressed de Gaulle to pursue AFVG and SEPECAT Jaguar construction to grow a basis for the Europe puissance. 66 The French political classes relented to pressures from the domestic aviation industry as the Commandant of the Forces aériennes stratégiques (FAS) General Marie stressed the vital role Concorde played in establishing credible bi-lateral links between BAC and Sud-Aviation. Marie persuaded de Gaulle to recognise the strategic potential of the Anglo-French Agreement. Général Aéronautique Marcel Dassault (GAMD) gained access to critical information concerning British turboprop design, which advanced the development of the Mirage IV aircraft for the force de frappe. Marie's concerns for French turboprops stemmed from GAMD's failure to design an engine capable of achieving supersonic flight. Upon Marie's advice, Messmer began bi-lateral negotiations with Zuckerman to establish cooperation over Mirage IV engines. The main sticking point in legal collaboration between BAC, Rolls-Royce, Sud-Aviation and Société nationale d’études et de construction de moteurs d’aviation (SNECMA) was the MacMahon Act, which forbade sharing of nuclear technologies. Zuckerman, who had exhibited fears over nuclear weapons, displayed an amenable attitude towards Franco-British cooperation as it furthered Wilson's idea of a European Community for technological innovation. 67 The outcome was simple, yet effective. Turboprop manufacturing for Mirage IV would be supplemented by technical guidance from Rolls-Royce thus avoiding the accusation of overt technology sharing from NATO powers.
Ironically, British assistance with turboprop designs impacted the bi-lateral relationship as the unveiling of the force de frappe was further accelerated by their integration into the Mirage IV. The force de frappe was considered the foundation of the Europe puissance. In a bid to accelerate force de frappe development, General Philippe Maurin replaced Marie as Commandant of the FAS in May 1964. Maurin was tasked with overseeing the integration of the Concorde turboprop technology into the Mirage IV designs, as well as preparing French strategic air forces for the synthesis of nuclear weapons delivery systems into pre-existing hardware. De Gaulle understood the strategic advantages of entertaining discussions around Concorde's use in an IANF. Taking the advice of the Director of the Société d’études pratiques de recherche opérationnelle and French expert in military aeronautics M.E. Ventura, de Gaulle allowed consideration of Concorde to continue since it allowed the French access to information retained within the Atlantic Alliance. Ventura alluded that nuclear technologies shared within the NATO framework would allow France to ‘gain several months’ on the scheduled completion date for the force de frappe. 68 While de Gaulle's posturing for a European Defence Community is well-documented, the French government's use of the bi-lateral links over Concorde threatened the Franco-British relationship. A force de frappe outside of the NATO framework characterised bi-lateral divisions since GAMD launched its first in-service Mirage IV model ‘Gascogne’, which joined French strategic bomber command in November 1965.
While Concorde's development secured Franco-British military cooperation, the SST's role in multi-lateral defence organisation was further imperilled following disagreements over Anglo-American policy. Having previously refused to endorse the IANF during the first EEC negotiations, President de Gaulle opposed British requests to endorse the IANF in May 1965. Therefore, Concorde's future involvement in multi-lateral military discussions remained unlikely. Wilson and Brown shared some of de Gaulle's scepticism about the US controls measures within the IANF concept, and proposed an alternative – the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF). By 1965, US President Lyndon B. Johnson could not agree with Wilson over the next steps of the IANF, with the latter suggesting that it be reformed into an ANF. British proposals impacted Concorde's military role. In these proposals, the more generic ‘kind of mixed-manned and jointly-owned element’ replaced specific reference to the Concorde SST as hardware for a nuclear deterrent.
69
These proposals pointed towards Wilson's lack of commitment towards Concorde as an apparatus for continental defence since Wilson said ‘there was no give at all by the French’.
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Part of Brown's proposals included the removal of US controls in favour of a veto by any country which supplied manpower to the deterrent force. The British Cabinet viewed the ANF as an adequate defence policy, which protected Britain from Soviet attack and preserved the delicate Franco-British working partnership. Brown's proposals resulted in a backlash from the Johnson administration, which insisted on a US veto for an ANF. Brown's proposals countered the fundamental tenet of US foreign policy towards Britain – namely, to erode British independence over a nuclear deterrent. On the advice of the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee William Fulbright, Johnson shelved the IANF proposals citing that it would avoid any accusation of an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ axis within NATO.
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Fulbright was categorical in his criticism of a multi-lateral approach to European defence. Reporting to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Fulbright noted: Technical assistance, particularly in such areas [as defence], should remain on a bilateral basis. There are, and probably should be, some brakes on too rapid a movement in the direction of multilateralism … If the shift to multilateralism were to involve a large sum of money, its effect on our balance of payments would have to be carefully considered.
