Abstract
Great Power efforts to control arms trafficking began in the late nineteenth century, but were applied only to colonial territories and were motivated by concerns for the stability of European empires. The first world war altered the international consensus that the arms trade was essentially free, and the 1919 Treaty of Saint-Germain tried to impose new restrictions on arms trading. Though Saint-Germain was never ratified, the League of Nations continued its efforts to control the arms trade at a conference in Geneva in 1925. The League's efforts had the endorsement of the major arms-producing powers and even the USA, which had refused to join the League. The Geneva conference made clear, however, that smaller, non-producing states saw free trade in arms as essential to their security, and resisted what they saw as infringements on their sovereignty and security. The compromise Geneva Convention did not assuage small states, and, like its predecessor, was never ratified. The League's force of moral example, however, did produce long-term changes in state policies on arms trading. This suggests that the League's legacy should be judged not just by its failure to avert the second world war, but by its success in establishing norms of international behaviour. Also, smaller states, not just Great Powers, had the ability to block League initiatives.
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