Richardson's simple arms race model inspired an extensive (and still growing) body of research by scholars in many disciplines. Unfortunately, much of this work follows Richardson's lead by paying scant attention to domestic politics and decision-making processes. Despite the use of increasingly sophisticated formal models, empirical measures, and statistical methods, progress has been stymied by continued reliance on rigid models and literal interpretations of statistical tests, especially regarding the relative potency of external and internal factors. A new approach to modeling is required if we are to understand the underlying dynamics of resource allocation that sustain an arms race. The author argues that the substantive complexities of arms rivalries can be implicitly encompassed by simple rational models considerably less restrictive than Richardson's model.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Abolfathi, F. 1980. Threat, public opinion, and military spending in the United States, 1930-1990. In Threats, weapons, and foreign policy, edited by P. McGowan and C. W. Kegley, Jr., Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, Vol. 5 83-133. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
2.
Achen, C. H. 1988. A state with bureaucratic politics is representable as a unitary rational actor. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, September.
3.
Allan, P. 1983. Crisis bargaining and the arms race. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
4.
Allison, G. T. 1971. Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile crisis. Boston: Little, Brown.
5.
Allison, G. T. 1974. Questions about the arms race: Who's racing whom? A bureaucratic perspective. In Contrasting approaches to strategic arms control, edited by R. L. Pfaltzgraff, 31-72. Lexington, MA: Heath.
6.
Anderton, C. H.1985. A selected bibliography of arms race models and related subjects. Conflict Management and Peace Science8:99-122.
7.
Anderton, C. H.1989. Arms race modelling: Problems and prospects. Journal of Conflict Resolution33:346-367.
8.
Arrow, K. J. 1963. Social choice and individual values, 2d ed.New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
9.
Axelrod, R. 1984. The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic.
10.
Begg, D.K.H. 1982. The rational expectations revolution in macroeconomics. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
11.
Boulding, K. 1962. Conflict and defense: A general theory. New York: Harper and Row.
12.
Brams, S. J. 1985. Superpower games. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
13.
Brams, S. J. , and D. M. Kilgour. 1988. Game theory and national security, New York: Basil Blackwell.
14.
Brito, D. L.1972. A dynamic model of an armaments race. International Economic Review13:359-375.
15.
Brito, D. L. , and M. D. Intriligator. 1982. Arms races: Behavioral and economic dimensions. In Missing elements in political inquiry, edited by J. A. Gillespie and D. A. Zinnes, 93-116. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
16.
Brito, D. L. , and M. D. Intriligator. 1987. Arms races and the outbreak of war: Application of principal-agent relationships and asymmetric information. In Peace, defense and economic analysis, edited by Christian Schmidt and Frank Blackaby, 104-120. New York: St. Martin's.
17.
Bueno de Mesquita, B. 1981. The war trap. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
18.
Bueno de Mesquita, B. , and D. Lalman. 1990. Domestic opposition and foreign war. American Political Science Review84:747-765.
19.
Busch, P. A. 1970. Mathematical models of arms races. Appendix to Bruce Russett, What price vigilance?, 193-233. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
20.
Byers, J. D. , and D. A. Peel. 1989. The determinants of arms expenditures of NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Some further evidence. Journal of Peace Research26:69-77.
21.
Caspary, W. R.1967. Richardson's model of arms races: Description, critique, and an alternative model. International Studies Quarterly11:63-90.
22.
Crecine, J. T. 1971. Defense budgeting. In Studies in budgeting, edited by W. W. Cooper, R. F. Byrne, A. Charnes, O. A. Davis, and D. Gilford, 210-261. Amsterdam: North Holland.
23.
Crecine, J. T. , and G. W. Fischer. 1973. On resource allocation in the U.S. Department of Defense. Political Science Annual4:181-236.
24.
Cusack, T. , and M. D. Ward. 1981. Military spending in the United States, Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China. Journal of Conflict Resolution25:429-470.
25.
Cyert, R. M. , and J. G. March, eds. 1963. A behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
26.
Davis, O. A. , M.A.H. Dempster, and A. Wildavsky. 1966. A theory of the budgetary process. American Political Science Review60:529-547.
27.
Domke, W. K. , R. C. Eichenberg, and C. M. Kelleher. 1983. The illusion of choice: Defense and welfare in advanced industrial democracies, 1948-1978. American Political Science Review77:19-35.
28.
