Relational Exchange Norms,Perceptions of Unfairness,and Retained Hostility in Commercial Litigation

Abstract

Relational Exchange Theory suggests that the norms that govern commercial exchange behavior in discrete transactions are markedly different from those in relational exchange. When parties to commercial exchange become involved in a manifest conflict episode, it might be expected that the types of norms that govern their relationship will affect their characterization of each other's conflict behavior. This article proposes a model of conflict in commercial exchange relationships. The model focuses on how the prevailing exchange norms of solidarity, role integrity, and mutuality impact a party's perception of unfair treatment, and how causal attributions mediate those effects. The perception of unfairness is then linked to the level of hostility that is retained after the conflict episode ostensibly has been terminated. Several hypotheses are tested using a sample of firms engaged in contract litigation. The norm of solidarity and its interaction with the causal attribution measure are found to be significantly related to the level of perceived unfairness. Perceived unfairness is also significantly related to retained hostility.

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