Issue Linkage and the Evolution of International Cooperation

Abstract

This article extends Axelrod's results concerning the evolution of cooperation to situations in which a pair of individuals is simultaneously engaged in several continuing interactions, all of the Prisoners' Dilemma type. It is shown formally that in such a PD multisupergame, players may adopt strategies that create linkages across time and games, thus opening up new opportunities for cooperative outcomes in games for which cooperation would not be rational if considered in isolation. However, such linkage-based cooperation is often very brittle, in that attempts to include or delete issues may shatter the existing basis of cooperation. Numerical examples are given to demonstrate the wide variety of possible cooperative equilibria and the sensitivity of these equilibria to small changes in the payoffs of each game. Some implications for the evolution of arms control and other international regimes are discussed.

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

References

Axelrod, R. (1981) “The emergence of cooperation among egoists.” Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 75: 306-318.

Axelrod, R. (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.

Brams, S. J. (1985) Superpower Games. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.

Hardin, R. (1982) Collective Action. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins.

Kissinger, H. (1979) White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown.

Levy, S. A. (1975) “INTELSAT: technology, politics, and the transformation of a regime.” Int. Organization 29: 655-680.

Luce, R. D. and H. Raiffa (1957) Games and Decisions. New York: Wiley.

Mueller, D. C. (1979) Public Choice. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Rubin, J. Z. and B. R. Brown (1975) The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation. New York: Academic Press.

10.

Russett, B. (1983) The Prisoners of Insecurity. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

11.

Sebenius, J. K. (1983) “Negotiation arithmetic: adding and subtracting issues and parties.” Int. Organization 37: 281-316.

12.

Shubik, M. (1970) “Game theory, behavior, and the paradox of the prisoners' dilemma: three solutions.” J. of Conflict Resolution 14: 181-194.

13.

Snidal, D. (1981) “Interdependence, regimes, and international cooperation.” PhD dissertation, Yale University.

14.

Stein, A. (1980) “The politics of linkage.” World Politics 33: 62-81.

15.

Stein, A. (1982) “Coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world.” Int. Organization 36: 299-324.

16.

Taylor, M. (1976) Anarchy and Cooperation. London: Wiley.

17.

Tollison, R. D. and T. D. Willett (1979) “An economic theory of mutually advantageous issue linkages in international negotiations.” Int. Organization 33: 425-449.

18.

Ulam, A. V. (1983) Dangerous Relations. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.

19.

Westell, A. (1981) “Poison pinpricks.” Foreign Policy 41: 95-111.