Cultural Intervention in the Spanish Civil War: A Comparative Analysis of Nazi and Fascist Propaganda

Abstract

This article analyses Fascist and Nazi propaganda during the Spanish Civil War, asking how both nations exploited the conflict and how they interacted with each other and the emerging Francoist state. In so doing, the article highlights the propagandistic value of Nazi-fascist cultural policy and sheds light on the development of the Nazi-fascist alliance. It shows how despite Italy being in many ways at the forefront of the intervention, the development of tight Nazi-falangist relations, among other factors, led to the replacement of Fascist Italy by Nazi Germany as a model for the rebirth of the nation in Spain. This, in turn, sheds light on the Nazi-fascist Alliance, showing how Italy's wide-ranging propaganda originated from a place of self-perceived weakness rather than strength. German–Italian relations were marked by a complex and non-linear dynamic of admiration and jealousy, collaboration and competition, which made itself evident in the Spanish conflict and beyond.

Shortly after the coup of 18 July 1936, Adolf Hitler decided to support Francisco Franco's fight against the Second Republic by providing much-needed transport for Franco's Moroccan troops. By the end of August 1936, the German intervention escalated, but the most important German contribution to the rebel war effort was the deployment of the Condor Legion, which increased the number of German fighters in Spain from 600 to 800 in mid-October 1936 to 4423–4623 by the end of the year. ¹

The Italian intervention started slightly later. Despite having supported several antirepublican movements on the Iberian Peninsula in the early 1930s, when the time came to support the 1936 conspiracy, Mussolini hesitated. When he finally decided to intervene, it seems French and British action, or the lack thereof, held more influence than the German intervention, although this too had some influence in the decision-making process. The anti-French stance of Fascist Italy, closely linked to Italian imperial designs for the Mediterranean, finally led to intervention with the deployment of troops in October–November 1936. ² More importantly, the Italian contribution heavily surpassed the German one. As Javier Rodrigo has highlighted ‘Mussolini disbursed the equivalent of an entire year of armed forces expenditure – 8.5 billion lira – in Spain’, which eventually involved the deployment of 78,474 men to the peninsula. Moreover, if we also account for the cost of reinstating the material sent by Italy to Spain, and in many cases donated at the end of the conflict, the total expenditure would increase to more than 11 billion. ³

The Nazi-fascist intervention in Spain, which presented both ideological and opportunistic elements, was accompanied by large propaganda campaigns, which aimed to consolidate and increase both countries’ influence over the emergent regime. The centrality of propaganda to the consolidation and international image of these nations and a still much-needed evaluation of their influence over Franco's regime has produced numerous studies in the field. It is important to highlight here the works of Ingrid Schulze and Lorna Waddington for the German case, and Alejandro Pizarroso Quintero for Italy. ⁴ Moreover, the field of cultural diplomacy has also shed considerable light on the topic, particularly through the works of Marició Janué and Jesús de la Hera for Germany and Rubén Domínguez for Italy. ⁵ Although these studies are essential to the history of Nazi-fascist propaganda in the Spanish Civil War, they are naturally limited by their focus, which provides a good overview of one or the other country, but not of the propagandistic actions of the Nazi-fascist alliance as a whole. The result is often an imbalanced or incomplete interpretation of the significance of this propaganda. Studies on Italy, therefore, argue that fascist propaganda during this period was further reaching than Nazi propaganda, yet studies focused on Germany challenge this argument, citing the rapid development of German networks and the importance of the Spanish Civil War to their international Anti-Bolshevik campaign. Using archival sources from Spain, Germany and Italy, ⁶ I will show how these divergent perspectives owe much not only to the lack of comparative studies in the field but also to the distinct aims and strategies deployed by each nation.

Additionally, it is important to place this study within a broader context. In this sense, recent studies on the Nazi-fascist alliance, particularly those by Benjamin Martin and Christian Goeschel, ⁷ have shown the importance of looking more closely at the dynamic of cooperation and competition that characterized German–Italian relations. This dynamic had a direct effect on both the construction of the New (fascist) Order and the gravitational pull that these regimes exercised on the European right-wing political spectrum, further influencing and contextualizing the transnational history of fascism and fascisticized movements. In this sense, the approach adopted here aims to employ the methods of comparative history to help provide further answers to these broader transnational questions. As Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka have argued, while we need to consider a global framework that allows us to account for transnational developments and linkages, it is impossible for historians of transfers and entanglements to identify and analyse these phenomena without making use of comparison. ⁸ Therefore, what I do in this article is apply a comparative framework to identify and highlight the entanglements between German and Italian policy. Given the importance of the Spanish Civil War to the establishment of the Axis, an analysis of the key propaganda networks and tools used by both nations and the ways in which Nazi-fascist relations shaped those campaigns can shed light not only on the history of the Spanish Civil War but on the nature and dynamic of the Nazi-fascist Alliance more broadly. Here was an alliance marked by a complex and non-linear dynamic of admiration and jealousy, collaboration and competition.

Although Fascist Italy had already established direct contact with several antirepublican movements, Nazi Germany had some contact with fascist groups like the Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista and the Falange, and even financed the right-wing newspaper Informaciones, but did not see Spain as a priority. ⁹ The Spanish Civil War gave Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany the opportunity to expand their influence in the peninsula. Germany's cultural reach in Spain followed on earlier cultural diplomacy networks, including scientific and cultural exchanges, many of them centred on the Ibero-American Institute in Berlin, the German–Spanish Society in Barcelona and the German schools. Between 1910 and 1934, Germany received 25% of all Spanish researchers who received funding from the Junta para la Ampliación de Estudios to study abroad, becoming their second favourite destination, surpassed only by France, whose strong imprint over the Spanish Second Republic was not without tensions. Moreover, soon after their rise to power, the Nazis transformed many, if not all, of Germany's cultural and scientific institutions abroad into instruments of propaganda. ¹⁰ It is, therefore, unsurprising that cultural diplomacy was to become the springboard of Germany's propagandistic activities in Spain.

