This article reports on an experiment concerned with a two-stage, two-person, simultaneous-demand bargaining game. The focus of analysis is on a prediction for concession behavior in the second-stage game provided by Harsanyi's “risk dominance” principle, which is at odds with the prediction provided by the mixed-strategy equilibrium in the second-stage game. The results of the experiment provide support for the risk dominance prediction, with concessions occurring according to the prediction in 78% of eligible cases, thus outperforming the mixed-strategy equilibrium as a predictor of concession behavior.
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