While the problem of war in general deserves continuing scholarly attention, it seems appropriate to single out the systemwide—that is, global—war for intensive analysis as the kind of war that poses the gravest threat of catastrophe. Such a war can best be understood as an integral part of a long cycle, a recurring pattern in the development and operation of the global layer of the international system. From this perspective the design of a solution to the problem of global war requires either disruption of the long cycle or the development of a functional substitute for the leadership selection process that these wars have provided for the global system. The dominant contemporary solution to the problem, nuclear deterrence, ignores this perspective, and thereby overestimates the long-term utility and viability of deterrence. Deterrence theory also fails to provide a satisfactory explanation as to why and how deterrence works. Thus we must search for a creative alternative; and while its exact nature cannot be described, some relevant lines of inquiry can be identified.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Beer, F. (1981) Peace Against War.San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
2.
Betts, R. (1982) Surprise Attack. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
3.
Bull, H. (1981) “Future conditions of strategic deterrence,” in C. Bertram (ed.) The Future of Strategic Deterrence. London: Macmillan.
4.
Bueno de Mesquita, B. (1980) The War Trap. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
5.
Carr, E. H. (1939) The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939. London: Macmillan.
6.
Freedman, L. (1981) The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. New York: St. Martin's.
7.
George, A. and R. Smoke (1974) Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
8.
Gilpin, R. (1981) War and Change in World Politics. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.
9.
Gray, C. and K. Payne (1980) “Victory is possible.”Foreign Policy39 (Summer): 14-27.
10.
IklÉ, F. (1973) “Can nuclear deterrence last out the century?”Foreign Affairs (January): 267-285.
11.
James, W. (1910) “The moral equivalent of war.”Int. Conciliation27 (February).
12.
Jervis, R. (1976) Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
13.
Johansen, R. (1983) “Toward an alternative security system.” World Policy Paper 24. New York: World Publishing.
14.
Kahn, H. (1960) On Thermonuclear War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
15.
Kennan, G. (1982) The Nuclear Delusion. New York: Pantheon.
16.
Knorr, K. and P. Morgan (1983) Strategic Military Surprise. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
17.
Kohler, G. (1981) “Approaches to the study of the causes of war.”UNESCO Yearbook of Peace and Conflict Studies 1980. Paris: UNESCO.
18.
Kugler, J. (1984) “Terror without deterrence: reassessing the role of nuclear weapons.”J. of Conflict Resolution28, 3: 470-506.
19.
Lebow, R. N. (1981) Between Peace and War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.
20.
Levy, J., Jr. (1983) War in the Modern Great Power System 1495-1975. Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky Press.
21.
Lippman, W. (1928) “The political equivalent of war.”Atlantic Monthly (August): 181-187.
22.
Mahan, A. T. (1911) Naval Strategy. Boston: Little, Brown.
23.
Martin, L. (1980) Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.
24.
Merton, R. K. (1968) Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: Free Press.
25.
Midlarsky, M. (1975) On War: Political Violence in the International System. New York: Free Press.
26.
Modelski, G. (1984) “Global wars and world leadership selection.”Second World Peace Science Congress, Rotterdam, June.
27.
Modelski, G. (1983) “Long cycles of world leadership: an annotated bibliography.”Int. Studies Notes10 (Fall): 1-6.
28.
Modelski, G. (1978) “The long cycle of global politics and the nation-state.”Comparative Studies in Society and History20, 2: 214-223.
29.
Morgan, P. (1983) Deterrence, a Conceptual Analysis. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
30.
Newman, B. and M. Dando [eds.] (1982) Nuclear Deterrence: Implications and Policy Options for the 1980's. Tunbridge Wells, KY: Castle House Publications.
31.
Olson, M. (1982) The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
32.
Organski, A.F.K. (1968) World Politics. New York: Knopf.
33.
Organski, A.F.K. and J. Kugler (1980) The War Ledger. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.
34.
Polsby, N. (1984) Policy Innovation in America. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
35.
Rasler, K. A. and W. R. Thompson (1983a) “Global wars, public debts, and the long cycle.”World Politics34 (July): 489-515.
36.
Rasler, K. A. (1983b) “War-making and statemaking: governmental expenditures, tax revenues, and global wars.”Int. Studies Association Annual Meeting, Mexico City, April.
37.
Roberts, A. [ed.] (1967) The Strategy of Civilian Defense. London: Faber & Faber.
38.
Schelling, T. (1966) Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
39.
Sharp, G. (1980) Social Power and Political Freedom. New York: Porter Sargent.
40.
Sharp, G. (1965) “The political equivalent of war—civilian defense.”Int. Conciliation555 (November).
41.
Singer, J. and M. Small (1972) The Wages of War 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook. New York: John Wiley.
42.
Smith, T. (1983) Trojan Peace: Some Deterrence Propositions Tested. Denver: Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver.
Snyder, G. and P. Diesing (1977) Conflict among Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
45.
Stein, J. G. (1985) “Calculation, miscalculation, and conventional deterrence: the view from Cairo,” in R. Jerviset al. (eds.) Psychology and Deterrence. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.
46.
Steinberg, J. (1965) Yesterday's Deterrent. New York: Macmillan.
47.
Stephenson, C. M. [ed.] (1982) Alternative Methods for International Security. Washington, DC: Univ. Press of America.
48.
Thompson, W. R. [ed.] (1983a) Contending Approaches to World System Analysis. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
49.
Thompson, W. R. (1983b) “Uneven economic growth, systemic challenges and global wars.”Int. Studies Q.27 (September): 342-355.
50.
Thompson, W. R. and G. Zuk (1982) “War, inflation, and Kondratieff'slong waves.” J. of Conflict Resolution26 (December): 621-644.
51.
Toynbee, A. (1954) A Study of History, Vol. 9. London: Oxford Univ. Press.
52.
Tuchman, B. (1961) The Guns of August. New York: Macmillan.
53.
van der Dennen, H. (1981) “On war: concepts, definitions, research data: a short literature survey and bibliography.”UNESCO Yearbook of Peace and Conflict Studies 1980. Paris: UNESCO.
54.
Wallace, M. (1982) “Armaments and Escalation.”Int. Studies Q.26, 1: 37-56.
55.
Wright, Q. (1942) A Study of War. Chicago: Chicago Univ. Press.
