The existence and prevalence of behavior inconsistent with economists' definition of self-interest is measured in an experimental context. Experimental situations involving choices with monetary payoffs are designed to induce preferences. The subjects' behaviors are used to measure the existence and intensity of various forms of motivation based on “interactive preference functions.” Explicitly, we test for altruistic, egalitarian, and difference maximizing behaviors. Attempts to explain the nonself-interested choices by psychological and ideological constructs are not successful but statistical relationships between these choices and partisan political preferences are found.
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