The possible relationships of an arms race to the outbreak of war are treated in the framework of a dynamic model of a missile war that could be used by defense planners to simulate the outbreak of war between two nuclear nations. It is shown that, depending on the initial and final configuration of weapons on both sides, an arms race could lead not only to war but to peace. Conversely, a disarming race could lead not only to peace but to war. The analytic framework is also applied to a qualitative arms race to show that such a race can promote crisis instability. These results are applied both to questions of disarmament and arms control and to the U.S.-Soviet postwar arms race. A conclusion of this analysis is that the quantitative U.S.-Soviet arms race of the 1960s and 1970s not only reduced the chances of war outbreak but also provided insurance against qualitative improvements in weapons.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Beaufre, A. (1965) Deterrence and Strategy (R. H. Barry, trans.). New York: Praeger.
2.
Brito, D. L. and M. D. Intriligator (1974) “Uncertainty and the stability of the armaments race.”Annals of Econ. and Social Measurement3: 279-292.
3.
Brito, D. (1973) “Some applications of the maximum principle to the problem of an armaments race.”Modeling and Simulation4: 140-144.
4.
Gray, C. S. (1976) The Soviet-American Arms Race. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
5.
Gray, C. S (1975) “Arms races and their influence upon international stability with specific reference to the Middle East,” in G. Sheffer (ed.) Dynamics of a Conflict. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
6.
Gray, C. S (1971) “The arms race phenomenon.”World Politics24: 39-79.
7.
Holsti, O. R. (1972) Crisis, Escalation, War. Montreal: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press.
8.
Huntington, S. P. (1958) “Arms races: prerequisites and results.”Public Policy8: 41-86.
9.
Intriligator, M. D. (1982) “Research on conflict theory: analytic approaches and areas of application.”J. of Conflict Resolution26: 307-327.
10.
Intriligator, M. D (1975) “Strategic considerations in the Richardson model of arms races.”J. of Pol. Economy83: 339-353.
11.
Intriligator, M. D (1968) “The debate over missile strategy: targets and rates of fire.”Orbis11: 1138-1159.
12.
Intriligator, M. D (1967) Strategy in a Missile War: Targets and Rates of Fire. Security Studies Paper No. 10. Los Angeles: Security Studies Project, University of California, Los Angeles.
13.
Intriligator, M. D and D. L. Brito (1977) “Strategy, arms races, and arms control,” in J. V. Gillespie and D. A. Zinnes (eds.) Mathematical Systems in International Relations Research. New York: Praeger Publishers.
14.
Intriligator, M. D and D. L. Brito (1976) “Formal models of arms races.”J. of Peace Sci.2: 77-88.
15.
Kybal, D. (1960) “Remarks,” in Proceedings of the National Security Seminar, Asilomar, California, April 24-30.
16.
Lambelet, J. C. (1976) “Complementary analysis of the Anglo-German dreadnought race, 1905-1916.” Papers of the Peace Research Society (International) 26: 49-66.
17.
Lambelet, J. C (1975) “Do arms races lead to war?”J. of Peace Research12: 123-128.
18.
Lambelet, J. C (1973) “Toward a dynamic two-theater model of the East-West arms race,”J. of Peace Sci.1: 1-38.
19.
Lambelet, J. C (1971) “A dynamic model of the arms race in the Middle East, 1953-1965.”General Systems16: 145-167.
20.
Pruitt, D. G. and R. C. Snyder (1969) Theory and Research on the Causes of War. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
21.
Rapoport, A. (1957) “Lewis Fry Richardson's mathematical theory of war.”J. of Conflict Resolution1: 249-304.
22.
Richardson, L. F. (1960) Arms and Insecurity. Pittsburgh: The Boxwood Press.
23.
Richardson, L. F (1951) “Could an arms race end without fighting?”Nature, September29: 567-568.
24.
Russett, B. M. [ed.] (1972) Peace, War, and Numbers. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
25.
Saaty, T. L. (1968) Mathematical Models of Arms Control and Disarmament. New York: John Wiley.
26.
Saaty, T. L (1964) “A model for the control of arms. Operations Research 12.
27.
Schelling, T. C. (1966) Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
28.
Singer, J. D. (1981) “Accounting for international war: the state of the discipline.”J. of Peace Research18: 1-18.
29.
Smith, T. C. (1980) “Arms race instability and war.”J. of Conflict Resolution24: 253-284.
30.
Szilard, L. (1964) “`Minimal deterrent' vs. saturation parity.”Bull. of the Atomic Scientists20: 6-12.
31.
Wallace, M. D. (1982) “Armaments and escalation: two competing hypotheses,”Int. Studies Q.26: 37-56.
32.
Wallace, M. D (1979) “Arms races and escalation: some new evidence.”J. of Conflict Resolution23: 3-16.
33.
Wallace, M. D (1972) War and Rank Among Nations. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
34.
Wohlstetter, A. (1959) “The delicate balance of terror.”Foreign Affairs37: 211-234.