In early 1936, Wilhelm Faupel, director of the Ibero-American Institute, became the head of the German–Spanish Society. This appointment was highly significant because the Society not only arranged academic exchanges but also directly supported the foreign section of the Falange – the Spanish fascist party – in Berlin. Furthermore, Faupel's appointment as special ambassador to Franco confirmed the temporary success of the Reich Propaganda Ministry's (Promi) strategy in Spain, which prioritized contact with the Falange, over the German Foreign Ministry's desire to focus on Franco and his cabinet. In fact, after subdued activity during the Second Republic, Faupel's leadership and the society's dependence on the Promi allowed it to increase its budget considerably. Over the course of the civil war, the German–Spanish Society came to welcome the heads of Hisma-Rowak – the industrial complex that monopolized German–Spanish trade – to its board, showcasing the connection between propagandistic, cultural and economic interests. ¹¹

Fascist Italy's cultural diplomacy, on the other hand, had been mainly channelled through the Spanish section of the Società Dante Alighieri, founded in Barcelona in 1910, not least because the city was home to 2000 of the 5000 Italians living in Spain. ¹² Technically, a private organization whose fascistization was completed in 1931, the Dante aimed to nationalize the Italian emigrant community and to foster the study of Italian as a foreign language. ¹³ Language learning, however, had a propagandistic value, given that the lack of Italian speakers had been the main obstacle to fascist proselytizing since the 1920s. The fascist government, considering language the gateway for both Italians and Spaniards to their glorious Roman tradition, encouraged the fasci – the foreign organization of the fascist party –, particularly the one in Barcelona, to start language courses. In the 1930s, this policy led to an increase in activity: from targeted distribution of periodicals among right-wing parties, to the translation of key Italian works into Spanish. ¹⁴ Imports of Italian publications increased rapidly starting in 1934, and especially after the elections of February 1936, often upon request by Spanish citizens themselves. The main objective, therefore, of these interwar activities was to fascistize Italian emigrant communities, considered the first phase of fascist infiltration abroad. ¹⁵ However, attempts at promoting fascism in Barcelona were neither sufficiently broad nor successful, while the Comitati d’Azione per l’Universalità di Roma was not particularly active. ¹⁶

The Italian presence in Spain gathered pace in the mid-1930s. The first Cultural Institute opened in Barcelona in 1934, and, in the midst of the war of Ethiopia and the run-up to the civil war, several Dante committees were nominally established in other cities, including Madrid. The only one that worked, however, was the one in Catalonia. With the war, the Dante halted its growth, while Cultural Institutes – created directly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – emerged all over Spain. Still, the modest size of the Italian community and the stronger reputation of French and German schools compared to Italian ones helps to explain the limitations encountered by Italian cultural diplomacy in Spain before 1936. ¹⁷

The limited cultural diplomacy conducted by both nations immediately before the outbreak of the Civil War did not preclude them from rapidly expanding their cultural and propagandistic activities following their military intervention. Here, existing cultural networks provided a ready-made channel for an increase in propagandistic activity, while lending this propaganda further credibility. In fact, both Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy noted the strong connection between cultural diplomacy and propaganda. Although German sources often used cultural policy and propaganda interchangeably as intrinsically related terms during this period, fascist authorities considered language learning, the core of traditional cultural diplomacy, to be at the centre of any propaganda activity. In this sense, the highly ideological character of Nazi-fascist cultural diplomacy, as well as a tendency to micromanage all aspects of cultural policy abroad, ¹⁸ made the already porous borders between cultural diplomacy and propaganda almost non-existent. This, however, does not mean that the cooperative aspect of cultural diplomacy was totally obliterated by propaganda needs, but that this cooperation could only take place within a highly limited space, shaped by the imperialistic and nationalistic objectives of all involved. These constraints, as well as the pre-war experience, shaped the development of Nazi-fascist propagandistic activity during the war.

The deployment of specific propaganda operations followed the military intervention of both countries. In the case of Nazi Germany, the conflict saw the development of different operations, which served distinct purposes and reflected the very different approaches to the foreign policy of its two ambassadors: Wilhelm Faupel and Eberhard von Stohrer. The first operation, the Antikomintern, was established in 1936 immediately after the outbreak of the conflict. This agency, whose main aim was to capitalize on the propagandistic value of the Spanish Civil War to the Nazi international anti-Bolshevik campaign, worked with the Auslandsorganisation – the foreign organization of the Nazi party –, the Dienststelle Ribbentrop – Ribbentrop's unofficial Foreign Ministry – and, from late 1936, the Sonderstab Köhn. ¹⁹ The second propaganda operation on the peninsula had been planned in autumn 1936 as part of Hitler's decision to appoint Faupel as ambassador to Salamanca, following the personal recommendation of Willi Köhn – general consul in Spain – and against the wishes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin. ²⁰ The Sonderstab, led by Köhn himself, was set up in Salamanca and worked closely with the Promi. It had a team of more than 60 people, ²¹ including four Spanish nationals eager to serve the National-Socialist cause. Through these agencies, Nazi Germany aimed to strengthen the anti-Bolshevik campaign and prevent Spain from falling back into the orbit of Britain and, especially, France. ²² Although the Antikomintern maintained its operation until it was no longer needed, the Sonderstab would be pushed out of the picture between 1938 and 1939, following the arrival of Hans Lazar, representative of the news agency Transocean, who had been sent to Spain by Ribbentrop himself. ²³ Although there was clearly competition between the Sonderstab on one hand, and Hans Lazar and Eberhad von Stohrer on the other, Nazi propaganda benefitted from a considerable level of coordination, initially between the Sonderstab and the Antikomintern, and from 1938 onwards through the concentration of all propaganda activities in the hands of Hans Lazar.