Downs, G. W. , D. M. Rocke, and R. M. Siverson. 1985. Arms races and cooperation. World Politics38:118-146.
29.
Eckhardt, W.1981. Pioneers of peace research - Lewis Fry Richardson: Apostle of math. International Interactions8:247-273.
30.
Etcheson, C. 1989. Arms race theory: Strategy and structure of behavior. New York: Greenwood.
31.
Faber, J.1987. Measuring cooperation, conflict, and the social network of nations. Journal of Conflict Resolution31:438-464.
32.
Ferejohn, J. A. 1976. On the effects of aid to nations in arms races. In Mathematical models in international relations, edited by Dina A. Zinnes and John V. Gillespie, 218-251. New York: Praeger.
33.
Feynman, R. P. 1967. The character of physical law. Cambridge: MIT Press.
34.
Feynman, R. P. 1985. Surely you're joking, Mr. Feynman: Adventures of a curious character. New York: Bantam.
35.
Fogarty, T.1990. Deterrence games and social choice: Asymmetry, aggregation of preferences, and a conjecture about uncertainty. International Interactions15:203-226.
36.
Freeman, J. R.1983. Granger causality and the time series analysis of political relationships. American Journal of Political Science27:327-358.
37.
Freeman, J. R. , J. T. Williams, and T. Lin. 1989. Vector autoregression and the study of politics. American Journal of Political Science33:842-877.
38.
Galbraith, J. K. 1967. The new industrial state. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
39.
Gillespie, J. V. 1976. Optimal control theory and comparative foreign policy: A promising approach for future research. In in search of global patterns, edited by J. N. Rosenau, 235-246. New York: Free Press.
40.
Gillespie, J. V. , and D. A. Zinnes. 1975. Progressions in mathematical models of international conflict. Synthese31:289-321.
41.
Gillespie, J. V.1977. Embedded game analysis and international conflict control. Behavioral Science22:22-31.
42.
Gillespie, J. V. , D. A. Zinnes, G. S. Tahim, P. A. Schrodt, and R. M. Rubison. 1977. An optimal control model of arms races. American Political Science Review71:226-244.
43.
Gleick, J. 1987. Chaos: Making a new science. New York: Viking.
44.
Goldstein, J. S. , and J. R. Freeman. 1990. Three-way street: Strategic reciprocity in world politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
45.
Gray, C. S.1971. The arms race phenomenon. World Politics24:39-79.
46.
Gray, C. S.1972. The urge to compete: Rationales for arms racing. World Politics26:207-233.
47.
Griffin, L. J. , J. A. Devine, and M. Wallace. 1982. Monopoly capital, organized labor, and military expenditures in the United States, 1949-1976. American Journal of Sociology88:S113-S153.
48.
Griffin, L. J. , M. Wallace, and J. A. Devine. 1982. The political economy of military spending: Evidence from the United States. Cambridge Journal of Economics6:1-14.
49.
Hamblin, R. L. , M. Hout, J.L.L. Miller, and B. L. Pitcher, 1977. Arms races: A test of two models. American Sociological Review42:338-354.
50.
Hogarth, R. , and M. Reder, eds. 1986. Rational choice: The contrast between economics and psychology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
51.
Hollist, W. L.1977. Alternative explanations of competitive arms processes: Tests on four pairs of nations. American Journal of Political Science21:313-340.
52.
Hoole, F. W. 1976. Politics and budgeting in the World Health Organization. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
53.
Hoole, F. W. , and C. Huang. 1989. The global conflict process. Journal of Conflict Resolution33:142-163.
54.
Hopmann, P. T. , and T. C. Smith. 1977. An application of a Richardson process model: Soviet-American interactions in the test ban negotiations 1962-1963. Journal of Conflict Resolution21:701-726.
55.
Huckfeldt, R. R. , C. W. Kohfeld, and T. W. Likens. 1982. Dynamic modelling: An introduction. Sage Series in Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, no. 27, pp. 46-65. Beverly Hills: Sage.
56.
Huntington, S. P.1958. Arms races: Prerequisites and results. Public Policy8:41-86.
57.
Intriligator, M. D.1982. Research on conflict theory: Analytic approaches and areas of application. Journal of Conflict Resolution26:307-327.
58.
Intriligator, M. D. , and D. L. Brito. 1984. Can arms races lead to the outbreak of war?Journal of Conflict Resolution28:63-84.