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The short-term European vision for Concorde was in disarray. The uncertainty around a military concept SST contrasted the developments on the aircraft for civilian air travel. In May 1965, BAC and Sud-Aviation announced that the production of the prototype Concorde 001, with 130 seats, had started. 74 Conservative peer Lord David Trefgarne praised Anthony Wedgewood Benn for limiting government spending on the British components for the Concorde to £20 m in 1966, from a total budget of £69 m for his newly created Ministry of Technology. 75 In August 1966, Benn and French Minister of Transport Jean Chamant declared that assembly of the Concorde 001 had begun. 1966 marked a period of Franco-British politico-military reconciliation, something that had been a bone of contention since the Suez Crisis. Moreover, Chamant and Benn announced further collaboration over the SEPECAT Jaguar, to be introduced in 1973. 76 Cooperation over Jaguar demonstrates Concorde's success in fostering Franco-British collaboration on an industrial level. While political stalemates remained, the decision to develop Jaguar afforded an opportunity for military alignment while saving Britain the embarrassment of purchasing US aircraft. Upon the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the construction of Jaguar on 19 May 1965, Messmer stressed that industrial interaction between BAC and Sud-Aviation was essential in order to achieve ‘the wider working unity of Europe’. 77 The MoU acted as the beginning of a Franco-British defence package, which also included the development of AFVG – a strike-oriented, supersonic aircraft. 78 The defence package was a success for the Gaullist grandeur policy as the MoU permitted Britain to abandon its pursuit of the US F-111 medium-range combat aircraft and invest in European projects. Shifting Britain's defence outlook towards pan-European security demonstrates a turn away from reliance on US hardware, which France encouraged as British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart felt that opportunities for European cooperation could not be missed if non-superpower nations were to remain influential within the international community. 79 This renewed harmony coincided with a major geopolitical shake-up in the European defence sphere. On 21 February 1966, de Gaulle stated that France was withdrawing from NATO in March, citing the country's force de frappe as an ‘important development’ in its decision-making. De Gaulle argued that NATO's ability to organise western defence was inadequate, and refused to integrate the force de frappe into an US-dominated organisation believing that it was detrimental to French sovereignty. 80
The decision to remove France from the NATO command structure allowed Britain to abandon the pursuit of Concorde as a bomber aircraft. NATO withdrawal strained Franco-British politico-military relations; however the agreement over the Concorde SST reaped benefits. The design and manufacture of the Jaguar and AFVG aircrafts strengthened ties between British and French industries. This new technological trading partnership was the realisation of an idea by British Defence Secretary Peter Thorneycroft in 1963, after the failure of the British P.1154 to make it into production. 81 Thus, the Franco-British military relationship experienced a renaissance through industrial networking since the MoU represented divisions in the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ as British officials were no longer constrained by the ‘Buy American’ policy meaning dependence on US aeronautical hardware was replaced with a level of control over European military alternatives. The successful joining of British and French industries over military projects overcame the potential problems which the different loci of both countries’ military policy decisions might cause since both partner nations had disparate rationale for SST construction. While the need for a dual-purpose SST was viewed as necessary for the British to maintain their influence within NATO; Franco-British agreements over Jaguar and AFVG demonstrate Concorde's success in advancing European defence planning as the Anglo-French Agreement laid the foundation for the construction of Franco-British military hardware which André Pujet negotiated with Amery in May 1963. 82
The French departure from NATO followed the dismissal of Concorde's role within European defence. Concorde was inexorably linked to French and British foreign policy decisions. The Labour government did not wish to entertain Concorde being used for military purposes hence the prioritisation of Jaguar and AFVG. On 31 March 1966, the Wilson government had increased its majority following another general election. However unlike the previous election, nuclear weapons did not feature on the public agenda to the same degree, with six per cent of candidates speaking on the issue. 83 Concorde development achieved Britain's desired to rid itself of dependence on US technology. For example, the SEPECAT Jaguar was conceived as a replacement for the out-dated Sud-Aviation (Fouga) CM.170 Magister. This formally placed Britain on the course of further European integration via an aeronautical partnership with France.
