This article reviews the recent contributions of economic analysis to the literature concerned with the process of national arms accumulation and the potential for arms control and disarmament. The role of formal model building as an aid to understanding the armament process is discussed. The existing economic literature in this area is organized and reviewed on the basis of the different modeling approaches that have been explored to date. Finally, strands of economic thought that have not yet been introduced into the arms race literature are explored, with the purpose of suggesting further applications of the economic approach to this important area of analysis.
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