Excessive attention over the years to issues contained within the confines of the concept of the strategic balance have had notable consequences—generally by limiting attention to but one perspective on an extraordinarily complex and dynamic problem and specifically by ignoring critical command and control aspects of the whole. This article elaborates the theme of neglect and its consequences and then identifies and assembles many of the missing, but essential, pieces of the “C3I Puzzle.”
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