France's Occupation Costs and the War in the East: The Contribution to the German War Economy,1940–4

Abstract

This article analyses how Nazi Germany exploited France, which – from an economic point of view – was the most important occupied country during the Second World War. We can show that, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, there was no clear-cut caesura in Germany’s policy of exploiting occupied France – not in the extent of the exploitation in real terms or in the kind of policy toward occupation funds. Although the war in the East and preparations for the invasion made it necessary for Germany to reduce wasteful spending of occupation funds and combat French inflation more consistently, its occupation policy did not shift radically but gradually between mid 1942 and the end of 1943. However, it was not Albert Speer’s Armament Ministry, but other German institutions, especially the Reich Finance Ministry, which played a decisive role in this process. Without this policy Germany would not have been able to increase the French contribution to the German warfare all over Europe, especially on the Eastern front.