The findings of a quantitative analysis of the effectiveness of reciprocating influence strategies in militarized interstate crises (MICs) suggest that the success of reciprocating strategies in MICs is related to (1) withholding cooperative initiatives until after the reciprocating party has demonstrated its resolve, (2) the use of carrot-and-stick influence attempts and responses combining firmness with flexibility, and (3) overcoming ambiguity through overt communication of intentions. Reciprocating influence strategies are most likely to be employed by democratic states either defending the status quo or following a change in the status quo in their favor through a fait accompli. When reciprocating strategies are employed against different types of influence strategies, the outcomes are consistent with the intersection of the decision rules of the influence strategies employed by the two sides.
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