One criterion for evaluating a nation's military structure is its impact on crisis stability. This article presents a model to capture the process of interacting expectations that determines whether initial suspicions are sufficient to cause one or both nations to strike rather than wait during a crisis. The model can be used to assess the impact on crisis stability of specific changes in military structure. For example, the impact of a population defense depends on whether it is “thin,”“thick,” or “brick.” Also, the verification requirements of an offensive weapons arms control agreement affect crisis stability.
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