International Conflict and Military Expenditures

Abstract

This article analyzes the two-stage problem a country faces in first choosing the optimal amount of arms to acquire and then deciding whether it can improve upon the allocation that emerges after the first stage by engaging in a military conflict. A model is introduced based on the concept of economic externality to generate conflict situations in the first stage. Then comparative static results are derived by varying the parameters of this model, for example, the rate of technological progress in the military sector and the rate of economic growth, and examining whether the conflict situation improves or worsens as the social welfare of the nations change accordingly. Uncertainty is then introduced and the results are analyzed. Finally, the last part explores the conditions under which the conflict situations presented in the first stage actually lead to the outbreak of war.

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

References

Brito, D. L. and M. D. Intrilligator (1977) “Nuclear proliferation and the armaments race.” J. of Peace Sci. 2: 213-218.

Brito, D. L. and M. D. Intrilligator (1985) “Conflict, war, and redistribution.” Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 79: 943-957.

Bueno de Mesquita, B. (1981) The War Trap. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, B. (1985) “The war trap revisited: a revised expected utility model.” Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 79: 156-173.

Chatterjee, P. (1974) “The equilibrium theory of arms races: some extensions.” J. of Peace Research 11: 203-211.

Connolly, M. (1970) “Public goods, externalities and international relations.” J. of Pol. Economy 78 (2): 279-290.

Intrilligator, M. D. and D. L. Brito (1984) “Can arms races lead to the outbreak of war?” J. of Conflict Resolution 28: 63-84.

Lambelet, J. (1973) “Towards a dynamic two-theater model of the East-West arms race.” J. of Peace Sci. 1 (1): 1-38.

Russett, B. (1983) “International interactions and processes: the Internal vs. External debate revisited,” in A. W. Finifter (ed.) Political Science: The State of the Discipline. Washington, DC: American Political Science Association.

10.

Wittman, D. (1979). “How a war ends: a rational model approach.” J. of Conflict Resolution 23: 743-763.