As in the case of the Sonderstab, Fascist plans to establish a press and propaganda office followed the recognition of Franco's government in late 1936. The Ufficio Stampa e Propaganda della Missione Militare Italiana in Spagna (USP), while connected to the Foreign Affairs Ministry, worked independently of Roberto Cantalupo's ambassadorship. Guglielmo Danzi, close friend of the new foreign minister Galeazzo Ciano, was appointed to lead the USP in December 1936, although it seems the office was not fully set up in Salamanca until January 1937. The office started out with 26 people, including some Spanish collaborators, but reached more than 70 members over the course of the conflict. ²⁴ It was, therefore, similar in size to the Sonderstab, and was further supported by the fasci, which continued to emerge over the conquered territory. Up until Danzi's replacement by Carlo Bossi, fascist propaganda had two key aims: fascistize Spain and win the war. But there was also a desire, very early on, to limit Nazi influence in Spain, despite the fact that Mussolini and Hitler had already started to coordinate their support for Franco in August 1936. ²⁵ As Cantalupo was told upon his appointment as ambassador, ‘You will work with the Germans against the Germans’. ²⁶ For Fascist Italy, any sort of Nazification could take place only to their detriment.

Although Fascist Italy had good reason to be concerned by the Nazi presence in Spain, Germany – although careful not to allow Italian influence to surpass its own ²⁷ – had, in principle and in propaganda terms, a more international objective in mind. In the words of Berhardt Taubert, they aimed to ‘“assume leadership of a powerful [gewaltig] global force” dedicated to the extirpation of international Bolshevism’ ²⁸ and the Spanish Civil War presented a golden opportunity to do so. The Antikomintern was in charge of exploiting the conflict internationally, portraying it as proof of the Soviets’ global subversive activities. This organization had been created in 1933 to lead the propaganda fight against Bolshevism on the international scene. With this objective in mind, the Third Reich fostered the emergence, in as many countries as possible, of Antikomintern organizations, which, though they were closely related to German foreign policy, appeared to be independent. The Spanish branch published a fortnightly Spanish language news-sheet, Informaciones Antibolcheviques, organized exhibitions and radio broadcasts, supported nationalist propaganda in republican-held areas and advised Franco's director of propaganda at the front. ²⁹ The organization worked along two lines: to supply the rebel Army with anti-communist materials and to gather materials on the fight against Bolshevism in Spain in order to strengthen the anti-communist campaign abroad. In this sense, the Antikomintern was more interested in placing the Spanish Civil War at the centre of their anti-Bolshevik campaign abroad than spreading the ideals of National-Socialism as such. ³⁰

The work of the Antikomintern was clearly laid out. The agency followed precise instructions to stay on message – presenting the civil war as the result of a Bolshevik conspiracy that predated the July coup – and to avoid upsetting the Spanish rebels. As such, war propaganda was central to its activities. On the one hand, anti-Bolshevik materials provided by Germany helped pro-Francoist mobilization. On the other, as the German sources clearly state, it was necessary for the rebels to place anti-Bolshevism at the core of their propaganda for the Nazi campaign abroad to succeed. The only way to ensure this was to provide the right support in a way that did not diminish the actions and efforts of the Spanish military. In this sense, strengthening the reputation of Francoist Spain as a place of order and reconstruction vis-à-vis the Red Terror helped Nazi objectives in Spain and abroad. In order to reach these objectives, the Antikomintern organized several exhibitions that drew heavily on Antikomintern materials. That was the case of Bolshevismus ohne Maske or ‘Bolshevism unmasked’, which was exhibited throughout Germany and Austria between 1937 and 1938. ³¹ Presenting Bolshevism as an octopus poised to take over the world, the exhibition relied heavily on Goebbels’ speech, Die Wahrheit über Spanien (The Truth about Spain), and religious propaganda, showing the anti-Christian character of communism, usually referred to as the Godless International. ³² They even planned an exhibition in Spain and an international conference of the Antikomintern that do not seem to have ever taken place. ³³ However, the most important outcome was the publication of Das Rotbuch über Spanien. Released in June 1937, the book was a compilation of pictures and evidence on the Bolshevik conspiracy in Spain, presenting the Popular Front as a facade at the service of the Soviet Union. In four months, they sold 100,000 copies, which also served as the basis for many other anti-Bolshevik publications. ³⁴ Additionally, all materials collected served to furnish their propaganda campaigns in Latin America as well as to assist Ribbentrop's ambassadorship in London. ³⁵

In 1938, the Antikomintern office was absorbed by the Spanish Ministry of the Interior but maintained its cooperation with the Promi through the press and propaganda delegation of Franco's single party (FET). In fact, the Spanish office, which worked in tight connection with the German Antikomintern, was led by Ángel Ribera de la Portilla, a Falangist who, years later, would become General Director for Propaganda. Until its dissolution in March 1939, the organization ran a news service called Servicio Antimarxista. ³⁶ With these campaigns, the Nazis aimed to provoke an anti-communist psychosis in Europe as they had done before the Machtergreifung in Germany. ³⁷ By 1939, Nazi propaganda officials believed they had succeeded, at least in blaming the Soviet Union for the Spanish Civil War and placing the conflict at the centre of international debates on communism. ³⁸

