Trigger-Response Transitions in Foreign Policy Crises,1929-1985

Abstract

This article focuses on the behavior-begets-behavior dynamic in the context of the interactions of states in crisis. Matching behavior is defined as a reciprocal relationship between incoming behavior (crisis trigger) and outgoing behavior (crisis response). A model of matching or reciprocal behavior is proposed, and several factors — threat to basic values, sociopolitical conditions, and power relations among crisis actors — are examined from the perspective of their potential disruption of the matching process. An initial finding is that crises, like the much more heavily studied conflict processes in general, exhibit a very high degree of matching behavior. However, there is considerable evidence that the factors examined here contribute to the disruption of these processes. A low threat to decision makers' values provides a context in which decision makers may respond with violence to nonviolent crisis triggers. Similarly, deteriorating sociopolitical conditions in countries experiencing a foreign policy crisis contribute to a higher than expected level of violence in crisis behavior. Finally, power parity among crisis actors was found to contribute to disruptions in matching behavior.