Spatial models are increasingly finding entrance into the analysis of international relations. These models are perfectly appropriate as long as the relevant policy or negotiation space is unidimensional or the actors are truly unitary. But the recent discovery of the domestic arena questions the appropriateness of the unitary actor assumption. Hence, using spatial models becomes questionable. This article discusses the limitations of spatial models in this context and shows under what conditions the nonunitariness of actors poses no problems.
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