In the last decade, there has been a resurgence of interest in problems of cooperation, stimulated largely by Axelrod's work. Using an innovative tournament approach, Axelrod found that a simple strategy, tit-for-tat (TFT), was most successful in playing the repeated prisoner's dilemma (PD) in a noiseless environment. However, recent analytical work has shown that monitoring problems caused by noise significantly impair TFT's effectiveness. The primary purpose of the present research is to discover whether there exist alternative strategies that perform well in noisy PDs. To investigate this question, the authors conducted a computer tournament. The results of the tournament demonstrated that, consistent with analytical work, TFT performed rather poorly. In contrast, strategies that were generous (i.e., cooperated more than their partners did) were quite effective.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Axelrod, R.1980a. Effective choice in the prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution24:3-25.
2.
Axelrod, R.1980b. More effective choice in the prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution24:379-403.
3.
Axelrod, R. 1984. The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
4.
Axelrod, R. , and D. Dion. 1988. The further evolution of cooperation. Science242:1385-1390.
5.
Bazerman, M. 1986. Judgment in managerial decision making. New York: Wiley.
6.
Bendor, J.1987. In good times and bad: Reciprocity in an uncertain world. American Journal of Political Science31:531-558.
7.
Bendor, J. 1990. Uncertainty's effect on the repeated prisoner's dilemma: Four false conjectures - and five true propositions. Unpublished manuscript, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University.
8.
Bendor, J. , and P. Swistak. 1990. The evolutionary stability of cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. Research paper no. 1115, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University.
9.
Brann, P. , and M. Foddy. 1988. Trust and the consumption of a deteriorating common resource. Journal of Conflict Resolution31:614-630.
10.
Brewer, M. B. 1981. Ethnocentrism and its role in interpersonal trust. In Scientific inquiry and the social sciences, edited by M. B. Brewer and B. E. Collins. New York: Jossey-Bass.
11.
Coombs, C. H.1973. A re-parameterization of the prisoner's dilemma game. Behavioral Science18:424-428.
12.
Dawes, R. M. , and R. H. Thaler. 1988. Anomalies: Cooperation. Journal of Economic Perspectives2:187-197.
13.
Deutsch, M. 1973. The resolution of conflict: Constructive and destructive processes. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
14.
Downs, G. W. , D. M. Rocke, and R. M. Siverson. 1985. Arms races and cooperation. World Politics38:118-146.
15.
Etzioni, A. 1988. The moral dimension: Toward a new economics. New York: Free Press.
16.
Heider, F. 1958. The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley.
17.
Jervis, R. 1976. Perception and misperception in international politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
18.
Knight, G. P. , and A. F. Dubro. 1984. Cooperative, competitive, and individual social values: An individualized regression and clustering approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology46:98-105.
19.
Kramer, R. M.1989. Windows of vulnerability or cognitive illusions? Cognitive processes in the nuclear arms race. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology25:79-100.
20.
Kramer, R. M. , C. G. McClintock, and D. M. Messick. 1986. Social values and cooperative response to a simulated resource conservation crisis. Journal of Personality54:576-591.
21.
Kramer, R. M. , D. Meyerson, and G. Davis. 1990. How much is enough? Psychological components of “guns versus butter” decisions in a security dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology58:984-993.
22.
Kuhlman, D. M. , C. Camac, and D. Cunha. 1986. Individual differences in social orientation. In Experimental social dilemmas, edited by H. Wilke, D. Messick, & C. Rutte. Frankfurt, Germany: Peter Lang.
23.
Kuhlman, D. M. , and A. Marshello. 1975. Individual differences in game motivation as moderators of preprogrammed strategic effects in prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology32:922-931.
24.
Liebrand, W.B.1984. The effect of social motives, communication, and group size on behavior in an n-person multi-stage mixed-motive game. European Journal of Social Psychology14:239-264.
25.
Lindskold, S.1978. Trust development, the GRIT proposal, and the effects of conciliatory acts on conflict and cooperation. Psychological Bulletin85:7972-7993.
26.
Mansbridge, J. 1990. Beyond self-interest. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
27.
Messick, D. M. 1986. Decision making in social dilemmas: Some attributional effects. In New directions in research on decision making, edited by B. Brehmer, H. Jungerman, P. Lourens, and G. Sevon. North-Holland: Elsevier Science.
28.
Messick, D. M. 1990. The preference for equality. Unpublished manuscript.
29.
Messick, D.M. , & C. G. McClintock. 1968. Motivational basis of choice in experimental games. Journal of Experimental and Social Psychology4:1-25.
30.
Messick, D. M. , H. Wilke, M. B. Brewer, R. M. Kramer, P. Zemke, and L. Lui. 1983. Individual adaptations and structural change as solutions to social dilemmas. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology44:294-309.
31.
Molander, P.1985. The optimal level of generosity in a selfish, uncertain environment. Journal of Conflict Resolution29:611-618.
32.
Mueller, U.1987. Optimal retaliation for optimal cooperation. Journal of Conflict Resolution31:692-724.
33.
Nemeth, C. 1972. A critical analysis of research utilizing the prisoner's dilemma paradigm for the study of bargaining. In Advances in experimental social psychology Vol. 6, edited by L. Berkowitz, 203-234. New York: Academic Press.
34.
Ross, L. 1977. The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings. In Advances in experimental social psychology Vol. 10, edited by L. Berkowitz. New York: Academic Press.
35.
Rotter, J. B.1980. Interpersonal trust, trustworthiness, and gullibility. American Psychologist35:1-7.
36.
Solomon, L.1960. The influence of some types of power relationships and game strategies upon the development of interpersonal trust. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology61:223-230.
