Propositions about determinants of political violence at the cross-national level are derived from rational action theory and tested across the entire population of independent states in the mid-1970s. The data support two rational action hypotheses: Rates of domestic political violence are higher at intermediate levels of both regime repressiveness and negative sanctions than at either low or high levels of these indicators of institutionalized and behavioral coercion. Two hypotheses that can be interpreted within either a rational action or a deprivation framework also are supported: High rates of economic growth reduce the incidence of political violence, and potential separatism increases the incidence of violence. A deprivation hypothesis that high life expectancy reduces the incidence of political violence is not supported. Overall, this set of findings favors a rational action rather than a deprivation approach to explaining why nations differ in rates of political violence.
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