Neorealist theories of international relations, particularly when formalized as noncooperative games, have difficulty accounting for substantial cooperation between nation-states, perhaps because neorealists have underestimated the role of communication between states. To address this issue, the authors developed an experiment in which nation-states, represented as groups, can communicate. Two groups of three human subjects interacted for 10 iterations of a prisoner's dilemma (PD) game and an altered version of the game. The authors conducted 79 of these 10 iteration trials and tested the effects of communication and a withdrawal option on groups' ability to cooperate. Results indicate that groups cooperate more and defect less when they can communicate. Most groups appear to be motivated by fear of the opponent; communication appears to be a good mechanism for alleviating fear. However, a small but significant number of groups are motivated by greed; communication is not very effective in these situations.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Allison, G. 1971. Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile crisis. Boston: Little, Brown.
2.
Axelrod, R. 1984. The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
3.
Blight, J. , and D. Welsh. 1989. On the brink: Americans and Soviets reexamine the Cuban missile crisis. New York: Hill and Wang.
4.
Brams, S. , and D. M. Kilgore. 1988. Game theory and national security. New York: Basil Blackwell.
5.
Buchanan, J.1978. Markets, states and the extent of morals. American Economic Review68:364-368.
6.
Caldwell, M.1976. Communication and sex effects in a five-person prisoner's dilemma game. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology33:273-280.
7.
Campbell, D.1975. On the conflicts between biological and social evolution and between psychology and moral tradition. American Psychologist30:1103-1126.
8.
Chammah, A. M. , J. Dwyer, J. Gyr, and A. Rapoport. 1962. Three-person non-zero-sum non-negotiable games. Behavioral Science7:38-58.
9.
Coombs, C.1973. A reparameterization of the prisoner's dilemma game. Behavioral Science18:424-428.
10.
Crawford. V.1990. Explicit communication and bargaining outcomes. American Economic Review80:213-219.
11.
Dawes, R. , J. McTavish, and H. Shaklee. 1977. Behavior, communication, and assumptions about other peoples' behavior in a commons dilemma situation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology35:1-11.
12.
Dawes, R. , J. Orbell, R. Simmons, and A. van de Kragt. 1986. Organizing groups for collective action. American Political Science Review80:1171-1185.
13.
Deutsch. M.1958. Trust and suspicion. Journal of Conflict Resolution2:267-279.
14.
Deutsch. M. . 1960. The effects of motivational orientation upon trust and suspicion. Human Relations13:123-139.
15.
Gilpin, R. 1981. War and change in world politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
16.
Gilpin, R. . 1987. The political economy of international relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
17.
Gowa, J.1989. Bipolarity, multipolarity, and free trade. American Political Science Review83:1245-1256.
18.
Grieco, J.1988. Anarchy and the limits of cooperation. International Organization42:485-507.
19.
Grieco, J. , R. Powell, and D. Snidal. 1993. The relative gains problem for international cooperation. American Political Science Review87:729-743.
20.
Halperin, M. 1974. Bureaucratic politics and foreign policy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
21.
Hardin, R. 1982. Collective action. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
22.
Insko, C. A. , R. Pinkley, R. Hoyle, B. Dalton, G. Hong, R. Slim, P. Landry, B. Holton, P. Ruffin, and J. Thibaut. 1987. Individual versus group discontinuity: The role of intergroup contact. Journal of Experimental Psychology23:250-267.
23.
Insko, C. A. , J. Schopler, S. M. Drigotas, K. Graetz, J. Kennedy, C. Cox, and G. Bornstein. 1993. The role of communication in interindividual-intergroup discontinuity. Journal of Conflict Resolution37:108-138.
24.
Insko, C. A. , J. Schopler, R. H. Hoyle, G. Dardis, and K. Graetz. 1990. Individual-group discontinuity as a function of fear and greed. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology58:68-79.
25.
Janis, I. 1982. Groupthink. 2d ed.Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
26.
