This research examined the effects of resource distribution, voice, and decision framing on cooperative behavior in a social dilemma. It was hypothesized that high resource inequality would lead to less cooperation, whereas a more equal distribution of resources would lead to greater cooperation. It was further hypothesized that there would be more cooperation when people were given an opportunity to express voice, and when the decision was framed positively rather than negatively. This research also examined whether the salience, or strength, of two different motives for defection varied with the situation. When there was high resource inequality, it was hypothesized that the salience of each motive would depend on the amount of resources a person could contribute to a public good. The results strongly supported the hypothesis that inequality leads to decreased cooperation, but provided no support for the effects of framing and voice. There was evidence that under high inequality, different motives for defection were salient for those with more and less resources, respectively.
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