Cooperators,Competitors,and Response to GRIT

Abstract

Eighty-seven subjects were classified as cooperators and competitors. They then participated in a 30-trial Prisoner's Dilemma situation with a simulated other who, after 10 trials of 50% cooperation, followed one of three strategies during the next 10 trials: GRIT, tit-for-tat, or 100% cooperation. As predicted, competitors as well as cooperators responded cooperatively only to the GRIT strategy. During the final 10 trials, which were 100% cooperative in all three conditions, the cooperators were somewhat more cooperative than the competitors. In postexperimental ratings, competitors estimated people in general to be more competitive and untruthful than did cooperators. They also rated themselves as more competitive than did cooperators.

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

References

Bixenstine, V. E. , B. Lowenfeld , and C. E. Englehart (1981) “Role enactment versus typology: another test of the triangle hypothesis.” J. of Personality and Social Psychology 41: 776-788.

Garner, K. and M. Deutsch (1974) “Cooperative behavior in dyads: effects of dissimilar goal orientations and differing expectations about the partner.” J. of Conflict Resolution 18: 634-645.

Kelley, H. H. and A. J. Stahelski (1970a) “Social interaction basis of cooperators'and competitors' beliefs about others.” J. of Personality and Social Psychology 16: 66-91.

Kelley, H. H. and A. J. Stahelski (1970b) `Errors in perception of intentions in a mixed-motive game.” J. of Experimental Social Psychology 6: 379-400.

Kelley, H. H. and A. J. Stahelski (1970c) “The interference of intentions from moves in the Prisoner's Dilemma game.” J. of Experimental Social Psychology 6: 401-419.

Kuhlman, D. M. and A.F.J. Marshello (1975) “Individual differences in game motivation as moderators of preprogrammed strategy effects in Prisoner's Dilemma.” J. of Personality and Social Psychology 32: 922-931.

Kuhlman, D. M. and Wimberley, D. L. (1976) “Expectations of choice behavior held by cooperators, competitors, and individualists across four classes of experimental game.” J. of Personality and Social Psychology 34: 69-81.

Lacy, W. B. (1978) “Assumptions of human nature, and initial expectations and behavior as mediators of sex effects in Prisoner's Dilemma research.” J. of Conflict Resolution 22: 269-281.

Lindskold, S. (1979) “Conciliation with simultaneous or sequential interaction: variations in trustworthiness and vulnerability in the Prisoner's Dilemma.” J. of Conflict Resolution 23: 704-714.

10.

Lindskold, S. (1978) “Trust development, the GRIT proposal, and the effects of conciliatory acts on conflict and cooperation.” Psych. Bull. 85: 772-793.

11.

Lindskold, S. and J. R. Aronoff (1980) “Conciliatory strategies and relative power.” J. of Experimental Social Psychology 16: 187-198.

12.

Lindskold, S. and M. G. Collins (1978) “Inducing cooperation by groups and individuals: applying Osgood's GRIT strategy.” J. of Conflict Resolution 22: 679-690.

13.

Lindskold, S. and M. L. Finch (1981) “Styles of announcing conciliation.” J. of Conflict Resolution 25: 145-155.

14.

Miller, D. T. and J. G. Holmes (1975) “The role of situational restrictiveness on self-fulfilling prophecies: a theoretical and empirical extension of Kelley and Stahelski's triangle hypothesis.” J. of Personality and Social Psychology 31: 661-673.

15.

Osgood, C. E. (1979) “GRIT for MBFR: a proposal for unfreezing force-level postures in Europe.” Peace Research Reviews 8, 2: 77-92.

16.

Osgood, C. E. (1962) An Alternative to War or Surrender. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press.

17.

Schlenker, B. R. and H. J. Goldman (1978) “Cooperators and competitors in conflict: a test of the `triangle model.”' J. of Conflict Resolution 22: 393-410.