Jervis, R.1978. Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Politics30:167-214.
27.
Jervis, R. . 1988. Realism, game theory, and cooperation. World Politics40:167-185.
28.
Johnson, J.1993. Is talk really cheap? Prompting conversation between critical theory and rational choice. American Political Science Review87:74-86.
29.
Keohane, R. 1984. After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
30.
Krasner, S. 1978. Defending the national interest; Raw materials investment and U.S. foreign policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
31.
Krasner, S. . 1982. Structural causes and regime consequence: Regimes as intervening variables. International Organization36:186-206.
32.
Krasner, S. . 1991. Global communication and national power: Life on the Pareto frontier. World Politics43:336-336.
33.
Kratochwil, F. 1989. Rules, norms, and decisions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
34.
Kreps, D. 1990. A course in microeconomic theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
35.
Kreps, D. M. , P. Milgram, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson. 1982. Rational cooperation and finitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory27:245-252.
36.
Lebow, R. N. 1981. Between war and peace: The nature of international crises. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
37.
Majeski, S. Forthcoming. Generating and maintaining cooperation in international relations: A model of repeated interaction among groups in complex and uncertain situations. International Interactions.
38.
Majeski, S. , and S. Fricks. 1994. Relations among nation-states in a changing environment: A model of repeated interaction among groups with limited information. International Interactions19:283-309.
39.
Majeski, S. , and D. Sylvan. 1990. The construction of foreign policy recommendations. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, April 10-14, Washington, DC.
40.
McCallum, D. M. , K. Harring, R. Gilmore, S. Drenan, J. Chase, C. A. Insko, and J. Thibaut. 1985. Competition and cooperation between groups and between individuals. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology21:301-320.
41.
Orbell, J. , P. Schwartz-Shea, and R. Simmons. 1984. Do cooperators exit more readily than defectors?American Political Science Review78:147-162.
42.
Orbell, J. , A.J.C. van de Kragt, and R. Dawes. 1988. Explaining discussion-induced cooperation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology54:811-819.
43.
Oye, K.1985. Explaining cooperation under anarchy: Hypotheses and strategies. World Politics38:1-24.
44.
Powell, R.1991. Absolute and relative gains in international relations theory. American Political Science Review85:1303-1320.
45.
Rapoport, A. 1974. Fights, games, and debates. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
46.
Rapoport, A. , and A. Chammah. 1965. Prisoner's dilemma: A study in conflict and cooperation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
47.
Ruggie, G. 1983. International regimes, transactions, and change: Embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order. In International regimes, edited by S. Krasner. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
48.
Schelling, T. A. 1960. The strategy of conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
49.
Snidal, D. 1986. The game theory of international relations. In Cooperation under anarchy, edited by K. Oye, 25-57. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
50.
Snidal, D. . 1991a. International cooperation among relative gains maximizers. International Studies Quarterly35:387-402.
51.
Snidal, D. . 1991b. Relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation. American Political Science Review85:701-726.
52.
Snyder, G. , and P. Diesing. 1977. Conflict among nations: Bargaining, decision making and system structure in international crises. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
53.
Tajfel, H. , and J. Turner. 1979. An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In The social psychology of intergroup relations, edited by W. Austin and S. Worchel, 33-47. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
54.
Taylor, M. 1976. Anarchy and cooperation. London: Wiley.
55.
Taylor, M. . 1987. The possibility of cooperation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
56.
Turner, J. , and H. Giles. 1981. Intergroup behavior. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
57.
Wagner, R. H.1983. The theory of games and the problem of international cooperation. American Political Science Review70:330-346.
58.
Walt, S. 1987. The origins of alliances. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
59.
Waltz, K. 1979. Theory of international relations. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
60.
Wichman, H.1970. Effects of isolation and communication in a two-person game. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology16:114-130.
61.
Williamson, O.1983. Credible commitments: Using hostages to support exchange. American Economic Review73:519-540.
