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Abstract

There are differences between what the United States says and does with regard to strategic arms. There are also differences between policies that are ideal from a uniquely U.S. perspective and from a broader alliance perspective. These two sets of differences correspond to one another; the latter help to explain the former. Furthermore, recent discussions of arms reduction options, such as Nalebuff (1988), fail to consider the differences between national and alliance points of view. Arguments for minimal deterrence do not account for the damaging effects on alliance relations. A clear understanding of the different perspectives, which consequently pull U.S. policy in different directions, is necessary to see the genuine merits of various options under discussion for future agreements. American alliance commitments help to explain the divergence.

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Stability and Alliance Cohesion

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