Response to Strategy and Communication in an Arms Race-Disarmament Dilemma

Abstract

Subjects (40 males and 40 females) played against a simulated other in a six-choice prisoner's dilemma game that was described in terms of an arms race. The simulated other employed either a GRIT or tit-for-tat strategy, with either communication or no communication. The GRIT strategy elicited more cooperation than the tit-for-tat strategy, and there was an interaction such that the GRIT strategy with communication produced more cooperation than any of the other conditions. In addition, explicit communication decreased the occurrence of deception being employed against the GRIT strategist. Although GRIT produced more conciliation than tit-for-tat, the simulated other using GRIT was also taken advantage of more frequently; to avoid exploitation, modifications in the GRIT strategy may be needed. The results are discussed in terms of how explicit communication is needed for GRIT to be optimally effective and how additional communication may reduce exploitation.