Italy also used the Spanish Civil War to warn international public opinion against the dangers of communism, particularly in Latin America, where Italian fascism aimed to use anti-Bolshevism to bring the region into the orbit of Roman Latinity. ³⁹ An ambitious objective, given Italy's lack of influence in the region and the harmful effect that their intervention in Spain had in nations like Mexico and the United States. ⁴⁰ Equally, the Italians happily contributed their own anti-Bolshevik materials to the Francoist propaganda campaigns, ⁴¹ and it is possible that an Italian proposal to hold an anti-communist world congress in Madrid or Seville – which does not appear to have taken place – referred to the same international conference the Antikomintern was preparing in collaboration with the Falange. ⁴² Although we have not found conclusive evidence of this, both proposals were made in 1937 and it would be easy to surmise that their postponement and final abandonment had much to do with the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the non-aggression pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, which made criticism of the Soviets highly inconvenient. In this sense, it is important to note that anti-Bolshevism was not just a rhetorical device. It was widely shared among many pro-Franco fighters. ⁴³ Yet, despite this shared interest in anti-Bolshevik propaganda, the Italians did express concern about entering into direct collaboration with the Germans in this area. As Leonardo Vitteti pointed out, the increase in anti-Bolshevik propaganda on Germany's part was understandable, but the Nazis also took advantage of this propaganda to distract Britain from the aggressive Nazi foreign policy by further stoking fears about the Italian presence in the Mediterranean. ⁴⁴ Such reservations were shared by other diplomats. The Italian consul to Munich, without opposing further collaboration with the Germans in these matters in principle, pointed out that this could lead to confusion on the nature of both regimes. ⁴⁵ It was, obviously, not the first time fascist elites expressed concerns about fascism losing ground in the face of National-Socialism. Hitler's rise to power in 1933 had already led to an intensification of fascist propaganda abroad and cultural diplomacy. ⁴⁶

Such concerns could not disappear in the face of the very obvious increase in German propaganda activity in Spain. The Italian ambassador to Madrid, Orazio Pedrazzi, immediately noted the strength of the German colony in the country ⁴⁷ and highlighted how, following the outbreak of the civil war, the Nazis had rapidly reactivated a long-standing network of institutions and collaborators in Spain. The Italian propaganda office, he added, paled in comparison to theirs. But it was not just a question of propaganda, Nazi Germany had contacts and emissaries everywhere that mattered, among the Falangists, the Carlists, the Air Force and, of course, the Francoist press office in Burgos. Although Pedrazzi noted that German propaganda was not directed against Italy, he still believed it should not go unanswered. He proposed to counteract German pressure by intensifying contacts between the Partito Nazionale Fascista (PNF) and the Falange and the Carlists, particularly with their youth organizations. This policy owed much to the German example: ‘The Germans do so and they create a vibrant atmosphere in their favour’. ⁴⁸ Moreover, while Pedrazzi correctly highlighted the ‘Italian flavour’ of the Falange, he expressed concern about the Falange's attraction to National-Socialism. A worry conveniently stoked by the French ambassador, who had warned him that the Falange reserved ‘German-like surprises’ for Italy. The only solution was to stay close to the Falange, while increasing their support of the Carlists. Pedrazzi was not wrong when he identified the almost unhealthy obsession Germans like Faupel had with the Falange, which he considered a mistake. The Carlists, he thought, while less prominent nationally, held strong positions in certain regions and, more importantly, they had proven to be faithful and loyal friends of Italy. This preference for the Carlists was shared by Danzi, who rapidly established contact with them and the Falangists, as well as with the press office in Burgos. ⁴⁹

Danzi's USP shared some of the objectives of the Sonderstab, such as the compilation of propaganda material for domestic and international purposes. In this sense, the Italians placed high importance on documenting their own intervention to further consolidate the regime at home. Something that the German sources also highlighted. ⁵⁰ However, this was not the only purpose of Danzi's office, which went into high gear during the first half of 1937, acting as a news agency for the Italian press, distributing as many Spanish-language leaflets on fascism as possible, dropping propaganda over enemy frontlines, distributing photographs among foreign journalists and publishing a bulletin showcasing the progress of Italian fascism, which was distributed to 70 newspapers, as well as a weekly mural newspaper. Additionally, the USP showed a particular interest in radio and film. ⁵¹ Apart from the well-known activities of the Istituto Nazionale LUCE, which found a strong competitor in the German UFA, ⁵² Danzi's office paid close attention to broadcasting for both propagandistic and economic reasons. The Italians worked to intercept European and Republican broadcasts and to provide propaganda materials, music and news items to all rebel broadcasters. Although the primary objective here was to support the war effort, particularly when their own men were fighting on the frontlines, broadcasting opened economic opportunities that both Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany wanted to exploit, a clear instance in which Nazi-fascist propagandistic and economic interest aligned. Here, however, the Italians lost the first battle to the Germans, who quickly provided the financial and technical assistance needed to establish Radio Nacional de España (RNE), the rebel radio network. The broadcasting station itself was provided and set up by German technicians in January 1937. In return, the network committed to broadcasting a daily 15-min programme covering German news and one hour per week dedicated to German music and culture. ⁵³ The idea had come from Goebbels himself, who considered the establishment of the station a priority, as it would help the rebels stay on message: ‘Popular, non-military, state-led antisemitism and anti-Bolshevism. Insist on all this. This way, the Italians won't win the game’. ⁵⁴

The German influence over RNE did not preclude any influence from Italy. In fact, Italy broadcasted a news bulletin for the Corpo de Truppe Volontarie (CTV) from this station. However, it seems the situation also encouraged Italy to explore other options, like setting agreements with Unión Radio, Radio Requeté and Radio Falange, which in some cases included broadcasts in Italian. The most important initiative, however, was the establishment of Radio Verdad. ⁵⁵ The prominence of Italian broadcasts within these initiatives highlights the importance that war propaganda – that is, propaganda addressed to one own's combatants and the enemy – had for the Italians. This was not the case for the Germans, who, having a much smaller footprint in terms of fighters, did not share this need. Military needs, however, did not blind Danzi and others to the economic possibilities that Franco's victory could bring in terms of broadcasting. Accordingly, the Italians entered negotiations with the rebels to provide them with broadcasting technicians and technology and maintained Radio Verdad, renamed Radio Verdad Italo-Española in 1939. Italy managed to reach some agreements that allowed them to have a share of the Spanish broadcasting sector after the war, but their advances were hindered by Germany, who continued to compete with them in this area. ⁵⁶