59.
Intriligator, M. D. , and D. L. Brito. 1989. Richardsonian arms race models. In Handbook of war studies, edited by M. I. Midlarsky, 218-236. Winchester, MA: Unwin Hyman.
60.
Isard, W. 1988. Arms races, arms control, and conflict analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press.
61.
Isard, W. , and C. H. Anderton. 1985. Arms race models: A survey and synthesis. Conflict Management and Peace Science8:27-98.
62.
Johnson, P. , and R. A. Wells. 1986. Soviet military and civilian resource allocation 1951-1980. Journal of Conflict Resolution30:195-219.
63.
Jones, D. L. 1988. The dynamics of contemporary international conflict. Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, Bloomington.
64.
Kim, K. 1988. Equilibrium business cycle theory in historical perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
65.
Krell, G.1981. Capitalism and armaments: Business cycles and defense spending in the United States 1945-1979. Journal of Peace Research18:221-240.
66.
Kugler, J. , and A.F.K. Organski with D. J. Fox. 1980. Deterrence and the arms race: The impotence of power. International Security3:105-138.
67.
Kugler, J. , and F. C. Zagare, eds. 1987. Exploring the stability of deterrence. GSIS Monograph Series in World Affairs, University of Denver. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
68.
Lambelet, J.1971. A dynamic model of the arms race in the Middle East, 1953-1965. General Systems16:145-167.
69.
Lambelet, J.1973. Toward a dynamic two theater model of the East-West arms race. Journal of Peace Science1:1-37.
70.
Lambelet, J.1986. The formal (`economic') analysis of arms races: What - if anything - have we learned since Richardson?Conflict Management and Peace Science9:1-17.
71.
Lambelet, J. , and U. Luterbacher. 1987. Conflicts, arms races and war: A synthetic approach. In Peace, defense and economic analysis, edited by C. Schmidt and F. Blackaby, 85-103. New York: St. Martin's.
72.
Lambelet, J. , and U. Luterbacher with P. Allan. 1979. Dynamics of arms races: Mutual stimulation vs. self-stimulation. Journal of Peace Science4:49-66.
73.
Leidy, M. P. , and R. W. Staiger. 1985. Economic issues and methodology in arms race analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution29:503-530.
74.
Levy, J.1988. Domestic politics and war. Journal of Interdisciplinary History18:653-673.
75.
Levy, J. 1989. The diversionary theory of war: A critique. In Handbook of war studies, edited by M. I. Midlarsky, 259-288. Winchester, MA: Unwin Hyman.
76.
Lichbach, M. I.1989. Stability in Richardson's arms races and cooperation in prisoner's dilemma arms rivalries. American Journal of Political Science33:1016-1047.
77.
Lichbach, M. I.1990. When is an arms rivalry a prisoner's dilemma? Richardson's models and 2 × 2 games. Journal of Conflict Resolution34:29-56.
78.
Lindblom, C. E.1959. The science of muddling through. Public Administration Review19:79-88.
79.
Lindblom, C. E. 1965. The intelligence of democracy. New York: Free Press.
80.
Looney, R. E.1989. Internal and external factors in effecting Third World military expenditures. Journal of Peace Research26:33-46.
81.
Lucas, R. E., Jr. 1981. Studies in business-cycle theory. Cambridge: MIT Press.
82.
Lucas, R. E. , and T. Sargent, eds. 1981. Rational expectations and econometric practice. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
83.
Lucier, C. E.1979. Changes in the values of arms race parameters. Journal of Conflict Resolution23:17-39.
84.
Luterbacher, U.1975. Arms race models: Where do we stand?European Journal of Political Research3:199-217.
85.
Majeski, S. J.1983a. Dynamic properties of the U.S. military expenditure decision-making process. Conflict Management and Peace Science7:65-86.
86.
Majeski, S. J.1983b. Mathematical models of the U.S. military expenditure decision-making process. American Journal of Political Science27:485-514.
87.
Majeski, S. J.1984. The role of expectations in arms acquisitions processes: The U.S.-USSR case. International Interactions11:333-356.
88.
Majeski, S. J.1985. Expectations and arms races. American Journal of Political Science29:217-245.
89.
Majeski, S. J.1989. A rule based model of the United States military expenditure decision-making process. International Interactions15:129-154.
90.
