By applying the criteria suggested by Lakatos for comparing rival theories, I show that the expected utility research program developed in The War Trap has yielded an integrative, fairly comprehensive theory that has provided a better empirical understanding of international conflict than any widely tested alternative. I go on to demonstrate that Majeski and Sylvan are mistaken with regard to their criticisms of the accuracy, importance, relevance, and fairness of the theory set out in The War Trap. Also, I show that they have misunderstood fundamental aspects of the theory and have, therefore, attributed premises and characteristics to it that it does not possess.
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