This article identifies factors that help explain terrorist success in hostage-taking events. Two measures of success are examined: logistical success and negotiation success. In the empirical estimations, we regress the log of the odds ratio against various sets of explanatory variables. For both sets of models, the statistical results are robust to changes in the explanatory variables. Our results are compared with propositions derived from the economic theory of bargaining; these propositions are partly supported by our findings. The article also sketches the choice-theoretic model faced by a terrorist during the planning and negotiating stages of a hostage mission.
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