Primitive measures of utility—identified simply as positive (+), neutral (0), or negative (-)—were used in experimental work to show important differences in two-person co-operation between different structures, even though these structures have an identical rank-ordering of possible choices. Interpersonal comparisons and considerations of equity appear to account for the differences in results. It is suggested that further experimental use of primitive measures might be helpful in clarifying how interpersonal comparisons may affect emergent processes of cooperation in two-party situations.
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