In terms of propaganda, Nazi Germany would turn out to be Italy's most direct competitor. ⁵⁷ Germany's advances in this area were already noticeable in the energetic activities of Faupel and the Sonderstab, whose main objective was to help consolidate Franco's regime as well as to establish strong relationships between Germany and Spain. This meant delivering a wide array of propaganda material and Spanish translations of German publications. In order to do so, they increased their activity, especially by feeding articles to the Spanish press – sometimes through bribery – and publishing two news-sheets: El Observador del Reich, a fortnightly bulletin on different aspects of German culture, politics and society, which supplied material to the Spanish news agency Fabra, and the weekly and better written ASPA, specifically addressed to Falangist leaders. Both publications made a special effort to highlight the social achievements of National-Socialism, although they also included anti-communist propaganda. Among others, Falangist newspapers like Arriba and Amanecer made use of the articles and news disseminated through ASPA. ⁵⁸ This was not intended to interfere with the domestic politics of the rebel zone or to press Franco to give preferential treatment to the Falange, yet Faupel's conviction that the strength of any future alliance with the new Spain relied on the unequivocal triumph of the Falangists led to his increased involvement in Spanish politics. This attitude is unsurprising, however, given that he had been pursuing such a policy as the head of the German–Spanish Society, and that this organization and the Ibero-American Institute continued to support his work along these lines. ⁵⁹

Thanks to these institutions and an increasing admiration among Falangists for National-Socialism, Faupel found a close collaborator in the foreign section of the Falange, established in Berlin in 1936 and led by Luis Casaús. This organization, directly supported by the German–Spanish Society until February 1937, showed special interest in receiving detailed information on the organization of the Nazi state and facilitated travel arrangements for Germans who wanted to travel to Spain to film the war. Moreover, the organization expressed a direct interest in receiving Nazi propaganda to disseminate in Spain and willingly shared information with the Germans on the amount and type of propaganda they received from Italy and Portugal. ⁶⁰ Still, Faupel seemed eager to counteract Italian attempts to influence the formation of the new regime. In March 1937, he noted a considerable increase in Italian cultural propaganda: ‘It seems as if in every shop there is a portrait of Mussolini. Local tradespeople have been well-stocked with books in Spanish that describe fascism and the work of developing fascism in Italy’. ⁶¹ If Nazi Germany wanted to safeguard its future interests on the peninsula, it would be necessary to provide translations of key works on National-Socialist legislation and structures, including on hygiene and eugenics. Consequently, he asked the Ibero-American Institute to compile a bibliography. He also requested postcards of the Führer and other Nazi personalities to counteract the overwhelming presence of Mussolini's portrait across rebel Spain. ⁶² Also concerning were, according to Faupel, the increased contacts between the Falange and the PNF, particularly constant attempts by the Opera Nazionale Balilla to influence the Falangist youth organization. In response, he intensified contacts between the Falange and the Hitler Youth through the German–Spanish Society and worked with Baldur von Schirach to fund a German–Spanish summer camp in Germany. ⁶³ Moreover, the Sonderstab asked the Promi to arrange for 30–40 places in the leadership schools of the Hitlerjugend to be reserved for Falangists, ⁶⁴ showcasing the tight connection between Nazi cultural policy and propaganda work. Education and training were clearly the best guarantee for effective propaganda within the Falange, which in turn would influence the government and the rest of the country.

March 1937, however, saw a shift in policy from Berlin, which sidelined the Berlin Falange and prioritized Germany's support for Franco and the war effort. This meant that Faupel required permission from the Spanish authorities before handing out invitations to visit Germany, so as to ensure that such invitations would not hinder the rebel war effort. ⁶⁵ Although he took note of this change, he continued to support the Falange in ways that did not always benefit Spanish–German relations. This attitude relied heavily on his pro-Falangist stance but Danzi's activities must also have played a role in encouraging this behaviour. The Italian diplomat had approached Franco in January 1937 to encourage him to give his regime a clearly fascist character. In order to do so, he offered to launch a widespread propaganda campaign, which, through print, radio and film, would foster an atmosphere of sympathy and understanding for fascism. He even took credit for inspiring Franco's decision to create a single party and began working, alongside Vicente Gay – delegate of the Francoist Junta for cultural relations and also on the Nazis’ payroll – on the ideological platform of said party, convinced as he was of the increasingly Italophile character of the Falange. ⁶⁶ Danzi had to abandon his collaboration with Vicente Gay under Ciano's orders, but his desire to fascistize Spain had already been noted by Faupel himself: ‘Signor Danzi, the very young and extremely active leader of the local fascio, some days ago gave General Franco or his brother a draft made by him, Danzi, of a constitution leaning heavily on the Italian model. From statements which Franco made to me, I do not believe that he will consider adopting this draft. […] The best thing Franco could do would be to put into immediate effect some of the proposals for reform which have already been prepared by the Falange, partly with German collaboration, and make use of suitable representatives of the Falange itself for this purpose.’ ⁶⁷ Despite Danzi's intense activity, Faupel was confident Germany would leave its mark on Francoism through falangist social policies that were being developed with Nazi assistance. For him, the purpose of this ideological (and propagandistic) work was threefold: ensure an alliance with Spain, transform the country into a key source of raw materials in the future and prevent any further influence on the country on the part of France and Britain. Although Fascist Italy was not his main concern, any fascist advance in this area could endanger, or at least hinder, his own agenda.

Unfortunately for Faupel, his meddling in Spanish politics, particularly around the events that precipitated the Unification Decree – the fusion of all rebel political parties into a single party – led to his replacement by Eberhard von Stohrer in late August 1937. This, however, did not put an end to his close relationship with FET, which he continued to pursue after resuming his role at the head of the German–Spanish Society and the Ibero-American Institute in early 1938. From Berlin, he continued to foster the relationship between the Women's Section and the Youth Organizations with their Nazi equivalents and re-established formal academic exchanges between both countries. ⁶⁸ Moreover, Faupel soon transformed the Society and the Ibero-American Institute, which now shared the same building, into the centre of Spanish pilgrimages to Nazi Germany, making sure that no one of importance in Spain was deprived of an invitation to visit Berlin, ⁶⁹ a role the institute continued to perform after the end of the civil war.

