Flawed arguments often recur in debates on U.S. security policy long after their weaknesses have been exposed. In this article I argue that certain political misconceptions and fallacies resist counterargument because they are reinforced by particular reasoning shortcuts known as “cognitive heuristics.” Although heuristics save time and mental work, they can lead to error because they are based on violable assumptions. I discuss seven different cognitive heuristics and the particular security fallacies they perpetuate — from the domino theory to the idea that deterrence requires force matching. Finally, the scope and limitations of such psychological explanations will be discussed.
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