Since Lewis F. Richardson's seminal contribution in arms race modeling, there has been a proliferation of arms race models in journals and books across many disciplines. Despite this proliferation, there are some fundamental methodological problems associated with Richardson-type models and the arms race modeling enterprise in general that have not been adequately addressed. We discuss these methodological problems and offer some suggestions on where the arms race modeling enterprise should head.
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