A set of hypotheses derived from experiential learning and a realpolitik orientation to crisis bargaining are employed to investigate the bargaining behavior of pairs of states embroiled in recurring crises. It is proposed that in crisis bargaining, experiential learning focuses on the outcome of the preceding crisis, and the lessons drawn from that experience are interpreted in accordance with a realpolitik orientation that stresses the importance of a credible demonstration of power and resolve. The hypotheses predict that in crises between states of relatively equal military capabilities, successful outcomes encourage policymakers to repeat the bargaining strategy employed in the previous crisis, while failures lead to more coercive bargaining in the next crisis. Employing events data from a sample of 18 disputes among 6 pairs of states, each pair having been engaged in three successive crises, a significant pattern of shifts to more coercive bargaining following crises with unsuccessful outcomes was found.
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