Competition among bureaus is often advanced as a solution to overproduction by monopoly bureaus. Further, competition tends to be viewed as some kind of natural state which bureaus will willingly gravitate to if given the opportunity. Beginning with the theoretical extensions of Niskanen to multiple bureaus, this article examines experimentally the effect of a competitive agenda proposal process on the outcomes of three-person committee games. The results suggest that simply duplicating the functions of a bureau is insufficient to generate increased efficiency. The success or failure of competitive reforms depends on the structure these reforms take, both in terms of the number of agenda setters and the level of communication between agenda setters and committee members.
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