This article investigates voting behavior and policy outcomes when violence can occur after the election. The author finds that under complete information, voters will prefer the weak party—that is, the party that is the least capable of controlling violence. Under incomplete information, however, violence might occur, and voters could prefer the party the most capable of controlling violence. Finally, the author shows that despite this likely voting outcome, the weak party will choose to participate nonaggressively in the election, providing legitimacy to the new democratic process.
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