Majeski, S. J. , and D. L. Jones. 1981. Arms race modeling: Causality analysis and model specification. Journal of Conflict Resolution25:259-288.
91.
March, J. G. , and H. A. Simon. 1958. Organizations. New York: Wiley.
92.
Marra, R. F.1985. A cybernetic model of the U.S. defense expenditure policy-making process. International Studies Quarterly29:357-384.
93.
McGinnis, M. D.1991. Limits to cooperation: Iterated graduated games and the arms race. International Interactions16:271-293.
94.
McGinnis, M. D. , and J. T. Williams. 1989. Change and stability in superpower rivalry. American Political Science Review83:1101-1123.
95.
McGinnis, M. D., and J. T. Williams. 1991. Correlated equilibria and domestic and international policy games. Working paper, Indiana University, Bloomington.
96.
McGuire, M. C. 1965. Secrecy and the arms race. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
97.
McGuire, M. C.1982. U.S. assistance, Israeli allocation, and the arms race in the Middle East. Journal of Conflict Resolution26:199-235.
98.
Mefford, D. 1987. Analogical reasoning and the definition of the situation: Back to Snyder for concepts and forward to artificial intelligence for method. In New directions in the study of foreign policy, edited by C. F. Hermann, C. W. Kegley, Jr., and J. N. Rosenau, 221-244. Boston: Allen & Unwin.
99.
Milstein, J. S. , and W. C. Mitchell. 1970. Computer simulation of international processes: The Vietnam War and the pre-World War II naval race. Peace Research Society (International) Papers12:117-136.
100.
Mintz, A.1985. The military-industrial complex: American concepts and Israeli realities. Journal of Conflict Resolution29:623-639.
101.
Mintz, A. 1988. The politics of resource allocation in the U.S. Department of Defense: International crises and domestic constraints. Boulder, CO: Westview.
102.
Mintz, A.1989. Guns versus butter: A disaggregated analysis. American Political Science Review83:1285-1293.
103.
Mintz, A. , and A. Hicks. 1984. Military Keynesianism in the United States, 1949-1976: Disaggregating military expenditures and their determination. American Journal of Sociology90:411-417.
104.
Mintz, A. , and M. D. Ward. 1989. The political economy of military spending in Israel. American Political Science Review83:521-533.
105.
Moll, K. D.1974. International conflict as a decision system. Journal of Conflict Resolution18:555-577.
106.
Moll, K. D. , and G. M. Luebbert. 1980. Arms race and military expenditure models: A review. Journal of Conflict Resolution24:153-185.
107.
Morrow, J. D.1988. Social choice and system structure in world politics. World Politics41:75-97.
108.
Morrow, J. D.1989. A twist of truth: A reexamination of the effects of arms races on the occurrence of war. Journal of Conflict Resolution33:500-529.
109.
Most, B. A. , and H. Starr. 1984. International relations theory, foreign policy substitutability, and `nice laws.'World Politics36:383-406.
110.
Most, B. A. , and H. Starr. 1989. Inquiry, logic and international politics. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
111.
Nicholson, M. 1989. Formal theories in international relations. New York: Cambridge University Press.
112.
Nincic, M. , and T. R. Cusack. 1979. The political economy of U.S. military spending. Journal of Peace Research16:101-115.
113.
Olinick, M. 1978. An introduction to mathematical models in the social and life sciences, 19-51. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
114.
Ordeshook, P. C. 1986. Game theory and political theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
115.
Ostrom, C. W., Jr.1977. Evaluating alternative foreign policy decision-making models: An empirical test between an arms race model and an organizational process model. Journal of Conflict Resolution21:235-266.
116.
Ostrom, C. W., Jr.1978. A reactive linkage model of the U.S. defense expenditure policymaking process. American Political Science Review72:941-957.
117.
Ostrom, C. W., Jr. , and R. F. Marra. 1986. U.S. defense spending and the Soviet estimate. American Political Science Review80:819-842.
118.
Prados, J. 1986. The Soviet estimate. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
119.
Rajmaira, S. , and M. D. Ward. 1990. Evolving foreign policy norms: Reciprocity in the superpower triad. International Studies Quarterly34:457-475.
120.
Rapoport, A.1957. Lewis F. Richardson's mathematical theory of war. Journal of Conflict Resolution1:249-299.
121.
Rapoport, A. 1960. Fights, games and debates. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
122.