March 1937 was also important for Fascist Italy. That month, the CTV suffered a humiliating defeat in Guadalajara. As noted by Javier Rodrigo, few armies have been the object of more ridicule than the Italian army in Spain. ⁷⁰ It was at this point that the prominent presence of so many Italian soldiers, once highlighted by German diplomats as obvious propaganda for Italy, ⁷¹ turned against them. Moreover, their defeat seemed to favour the Germans. In a CTV report, the Italians, still reeling from the humiliation, complained bitterly about the Spaniards’ ingratitude and noted how, despite the limited military support provided by the Germans, ‘with their rigid and imperious attitude, they are heard much louder than the Italians, they [the Germans] are more prestigious and admired [than us]’. The report, however, blamed the Spaniards more than the Germans: ‘They have inherited the ferocity of the inquisitors, the duplicity and untrustworthiness of the Arabs, the haughtiness of the Grandees of Spain’. This made them unable to properly repay Italy's kindness. ⁷² What this report and others did not recognize, however, was that fascist propaganda could magnify rather than mitigate their humiliation due to its tendency to boast about every Italian success in a way that made it seem as if the war was actually being fought between the Republicans and the Italians. Complaints on these issues eventually led to the production of two LUCE newsreels, one for Italian consumption and another for Spanish consumption. ⁷³ In this sense, the gap between propaganda and performance, as well as jealousy and unease among the three allies, more than the actual military prowess or efficiency of the Italians made them the subject of ridicule across the rebel camp. ⁷⁴ Here, the Italians proved much less mindful of Spanish sensibilities than the Nazis. It is also true, however, that while Italy wanted to highlight its participation, Germany benefitted from concealing its activity in order to strengthen its anti-Bolshevik campaign, which partly explains these opposing attitudes. Something that did not escape German pilot Hans Frieder Rost who, in his diary, highlighted how the Italians took credit for every aerial victory, while they had to do everything in secrecy. ⁷⁵

To make up for the setback, Danzi was ordered to reorganize the USP, for which he received an increased budget, 185,000 pesetas, by July 1937. Faupel worried about this development, overestimating Danzi's monthly budget at 240,000–500,000 pesetas and expressing concern about the Italian embassy's influence over some military circles. He did, however, believe that Franco was fully aware of the key military contribution by the Germans. ⁷⁶ The USP increased its activity, trying to improve its war propaganda. Most of its budget was devoted to the publication of Il Legionario. This paper, which ran from March 1937 to August 1938, was written in Italian and aimed at the Italian troops, although it was also made freely available to Spanish soldiers. This centring of propaganda activities on the CTV is not surprising given the circumstances. Moreover, it seemed to respond to criticism of Danzi's work, which was not only excessively biased but paid more attention to the demoralization of the enemy than to the morale of their own soldiers. However, German reports, written after Faupel's departure, dismissed this propaganda. According to Rudolf Bobrik – council to the German embassy –, the oversaturation of Spanish media and the directness of fascist propaganda had the opposite effect, making the Italians the laughing stock of the rebel zone. ⁷⁷ Eventually, Danzi's bloated budget, clashes with the Missione Militare Italiana in Spagna (MMIS) and the Italian ambassador as well as his notorious and costly lifestyle, led to his dismissal in August of 1937. ⁷⁸ The almost simultaneous departure of Danzi and Faupel marked the beginning of a shift in both propaganda campaigns. Without neglecting contacts with FET, their successors paid more attention to winning the war and ensuring a long-term political and economic alliance with Spain, than to meddling in Spanish politics. Both nations aimed to maintain good contacts with all political factions in rebel Spain and to avoid throwing their full support behind any of them.

Danzi was soon replaced by Carlo Bossi, previously Italian consul in Barcelona. Bossi's main objective was to clean up the USP's books, which involved considerable budget cuts. He further prioritized propaganda campaigns aimed at his own soldiers, including the launch of a travelling library and eventually replacing the costly Il Legionario with cheaper and more readily available publications. ⁷⁹ He did not, however, neglect Italy's long-term objectives of making Spain into a reliable ally. In this sense, the USP launched a propaganda campaign centred on corporatism, which, in tandem with Ernesto Marchiandi's work, heavily influenced the Fuero del Trabajo, clearly inspired on the Carta del Lavoro of 1927, the basis of fascist labour law. Although the Italians recognized that the final document could easily become a paper tiger, the campaign illustrated the political purpose of the USP. ⁸⁰ In fact, nazi-fascist influence did encounter some limitations in Francoist Spain. Despite promising signs, like the existence of Auxilio de Invierno – the falangist welfare agency created in the image of the German Winterhilfe – and increasingly close contacts between falangist youth groups and Nazi-fascist organizations, already mentioned in this article, not every axis-inspired initiative was to succeed. That was, prominently, the case of the project for the reorganization of the Spanish single party, championed, among others by Dionisio Ridruejo, the party's general propaganda officer. The project, heavily influenced by National-Socialism, would have increased the power and influence of the party beyond limits acceptable to Franco. ⁸¹ Its rejection clearly marked the lines that could not be crossed, namely that any Nazi-fascist-inspired initiative could only be developed if it served to further consolidate Franco's power, never the opposite.

