Experimental, computer-simulation, and inter-nation studies concerning effective strategies for eliciting cooperation from an adversary are reviewed. The laboratory and inter-nation studies are consistent in indicating that a policy of general reciprocity, combined with the use of unilateral cooperative initiatives to break out of lock-ins on mutual competition, generally is effective in gaining an adversary's cooperation. The conditions under which this strategy is likely to be effective are examined also.
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