Rattinger, H.1975. Armaments, detente, and bureaucracy: The arms race in Europe. Journal of Conflict Resolution19:571-595.
123.
Rattinger, H.1976. Econometrics and arms races: A critical review and some extensions. European Journal of Political Research4:421-439.
124.
Richardson, L. F. 1919. Mathematical psychology of war. Published privately.
125.
Richardson, L. F.1939. Generalized foreign policies. British Journal of Psychology Monograph Series, 23. London: Cambridge University Press.
126.
Richardson, L. F. 1960a. Arms and insecurity: A mathematical study of the causes and origins of war. Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press.
127.
Richardson, L. F. 1960b. Statistics of deadly quarrels. Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press.
128.
Riker, W. H. 1982. Liberalism against populism. San Francisco: Freeman.
129.
Russett, B. M.1982. Defense expenditures and national well-being. American Political Science Review76:767-777.
130.
Russett, B. M. 1983a. International interactions and processes: The internal vs. external debate revisited. In Political Science: The State of the Discipline, edited by A. W. Finifter, 541-568. Washington, DC: American Political Science Association.
131.
Russett, B. M. 1983b. The prisoners of insecurity. San Francisco: Freeman.
132.
Russett, B. M. , and H. Starr. 1989. World politics: The menu for choice, 3d ed.New York: Freeman.
133.
Saaty, T. L. 1968. Mathematical models of arms control and disarmament. New York: Wiley.
134.
Saperstein, A. M.1984. Chaos - A model for the outbreak of war. Nature309:303-305.
135.
Saperstein, A. M. , and G. Mayer-Kress. 1988. A nonlinear dynamical model of the impact of SDI on the arms race. Journal of Conflict Resolution32:636-670.
136.
Schrodt, P. A.1978a. Richardson's N-nation model and the balance of power. American Journal of Political Science22:364-390.
137.
Schrodt, P. A.1978b. Statistical problems associated with the Richardson arms race model. Journal of Peace Science3:159-172.
138.
Schrodt, P. A. 1985. Adaptive precedent-based logic and rational choice: A comparison of two approaches to the modeling of international behavior. In Dynamic models of international conflict, edited by U. Luterbacher and M. D. Ward, 373-400. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
139.
Schrodt, P. A.1988. Artificial intelligence and the study of international politics. The American Sociologist19 (Spring):71-85.
140.
Schrodt, P. A. , and M. D. Ward. 1981. Statistical inference in incremental and difference equation formulations. American Journal of Political Science25:815-832.
141.
Seiglie, C.1988. International conflict and military expenditures: An externality approach. Journal of Conflict Resolution32:141-161.
142.
Sheffrin, S. M. 1983. Rational expectations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
143.
Simaan, M. , and J. B. Cruz, Jr.1975. Formulation of Richardson's model of the arms race from a differential game viewpoint. Review of Economic Studies42:67-77.
144.
Simon, H. A. 1947. Administrative behavior. New York: Macmillan.
145.
Simon, H. A. 1957. Models of man. New York: Wiley.
146.
Simon, H. A. 1969. The sciences of the artificial. Cambridge: MIT Press.
147.
Sims, C. A.1980. Macroeconomics and reality. Econometrica48:1-48.
148.
Siverson, R. M. , and P. F. Diehl. 1989. Arms races, the conflict spiral, and the onset of war. In Handbook of war studies, edited by M. I. Midlarsky, 195-218. Winchester, MA: Unwin Hyman.
149.
Smith, R. P.1977. Military expenditure and capitalism. Cambridge Journal of Economics1:61-76.
150.
Smith, R. P.1980. The demand for military expenditure. The Economic Journal90:811-820.
151.
Smoker, P.1964. Fear in the arms race: A mathematical study. Journal of Peace Research1:55-63.
152.
Snidal, D.1985. The game `theory' of international politics. World Politics38:25-57.
153.
Snyder, G. H.1971. Prisoner's dilemma and chicken models in international politics. International Studies Quarterly15:66-103.
154.
Squires, M. L. 1982. Modeling the U.S.-USSR strategic arms race. Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, Bloomington.
155.
Starr, H. , F. Hoole, J. Hart, and J. Freeman. 1984. The relationship between defense spending and inflation. Journal of Conflict Resolution28:103-122.
156.
Stoll, R. J.1982. Let the researcher beware: The use of the Richardson equations to estimate the parameters of a dyadic arms acquisition process. American Journal of Political Science26:77-89.