In the meantime, Eberhard von Stohrer replaced Faupel as German ambassador to Salamanca. The new ambassador, who had been the original choice of the German Foreign Ministry, had already served in Spain during the First World War. The problem was that the Sonderstab, which had been partially designed to compete with the Wilhelmstrasse and behaved as a sort of parallel embassy, ⁸² did not let go of its bad habits once Faupel left for Berlin, causing constant problems to Stohrer and tarnishing German–Spanish relations. Moreover, Köhn had no sympathies for Stohrer, whom he defined as an old-school diplomat, ‘the worst kind’. ⁸³ The Sonderstab's insistence on promoting National-Socialism instead of falling in line with the Embassy's guidelines, complaints on the part of the Spanish government and the arrival of Hans Lazar – a skilled propagandist, who would ally himself to Stohrer – would be the end of the group's presence in Spain, which was finally dissolved in July 1939. ⁸⁴

The Lazar-Stohrer tandem marked a shift in Nazi propaganda, pulling away from Faupel's radical pro-Falangism and prioritizing the construction of a long and stable relationship between both countries. In this sense, Lazar rapidly expanded his network of contacts, establishing a strong relationship with high officials in the Spanish government, the editors of the major newspapers and, particularly, influential Falangists. ⁸⁵ German propagandists continued to expand the reach of the German news agency DNB, which had a strong relationship with the Spanish news agency Fabra. Since 1935 they had been running the Servicio especial de colaboración internacional, a joint initiative that delivered articles of Nazi origin to the Spanish press, while appearing as an exclusively Spanish operation. The Axis influence over the media only increased in November 1938, when Spain created EFE, a state news agency, which absorbed Fabra and received most of its information from the German DNB and Transocean, and Italy's Stefani. ⁸⁶ Although the Italians also provided materials to the Spanish press and pursued the introduction of Italian writers in Falangist journals, the reach of the DNB – which the Italians complained sought to sideline the Italian Stefani ⁸⁷ – and Lazar's contacts with Francoist elites would soon translate into an increase in Germany's presence with respect to Italy's, which would only grow with the outbreak of the Second World War.

Still, by 1938, both nations continued to work towards the construction of solid cultural relations with Spain. As part of this long-term strategy, Bossi assisted in the creation of new fasci, which more than tripled in number between 1936 and 1938. This was particularly significant because, along with the Italian institutes of culture, the fasci organized their own language courses, which Ciano believed were the cornerstone of their cultural policy. ⁸⁸ Bobrik noted the fervent activity of the fasci and other organizations, like the news agency Stefani, but did not think much of it. His general tone was dismissive of Italian propaganda, which he considered too open and often counterproductive. What is clear, however, is that language learning was central to both Germany and Italy, not only because it brought Spain culturally and ideologically closer to the Axis but because of its commercial value. ⁸⁹ Here, once again, the dividing line between propaganda, cultural diplomacy and commercial interest seemed to evaporate. In this sense, both nations were also aware that translations and continued exports of books to Spain served to make inroads into the Latin-American market. Significantly, Germany refused to grant Spain a monopoly over the translation of German books to Spanish. ⁹⁰

Matters improved further for the Axis when the Francoist regime made German and Italian mandatory foreign languages in high school, which helped to erode French influence. This measure, and the willing collaboration of Pedro Sainz Rodríguez, head of the Instituto España, further facilitated the Axis strategy of increasing book imports, which now found a greater number of willing readers. It seems, however, that his actions tended to benefit the Italians much more than the Germans. ⁹¹ In any case, the cultural and economic value of this strategy stoked fascist competitiveness. Italy increased imports of books – 117,565 in 1938 alone, extended invitations to political and professional elites to visit Italy, provided scholarships and published the journal Legiones y falanges in collaboration with FET. This fervent activity responded to the concerns of the Istituto per le Relazioni Culturali con l’Estero, increasingly wary not only of Nazi activities but also of Italy's lack of coordination in terms of cultural policy, which threatened the pre-eminence of fascist culture among the Spanish rebels. Both the increase in imported books and the organization of a travelling book fair for Spain and Portugal responded to Italy's desire to counteract similar Nazi initiatives. ⁹² As a result, Spain was inundated with Nazi-fascist publications, and the Instituto de Estudios Políticos became a channel for the introduction of fascist and Nazi ideas. ⁹³ Here, the strong link between cultural diplomacy and propaganda becomes even more noticeable. As Aristotle Kallis has highlighted, the most effective propaganda must make use of a shared vocabulary and terminology that can bridge the gap between the traditional social systems that the propagandist aims to modify and the alternative values and ideas they seek to impose. ⁹⁴ In this sense, the promotion of language, literature and legislation paved the way for a more positive reception of propagandistic arguments and leitmotifs rooted in a shared – although not exempt from contradictions – vision of the New (fascist) Order. ⁹⁵

Fascist Italy's increasingly reactive policy towards Nazi propaganda was the reflection of a political shift in the Spanish political arena. Although Italy had been the model for Falangists and pro-fascists in Spain for a long time, by 1937, Nazi Germany began to replace Fascist Italy as a model. The years 1937–43 mark the high point of Spanish admiration for Nazi Germany. ⁹⁶ This was not exclusive to Francoist Spain; Giuseppe Bottai remarked in July 1938 that ‘Nazi Germany appears to have become the benchmark for our fascist faith. A trip to Germany is a feather-in-cap for party functionaries hoping to advance’. ⁹⁷

As a result, Italian competition with Germany increased over the last months of the war, and it is no surprise that the Italian ambassador, Viola, expressed a certain schadenfreude at any setback experienced by the Germans. That is what happened in July 1938 when Stohrer became increasingly concerned by anti-Axis propaganda and approached Viola to ask for a concerted action towards Franco to deal with it. If we are to believe Viola, the German setback, which would have placed Stohrer in a vulnerable position akin to that of Faupel in 1937, was really down to their bombing of Cerbère and Portbou against Franco's orders, tense mining-rights negotiations between Spain and Germany, and the psychology of the Spaniards – particularly regarding their Catholicism – which he deemed incompatible with the Nazis. He happily noted that Italian–Spanish relations, on the other hand, were excellent and that anti-Axis propaganda was aimed exclusively at Nazi Germany. As such, he saw no reason for supporting Stohrer. ⁹⁸ Simultaneously, Ottavio de Peppo – head of the Foreign Affairs cabinet – recommended exploiting the Spaniards’ religious sentiments to weaken Germany's position, in light of the undoubtedly harmful effect that Nazi policy towards the Austrian church was having on Catholicism. ⁹⁹ This was not the first time the Germans registered difficulties in their cultural and propagandistic work. Early that year, Bobrik had already noted that many Spaniards, some within relevant political circles, believed that the war would have been over already if foreign powers had not intervened in pursuit of their own interests. The best way to counteract these issues was to avoid imposing attitudes and pursue indirect cultural propaganda. ¹⁰⁰ Yet, the Cultural Agreement brokered by Sáinz Rodríguez, the most important Nazi initiative in this area, was halted by the Vatican's mistrust which eventually forced Franco's government to drop the project. ¹⁰¹

