This article deals with the pregame phase of a three-person chicken game in which each player obtains joint gains so long as at least two of the three cooperate. Players have repeated opportunities to commit themselves to noncooperation in the pregame. As observations of others' pregame behavior are made, players may come to perceive their best strategy as commitments, even if they did not initially do so. It is shown that relatively few pregames end with joint gains foregone. Applications to international and domestic politics are suggested.
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