Toward the Global Optimization Model of Peace Defense

Abstract

This article proposes and develops a simple model of peace defense for the calculation of the optimal parameters of peace-building activity on different governmental and nongovernmental stages. The hierarchical structure of the model permits the use of different approaches and greater flexibility than existing models allow. At some stages of the model, the optimum criterion is the minimization of the probability of war, or (in a wider range) the “war potential”; at other stages, the criteria are more specific (for example, the minimization of time that is needed to realize the planned disarmament. Several qualitative results are derived from the model, including the formal description of a process of possible replacement of nuclear deterrence as a tool of international stability by the independent peace movement.

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