The demise of Concorde's military role also forced a re-evaluation of the Franco-British cooperation. The decision to remove France from NATO was well-received within the French political hierarchy. French Prime Minister Georges Pompidou and his Deputy Minister René Galy-Dejean hailed this move as it protected national sovereignty, which allowed the French to finance the ‘responsible administration’ of their nuclear force. 84 The force de frappe permitted France to counterbalance US influence on the continent. As a gesture of good-will, Sud-Aviation and BAC agreed the unveiling of the Spey-Mirage aircraft in autumn 1965. However, Wilson and British Defence Minister Denis Healey refused such cooperation, fearing a deterioration of the ‘special relationship’. The Spey-Mirage represented French attempts to draw Britain further into European integration, which Wilson wanted to avoid after imperilling Anglo-American relations with the British Prime Minister's criticism of US actions in Vietnam and his desire to negotiate a peace settlement during the conflict. 85 Stewart ultimately diluted the French withdrawal of any real shock. In January 1966, Stewart presented a memorandum to his Cabinet colleagues underpinning the Gaullist intentions to leave NATO. British policymakers clearly did not accept the French approach towards NATO. Stewart established that France ‘resorted to an attitude of obstruction… she rejects co-ordinated policy or military integration’. 86 He further criticised France's secession from NATO as a ‘time-wasting’ move, but was adamant that the Alliance must ‘survive without France’. This aggressive attitude towards French withdrawal contrasted with the new-found amicable state of Franco-British industrial relations. Wilson stressed the importance of Franco-British cooperation especially since the SEPECAT Jaguar aircraft was an important victory in the creation of a European aeronautical sector. But where did this leave the Concorde project, considering the SEPECAT Jaguar now acted as the medium for Franco-British technological cooperation in the military field? The need for technological innovation was crucially linked to a country's influence. Concorde ‘met out’ the same technical, practical and scientific requirements which British and French manufacturing industries needed to satisfy their ‘commercial needs’ according to Zuckerman. 87 BAC and Sud-Aviation shifted the focus towards a re-design of a commercial SST with a 108-seat model in production. With the delivery of the second production model (Concorde 002) scheduled for 12 September 1968, the French government announced that the SST programme was a resounding success for de Gaulle's grandeur policy, symbolising France's ‘historical legitimacy’ as a world leader in aeronautics, particularly with Franco-British links ranging across civil aviation and military fields. 88
Despite clashes with regards to their respective views on Concorde's role within NATO, the SST and its offshoots afforded European nations the opportunities to challenge US technological hegemony by advancing continental integration. However, Britain's commitment to the Atlantic Alliance threatened de Gaulle's vision of a ‘Europe of Nations’, with France playing a role of strategic importance. Nonetheless, Concorde's potential commercial success required cordiality in the bi-lateral relationship. On the advice of the former British Ambassador to Paris Sir Pierson Dixon, the Wilson government adopted a new policy of ‘turning the other cheek’ towards France's nuclearisation in a concerted effort to preserve established links between Rolls-Royce and SNECMA. 89 Britain's accommodating attitude was exemplified in this technological cooperation. Despite the Johnson administration's pursuit of a titanium SST, Franco-British collaboration critically challenged US prowess in technological innovation since the turboprop designs levelled the playing field between American and European engine models. Chancellor of the Exchequer Roy Jenkins lauded the ‘full freedom and equality of competition’ which Franco-British industrial cooperation allowed ‘for US and UK defence orders’. 90
While the European vision for Concorde remained incompatible with de Gaulle's political ideology; the renewed outlook for joint aeronautical projects protected the bi-lateral partnership. It was the collaboration over Jaguar that led to political reconciliation between the British and French governments. BAC and Sud-Aviation established the timeline for the assembly of Concorde 002 for the 1968 deadline, with certificates and declarations of airworthiness obtained throughout that year. Cabinet Secretary Sir Burke Trend wrote that divergence between the European Communities and the United States ‘would be extremely dangerous to this country in every respect’. 91 Prominent British politician Enoch Powell argued the ‘special relationship’ was paramount for ‘the retention of… [Britain's] nuclear capability’. 92 Thus, Britain fell back on their long-maintained defence position, that of subservience to the United States. The debate around a NATO-based aircraft became superfluous as the Alliance experienced a fragile period. Nuclearisation was no longer the Alliance's main concern following the ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in October 1968. Technological competition became a secondary consideration, as European nations, in particular, considered three questions – mainly, ‘What should an equitable, lasting peaceful order in Europe look like? How can it be achieved’? ‘What would be the role of the Alliance’? 93 Future tasks for the Alliance were finalised with the 1968 Harmel Report, marking a departure from the nuclear politics of the past.
