Two team games are introduced: a game of assurance and a game of chicken. The games were operationalized as a competition between two teams, with three players on each team, and were compared either with or without the opportunity for a within-team discussion. The authors found that the vast majority of the teams in both game types chose to compete, and almost all individual players abided by the group's decision. However, the rationale for choosing the competitive team strategy (as coded from group discussions) and the beliefs of individual team members following discussion (as reflected in the postdecision questionnaire) differed systematically as a function of game type.
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