157.
Strauss, R.1972. An adaptive expectations model of the East-West arms race. Peace Science Society (International) Papers19:29-34.
158.
Stromberg, J. L. 1970. The internal mechanisms of the defense budget process -fiscal 1953-1968. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, RM-6243-PR.
159.
Sylvan, D. A. , A. Goel, and B. Chandrasekaran. 1990. Analyzing political decision making from an information-processing perspective: JESSE. American Journal of Political Science34:74-123.
160.
Taagepera, R.1979/80. Stockpile-budget and ratio interaction models for arms races. Peace Science Society (International) Papers29:67-78.
161.
Wagner, D. L. , R. T. Perkins, and R. Taagepera. 1975. Complete solution to Richardson's arms race equations. Journal of Peace Science1:159-172.
162.
Wallace, M. D.1979. Arms races and escalation: Some new evidence. Journal of Conflict Resolution23:3-16.
163.
Wallace, M. D.1982. Armaments and escalation: Two competing hypotheses. International Studies Quarterly26:37-56.
164.
Wallace, M. D. , and J. M. Wilson. 1978. Non-linear arms race models. Journal of Peace Research15:175-192.
165.
Ward, M. D.1982. Dynamics of cooperation and conflict in foreign policy behavior: Reaction and memory. International Studies Quarterly26:87-126.
166.
Ward, M. D.1984. Differential paths to parity: A study of the contemporary arms race. American Political Science Review78:297-317.
167.
Ward, M. D.1987. Cargo cult social science and eight fallacies of comparative political research. International Studies Notes13:75-77.
168.
Ward, M. D. , and A. K. Mahajan. 1984. Defense expenditures, security threats, and governmental deficits: A case study of India, 1952-1979. Journal of Conflict Resolution28:382-419.
169.
Weinberg, S. 1977. The first three minutes. New York: Basic.
170.
Wildavsky, A. 1964. The politics of the budgetary process. Boston: Little, Brown.
171.
Williams, J. T.1990. The political manipulation of macroeconomic policy. American Political Science Review84:767-795.
172.
Williams, J. T. , and M. D. McGinnis. 1988. Sophisticated reaction in the U.S.-Soviet arms race: Evidence of rational expectations. American Journal of Political Science32:968-995.
173.
Williams, J. T. 1991. The dimension of superpower rivalry: A dynamic factor analysis. Working paper, Indiana University, Bloomington.
174.
Williams, J. T. Forthcoming. Expectations and the dynamics of U.S. defense budgets. In The political economy of military spending in the United States, edited by Alex Mintz. Winchester, MA: Unwin Hyman.
175.
Wittman, D.1989. Why democracies produce efficient results. Journal of Political Economy97:1395-1424.
176.
Wohlstetter, A.1974a. Is there a strategic arms race?Foreign Policy15:3-20.
177.
Wohlstetter, A.1974b. Rivals, but no race. Foreign Policy16:48-81.
178.
Wolfson, M.1968. A mathematical model of the cold war. Peace Research Society (International) Papers9:107-123.
179.
Wolfson, M.1985. Notes on economic warfare. Conflict Management and Peace Science8:1-20.
180.
Zagare, F. C. 1987. The dynamics of deterrence. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
181.
Zinnes, D. A. 1976. Contemporary research in international relations. New York: Free Press.
182.
Zinnes, D. A.1980. Three puzzles in search of a researcher. International Studies Quarterly24:315-342.
183.
Zinnes, D. A. , J. V. Gillespie, and G. S. Tahim. 1978a. A formal analysis of some issues in balance of power theories. International Studies Quarterly22:323-356.
184.
Zinnes, D. A.1978b. Modeling a chimera: The balance of power revisited. Journal of Peace Science3:31-44.
185.
Zinnes, D. A. , B. J. Hill, D. L. Jones, and S. J. Majeski. 1982. Modeling precrisis interactions. In Missing elements in political inquiry, edited by Judith Gillespie and D. Zinnes, 117-140. Beverly Hills: Sage.
186.
Zinnes, D. A. , and R. G. Muncaster. 1984. The dynamics of hostile activity and the prediction of war. Journal of Conflict Resolution28:187-229.
187.
Zuk, G. , and N. R. Woodbury. 1986. U.S. defense spending, electoral cycles, and Soviet-American relations. Journal of Conflict Resolution30:445-468.
