This article develops a rational theory of minimal nuclear deterrence: What is the minimal amount of weapons needed to maintain a stable balance of power? By searching for the requirements of minimal nuclear deterrence, we hope to gain a better understanding of how to proceed with arms reduction without compromising the value of deterrence.
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