Indian and Canadian Behavior in Two-Person Power Games

Abstract

Two experiments are reported that contrast the behavior of East Indian and Canadian university students in two different two-person “power” games. In the first study each participant could affect the other's outcomes but one was able to exert more control than the other. It was found that both advantaged and disadvantaged Indians were less generous than their Canadian counterparts and that disadvantaged subjects, in both cultures, were less generous than advantaged subjects. Also, the Indians were more likely than the Canadians to “retaliate” after the other had withheld points but the Canadians were more responsive to retaliation. In the second study, the advantaged subject could not affect the disadvantaged subject's outcomes but the disadvantaged subject could, at his discretion, donate points to the advantaged subject who could place himself in a position to accept or avoid them. In this situation the disadvantaged Canadians were less generous than the disadvantaged Indians and the advantaged Indians avoided the “donation” more often than the advantaged Canadians. The relationship of these results to previous comparisons between the two cultures are noted and factors that may account for the observed differences are discussed.

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