Violence and Uncertainty in Transitions

Abstract

This article develops a model of the strategic interaction between a regime and its domestic opposition. The author formally explores the strategic nature of the decision to pursue a transition. Specifically, the model incorporates the notion of uncertainty in the sense that the opposition does not know whether hard-liners or soft-liners control the regime. Liberalization then becomes a signal to the opposition, which may or may not convey meaningful information about the regime's type. An important result of the analysis is that in a scenario in which the opposition seeks a transition but wishes to avoid violence, conflict between the opposition and the regime can still occur. The model also provides an explanation for the occurrence of pacted transitions (negotiated transitions without violence) as well as why some transition opportunities do not materialize even when conditions are ripe for a peaceful transition. In addition, the model explains why and under what circumstances regimes liberalize. Empirical analysis of the Hungarian revolt of 1956 and pretransition Brazil during the late 1970s lends support to the model.