This research explores two approaches to modeling decisions about when to resort to conflict. The authors begin from a model of a single actor making unilateral decisions for her or his nation-state. That model is expanded to incorporate advisors who make recommendations to the unitary actor. Those recommendations can be accepted or rejected as the leader sees fit. The authors' concern is to explore the robustness of the unitary actor model when others are added to the decision process. The authors rely on theoretical findings from social choice theory to develop the model. Laboratory experiments are then used to test the predictions from their model.
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