The return to an amicable working partnership allowed British and French firms to assemble Concorde 002 with ease. It also ensured that Concorde would be ready for civilian air travel with minimum delays since the British aviation authorities provided Concorde with a Certificate of Airworthiness, and thus the French Concorde prototype was able to complete a 32-hour tour of South America on 19 September 1971. However, in the short term, it permitted Sud-Aviation and BAC to unveil Concorde 002 on 12 September 1968. The importance of this date cannot be understated. The roll-out of Concorde 002, at Toulouse St. Martin, was billed as a momentous occasion, as it marked an ‘important stage in an immense and ambitious programme’, according to Sir George Edwards, the chairman of the Committee of Directors for Aircraft design. 94 This statement was indicative of the enormity of the occasion; however BAC stated that the prototype was not flight-tested yet since only 65 per cent of its hydraulic mechanisms had passed initial inspections. As a result, BAC and Sud-Aviation released a joint statement at the unveiling which detailed the agreed changes for Concorde 002, including nose type 223, the aerodynamic ‘droop-nose’ at the front of the aircraft. A turbulent phase of Britain and France's bi-lateral relationship marred the construction of the Concorde SST. Since the Anglo-French Agreement was signed, it was apparent that both sides were opposed to the others’ ideas since both governments were caught in a ‘competition of technologies’. 95 Nonetheless, Franco-British relations progressively improved following the roll-out of Concorde 002.
In any attempt to analyse Concorde's role in the Franco-British partnership, it is essential to strike a balance between the potential military vision and its eventual use as a civilian transport. The Concorde SST played an important role in the development of Franco-British politico-military relations. It was at the centre of military planning in a Europe deeply divided by multi-lateral negotiations taking place within NATO. Considering Concorde as the basis for an IANF meant that in a hierarchical sense its proposed use superseded the Gaullist intention of using the SST as a framework to advance the Europe puissance. The self-assertive nature of NATO meant that Concorde was envisioned as a potential bomber. However, the long-term Gaullist policy of withdrawing France from the Atlantic Alliance brought divisions over the use of Concorde within the IANF into the open. It was here where difficulties in the Franco-British politico-military relationship became apparent. British politicians considered reliance on US technology through the Nassau Agreement more important than Wilson's preferred method of Franco-British cooperation. In essence, the decision to dissolve the IANF and French departure from NATO accompanied the abandonment of Concorde's perceived role as a dual-use aircraft within European defence institutions.
The demise of the European vision for Concorde gives credence to the historical interpretation that European defence integration was more difficult than financial assimilation. 96 Indeed, while Concorde has been traditionally seen as an economic failure, it is important to recognise its role in providing a structure for further Franco-British cooperation in the military field. Concorde was crucial to the development of beneficial industrial relations when interplay between British and French politicians remained turbulent with the fallout of the failed British EEC application. Nonetheless, the industrial ties between British and French aeronautics companies achieved substantial successes in the Cold War technological race. The research and development over turboprops for the Concorde engine allowed the French to progress with the development of Mirage IV jets, and by extension launch the force de frappe ahead of schedule. Thus, the role of industry in the Franco-British military partnership cannot be understated. As a result of Franco-British aeronautical cooperation, the decision was taken to work together over military aircraft. The SEPECAT Jaguar was the result. Sud-Aviation and BAC worked to facilitate the creation of the Jaguar as the next stage in military aviation technology. The launching of the aircraft in 1973 heralded a period of stability in the Franco-British partnership. The roots of the Jaguar and Mirage IV's success stem from the decision in November 1962 to combine British and French efforts in developing an SST. Concorde 002's entry into service in 1976 ensured its legacy and technological supremacy brought stability to a Franco-British industrial partnership, which was damaged following the Suez Crisis. While both countries may have disagreed on the military usage of Concorde, their partnership spearheaded innovation in the civil aviation sector. In the broadest sense, academics paint Concorde as a bittersweet technological advancement, one which succeeded in bringing supersonic transport to the masses while failing to make a profit for Aérospatiale until the mid-1990s. 97 Regardless, Concorde serves as a historic reminder that national schemes designed with the aim of retaining international influence can survive despite adversarial moves to undermine their success. The Concorde SST continued to be built following the French withdrawal from NATO and in 1969 was successful in reaching Mach 2 during test flights. It was for the continued progress on Concorde that de Gaulle hailed the ‘reciprocal friendship’ which characterised Franco-British cooperation in the civil aviation field. 98
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
This article, based upon a paper entitled ‘Concorde and the changing state of Franco-British political relations’ which was delivered at Queen's University, Belfast, has benefitted greatly from constructive advice and comments from Dr Ralph Dietl and Dr Paul Corthorn.
