Nuclear deterrence may be a useful political strategy, but it may not provide an effective empirical description of the behavior of nations faced with the prospect of major war. This evaluation is based on two tests. Empirical analysis of extreme crises since 1945 fails to detect substantial changes in interaction between nuclear and non-nuclear nations. Further, there is no evidence that nuclear weapons have added stability to the relation between the three nuclear giants. The terror created by nuclear devastation cannot, in sum, be directly linked to the preservation of peace.
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