Forty-eight groups participated once in an intergroup conflict in which two groups of equal or unequal size competed for the provision of step-level (binary) public goods. The study included a two-factorial design with preplay communication versus no preplay communication defining one dimension, and equal group size versus unequal group size defining the other. The decision to contribute or not toward the provision of the good was made privately and anonymously. Both the relative group size and communication conditions affected the level of contribution. The findings support a model predicting that within-group discussion results in a two-person game between the two groups, each of which uses the maximin criterion to designate a number of contributors. This criterion does not necessarily maximize group reward, enhance contribution, or guarantee efficient provision of the good.
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