As the war approached its end, the Axis sought to play a part in the reconstruction of Spain. Propaganda and cultural policy were soon mobilized in the interest of economic opportunism. Italy grew increasingly wary of Germany's activities in this area: ‘the few businesses that are there, they [the Germans] want to do it themselves and for that purpose they have invaded the country with an army of traveling salesmen’. ¹⁰² In fact, many cultural exchanges were intended to ensure Italy's participation in the reconstruction effort. ¹⁰³ However, here the Germans proved to be strong competitors, particularly thanks to the rapid expansion of the HISMA-ROWAK industrial complex and, according to Stohrer, their superior advertising work. ¹⁰⁴ To try and fight the Germans for a piece of the Spanish market, the MMIS proposed to organize an exhibition in order to showcase the military and media technical equipment they could provide to the Spaniards. Competition with the Germans in terms of price and technology is probably one of the reasons why the Italians donated so much equipment to Spain upon leaving the country at the end of the war. Donations that, incidentally, would harm their own performance in the Second World War. In the coming years, looking to curtail the increasing Nazi influence over the Spanish rebels, Italy designed a broad cultural program with a budget of 70,000 lire centralized in the new Istituto Italiano de Cultura established in Madrid. Italian investment, however, would be halted with the outbreak of the Second World War. ¹⁰⁵ In the German case, though, Lazar's continued presence in Spain between 1938 and 1945 increased the reach of German propaganda and cultural diplomacy to new heights…that is, until things started to go wrong for the Axis. ¹⁰⁶

Although fascist propaganda was wide-ranging during this period, Nazi Germany ended up in a much more beneficial position while investing less effort. Higher military involvement on the part of Italy necessarily put war propaganda at the centre of any campaign. This was further highlighted by the propagandistic value of their military intervention in the domestic sphere. Nazi Germany's participation, on the contrary, was militarily significant but less costly in terms of men. This also gave propagandists free rein to focus more on other objectives, such as capitalizing on the Spanish Civil War for their international anti-communist campaign and reactivating a strong cultural policy, which could strengthen Spanish–German relations and protect Germany's economic interests in Spain. Moreover, the Nazi anti-Bolshevik campaign could only be successful if Nazi Germany concealed, as much as possible, its intervention in the country. This required, therefore, a more careful deployment of propaganda and tighter collaboration with the Spaniards. Regardless of its effectiveness, this attitude contrasted greatly with that of the fascist propagandists, who were more worried about showcasing the strength of fascism than avoiding any offence to their allies. This, combined with a broad discoordination of their propaganda activities, harmed their chances of success.

In both cases, however, we see increasing attempts, in 1937, to fascistize or nazify Franco's regime at a fundamental juncture in its development. Yet, the common shift in policy, following Danzi and Faupel's departure, towards a propaganda strategy centred around preserving a long-term alliance with Spain and preventing Franco-British influence points towards a revalorization of traditional foreign policy objectives over exclusively ideological ones. The nationalistic agenda of both regimes naturally imposed itself over any potential desire to make Spain into a miniature version of National-Socialism or fascism. Cultural diplomacy and propaganda, which inevitably became enmeshed during this period, proved central to achieving these objectives. This further shows how, as demonstrated by Benjamin Martin, both Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy made use of the mechanics of internationalism and culture to infiltrate other nations’ cultural markets and steer their policies and populations towards the construction of a New (fascist) Order, one ultimately geared towards ‘Germany's domination of the continent’ and in the case of Fascist Italy, Rome's centrality to European culture. ¹⁰⁷

The civil war was also a turning point in Spanish–German relations, one which saw Fascist Italy's political influence over the Spanish right decrease in favour of Nazism. Here, Nazi Germany benefitted from a centuries-old scientific and intellectual relationship ¹⁰⁸ which made reactivating its old cultural networks easier once the war started. This, paired with a very clear propaganda focus and Lazar's skill, produced a steadily growing network that would prove very useful during the Second World War. Fascist Italy, on the other hand, conducted a campaign that was as large as it was uncoordinated, a problem the Italians tried to solve in 1939 by centralizing all cultural activities. Italy's mistrust of Nazi Germany and its reluctance to accept a subaltern position to National-Socialism led Italy to conduct a reactive propaganda policy in Spain. Although German sources became increasingly indifferent to, if not dismissive of, fascist propaganda by 1938, Italy continued to perceive Germany as one of its strongest competitors. Therefore, the extent of fascist propaganda in Spain responded more to fascism's self-perceived weakness than to its strength. The end of the Spanish Civil War, which came with a decrease in Italian propaganda activity, further confirmed Fascist Italy's regression in Spain vis-à-vis Nazi Germany. This was part of a wider development of German–Italian relations, in which Nazi-fascist nationalist and imperialist objectives inevitably clashed, at times, with each other. Although this relationship was dominated by Nazi Germany, Italy's refusal to relinquish its own ambitions engendered a dynamic of collaboration and competition, reciprocity and hostility, often plagued by petty jealousies and national stereotypes, ¹⁰⁹ which manifested itself very clearly in the Spanish arena.