Ulbricht in October 1956: Survival of the Spitzbart during Destalinization

Abstract

This article seeks to answer the question, how exactly did the East German leader Walter Ulbricht survive destalinization in the 1950s and remain in power until 1971, while his Hungarian counterpart Mátyás Rákosi (and his successor Ernő Gerő) were forced to resign and flee to the USSR in July 1956? How was Ulbricht able to prevent the kind of unrest that was occurring in Poland and Hungary? Both Ulbricht and Rákosi had spent the second world war in the Soviet Union and were ‘Muscovites’. Both were unpopular, diehard Stalinists who dragged their feet in implementing the reforms dictated by the Twentieth CPSU Congress. The article will conclude that, while the answer lies in a combination of factors, the most influential factor in Ulbricht's survival was probably Soviet support. Ordinarily, influenced by the Poles and Hungarians, the East Germans probably would have tried to oust him in 1956. However, historical and domestic factors intervened in the GDR case, especially the aborted June 1953 uprising and resulting fatalism vis-à-vis the Soviet military and Stasi. Thus, despite their relative economic deprivation and distrust of the punitive Ulbricht, the East Germans did not rise up against him and the SED regime.